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Case No. 20090771
in the

Utah Supreme Court
VON LESTER TAYLOR,
PETITIONER/APPELLANT,

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
RESPONDENT/APPELLEE.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Taylor appeals from the denial of his second petition for post-conviction relief
challenging his two convictions for Capital Homicide. This Court has jurisdiction under
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(i) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the district court properly dismiss Taylor's successive post-conviction

claims because they are procedurally barred?
Standard of Review. This Court "review[s] an appeal from an order dismissing or
denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower
court's conclusions of law." Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, f 13, 156 P.3d 739 (internal
quotations and case cites omitted).
2.

Do the newly amended provisions of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act apply

to Taylor's successive petition?

Standard of Review.

6m

Whether a statute operates retroactively is a question of law,

which we review for correctness without deference to the district court." Evans &
Sutherland Computer Corp., v. Utah State Tax Comm., 953 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1997).
3.

As an alternative basis for relief, may this Court affirm because Taylor's

claims are time-barred under the PCRA and do not meet the "interests ofjustice" exception?
Standard of Review. What meets the "interests of justice" exception to the PCRA
time bar is a legal determination to be made in accordance with precedent from this court
under a de novo standard of review. Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, If 8, 123 P.3d 400.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Copies of the following statutes and rules are included as addendum F.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

United States Const. Amend. VI.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12.
28 United States Code § 2265(a)(1) - formerly § 2261(c).
Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102, 104 - 107 and 109
Former Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-102, 104 through 107 and 109.
Capital Sentence Cases, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-202.
Former Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202.
Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence, Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-402
through 404.
Capital felony - Sentencing proceeding, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.
Jurors selected from random cross section, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-103,
formerly §78-46-3
Rights of Crime Victims Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-9(7).
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C, Post-Conviction Relief.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(e) - Change of Venue.
Utah Rule of Evidence 606 - Competency of Juror as Witness.
Utah Rule of Evidence 1101(b)(3) - Applicability of Rules.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Taylor with two counts of capital murder for murdering Beth Potts
and Kay Tiede. The State also charged Taylor with attempted aggravated murder of Rolph
Tiede; aggravated arson; two counts of aggravated kidnapping of Linae Tiede and Trisha
Tiede; aggravated robbery; theft of the Tiede's car; and failure to respond to an officer's
signal to stop (TR2-5).1
Taylor pled guilty to two capital homicide charges, and the State dismissed the other
charges (TR105-116, 2517). A jury sentenced Taylor to death for each murder. State v.
Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 683 (Utah 1997), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998) {Taylor I).
After the jury imposed sentence, Taylor moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. The trial
court denied the motion (TR250-51, 281). Taylor appealed. During the direct appeal, this
Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on trial counsel's effectiveness. After six
days of hearings, the trial court found that Taylor had not been deprived of his Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel (TR1134-52, 1179-94). This Court
affirmed. State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681 (1998) {Taylor I). The United States Supreme Court
denied review. Taylor v. Utah 525 U.S. 833 (1998).
On February 23, 1998, counsel was appointed to represent Taylor in State postconviction proceedings (PCR 1105). One year later, Taylor filed his first State postconviction petition (PCR 1). The parties stipulated that Taylor could file an amended
1

TR refers to the record in the underlying criminal case. PCR refers to the postconviction record in the first post-conviction case. R refers to the post-conviction record in
the second post-conviction case - the matter that is currently on appeal.
3

petition (PCR134).

Over three years later, Taylor filed his First Amended Petition

(PCR512). The State moved for summary judgment on all of Taylor's claims (PCR819,
823). After full briefing and argument, the post-conviction court granted summary judgment
and denied post-conviction relief (PCR1928-67). Taylor timely appealed (PCR1977). This
Court affirmed. Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, 156 P.3d 739 {Taylor II).
On September 4, 2007, Taylor filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, case
no. 2:07-CV-00194-TC. The federal case has been stayed pending the outcome of Taylor's
successive state petition for post-conviction relief.
On November 5,2007, Taylor filed a second state petition for post-conviction relief.
On August 17, 2009, the petition was dismissed (addendum A). Taylor timely appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS2
Taylor went on a crime spree that included burglaries; robbery; kidnapping two young
women; a high-speed car chase with the kidnapped girls in the car; attempted murder of a
man that Taylor twice shot in the head, doused with gasoline, and left in a burning cabin; and
the murders of a woman and her seventy-six-year-old, partially blind mother.
On December 14,1990 Taylor and his co-defendant, Stephen Deli, failed to return to
the Orange Street Community Correctional Center, a half-way house to which Taylor had
been paroled after his imprisonment for a 1989 aggravated burglary (TR317:732-42).
Taylor and Deli fled to Taylor's parents' cabin in Beaver Springs (TR317:780).

Taylor inappropriately includes argument and incorrect assumptions in his statement
of facts. The State addresses and corrects those statements as necessary in argument below.
3

Transcripts not individually paginated are cited by volume record number and page.
4

The Taylor's cabin was near "Tiede's Tranquility," a cabin owned by the Tiede
family (TR317:676-77, 771). Rolph and Kay Tiede and their children Linae (20), Shaun
(17), and Trisha (16) were spending the holidays at the cabin (TR316:489-94; 317:675-77).
On December 21 st they went to Salt Lake City for Christmas shopping and spent the night at
the home of Beth Potts, Kay's 76-year old mother (TR316:494; 317:678).
While the Tiedes were gone, Taylor and Deli broke into their cabin (TR 316:564,594,
317:782-83, 786-90). Taylor opened the Tiedes' Christmas presents while Deli videotaped
him (TR316:620-22). The next morning, Taylor called his friend Scott Manley (TR317:662,
671-74; State's Ex.57-A, addendum B). He said "he was at one of those cabins with
handguns and . . . he was going to shoot some people." When Manley asked about the
owners, Taylor replied that he "was going to waste them all" (Id, addendum B, pp. 653-54).
That same morning, Beth Potts, Rolph and Kay Tiede, and the two Tiede girls drove
from Salt Lake back to the cabin (TR316:495). Because the roads were snowpacked, they
parked their car at the gate to the Beaver Springs development (TR316:495-97). While
Rolph and Trisha left on an errand, Linae, Kay, and Beth Potts headed up the two miles to
the cabin on two snowmobiles (TR316:496-97).
Linae entered the cabin first (TR316:498-99). When she opened the door, Taylor
"came out holding his gun" pointed at her (TR316:499,317:795). Taylor demanded to know
who else had arrived with Linae. Linae told him that her grandmother and mother were
downstairs (R316:501, 317:795). Taylor told Linae to call them (TR316:501). Linae called
to Kay that there were robbers in the cabin. Kay ran up the stairs. Deli walked out from the

5

back bedroom holding a rifle (TR316:501). Kay told Taylor and Deli that Beth was
handicapped and would need help getting upstairs.

(Beth was partially blind, had

equilibrium problems, and needed help walking) (R316:495). Kay, accompanied by Deli,
went back downstairs to retrieve Beth. Taylor, still pointing his gun at Linae, ordered her to
sit down (TR316:495, 501, 504-05). Kay and Beth offered to give Taylor, who was already
wearing Rolph Tiede's warm-up suit, money or anything else he wanted (TR316:505).
Taylor pointed a gun at Kay and shot her (TR316:506).
When Beth Potts said something and started to move, she was also shot and Linae saw
"blood spray everywhere" (TR316:509-10). Linae did not see who shot Beth (R316:510).4
Linae turned to face the fireplace and started praying out loud while the shooting continued
(TR316:510). Taylor told her "to shut up, it wouldn't work, 'cause he was a devil
worshipper" (TR316:511).
Deli took Linae into a bedroom and tied her up with clear packing tape (TR316:51112). Taylor came into the bedroom and said he "had to shoot the bitch in the head twice"
(TR316:513). He told Linae that her grandmother was "disgusting because she was lying in
a pool of blood" (TR316:537). Taylor asked Linae for money, whether they had a car, and
where the car keys were. Linae told Taylor that her father might have money in his coat
pockets, and that her father kept a set of keys under the car's floor mat because the car had a
combination door lock. Taylor began searching the coats in the closet (TR316:514-15).

4

Linae opined that Taylor shot Beth Potts (TR316:541). Taylor's statement to Dr.
Moench confirmed this (R496A, Pet's Ex. 57, addendum C).
6

Taylor suggested that they "start the cabin on fire to get rid of our tracks"
(TR316:515-16). Taylor left to get a gas can from the garage. Deli told Linae that she
would have to go with them or they would have to kill her. So Linae went upstairs with
Deli, and she saw Taylor pouring gasoline in the living room. She did not see Kay or Beth,
and Taylor told her that they were dead (TR316:517, 519). Taylor "acted calm, just like he
knew what he was doing, just like it was a regular day" (TR316:520).
As Taylor and Deli were preparing the snowmobiles to leave, they heard other
snowmobiles approaching. Taylor and Deli ran into the garage and yelled to Linae to get in
the garage (TR316:520-21). As Rolph came up, he could see Linae standing in the doorway
and could tell she had been crying (R317:681). Taylor "jumped out from behind the garage
door, and pointed a gun in [Rolph's] face, and told [him] to get in the garage." (R317:682).
As Rolph walked in, Taylor grabbed Linae "by the throat and stuck a gun to [her] back"
(TR316:522, 317:682, 806). When Trisha arrived, Taylor and Deli ordered her into the
garage as well (TR316:522, 317:683). Taylor told Rolph to take his clothes off, so Rolph
took off his parka (TR317:683). Taylor also asked Rolph if he had any money (TR316:522,
317:683-84, 806-07). Rolph had $105. Taylor told him to "toss it over here" (TR316:523;
317:684). Taylor ordered Deli to pick up the money (TR316:524).
After obtaining the money, Taylor ordered Deli to shoot Rolph (TR317:684;
316:524). Deli raised his gun, cocked it, aimed at Rolph's face, but then hesitated
(TR316:524, 317:685-86). Taylor "became impatient" and shot Rolph (R316:524-25,
317:686). That particular bullet was loaded with bird shot (TR317:687). Pellets embedded
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in Rolph's eye area, nose, and forehead; the shot knocked him down and broke his jaw (id.).
Rolph was conscious and bleeding, but he "froze for fear of further shots," pretending he was
unconscious (TR317:687-89). As he heard Taylor and Deli cursing the cabin for refusing to
bum and talking with his daughters, Rolph "continued to lay there and tried to stay conscious
and tried to stay alive and not move" (TR317:688). He was hoping to maintain his strength
"so that somehow [he] could get [his] girls back" (TR317:689).
Later, Taylor returned to the garage (R316:526). Linae heard more gunshots
(R316:526-27). Rolph heard someone walk up to him and he was shot again at point blank
range in the head (TR317:688, 690). "It was so close that the plastic wadding from the
cartridge was stuck in [his] forehead," leaving a dent in his skull, but still not killing him
(TR317:690). Later someone poured gasoline on the floor and over Rolph (TR317:691).
Taylor and Deli finished loading up the snowmobiles and left on two snowmobiles
with the girls driving (R316:526-27). Deli wanted to drive, but Taylor refused, telling Deli
that Linae and Trisha should drive because they knew how to drive the snowmobiles
(TR316:527). When Taylor, Deli, Linae, and Trisha got to the Tiede's car, Taylor ordered
Linae to open the car and get the keys for him (R316:529-30). The four left in the Tiede's
car, with Taylor driving (TR316:529-30, 317:811).
Meanwhile, Rolph got up and went upstairs to look for his mother-in-law and his wife
(TR317:692). He attempted to stomp out the burning carpet, but "all of a sudden [he] was a
ball of fire, because [he] had been soaked with gas" (TR317:692-93). He removed his outer
clothes and doused them in the shower (TR317:693). Rolph tried to use the phone, but found

8

that the wires had been cut (TR317:693). Eventually he abandoned the effort to put out the
fire and rode a snowmobile back to the main road where he was rescued by his brother
Randy (TR317:694). Rolph got in Randy's car and they started down the canyon. When
they got to a point where the cell phone worked, they called the police (TR316:695-96).
Soon police began a high-speed pursuit of the Tiede car (TR316:533-34). As they got
close to Kamas, Linae saw a police vehicle with its lights flashing parked crossways in the
road. Taylor "gunned" the car around the roadblock, driving approximately seventy miles
per hour through a thirty-five mile per hour zone (TR316:533-35; 317:630-31). Taylor
began to lose control of the car, eventually crashing it (TR316:535; 317:630-33, 639). He
then pointed his gun at Deli and said, "It's time for us to die now" (TR316:535-36,317:814).
Deli grabbed the gun, yelled, "We have hostages, we have hostages," and got out of the car.
Deli pointed the gun at police. When an officer fired at Deli, Taylor and Deli surrendered
(TR316:535-36; 317:637-38).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Taylor is not innocent, and his claim of innocence is not a "gateway" through the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) procedural bar rules.
The district court correctly dismissed Taylor's successive petition because ail of his
claims are procedurally barred. Taylor does not challenge the ruling that claims previously
raised and addressed are procedurally barred. The only issue Taylor raises on appeal is
whether the district court erroneously ruled that claims that could have been, but were not
previously raised are also procedurally barred (Taylor's br. at 1, 12). Taylor has failed to

9

establish that the district court misinterpreted the PCRA procedural bars, or erroneously
determined that none of the common law exceptions excused him from the procedural bars.
He has also failed to establish that his prior post-conviction counsel was ineffective or that
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel excuses him from the procedural bar.
As an alternative basis for affirmance, this Court may hold that the amended
provisions of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, which went into effect on May 5, 2008,
apply to Taylor's petition. If the amended provisions apply, then Taylor has no right to the
effective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel. Therefore, a claim of ineffective
assistance cannot excuse the procedural bar and cannot entitle him to post-conviction relief.
This Court may also affirm on the alternative basis that even if an> of Taylor's claims
are not procedurally barred, they are time-barred. Taylor's successive petition was not filed
within the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations, and none of Taylor's claims meet the
"interests of justice" exception to the time bar.
Finally, Taylor's claim that the Attorney General should be estopped from asserting
the PCRA limits on post-conviction relief is frivolous.
ARGUMENT
I.

TAYLOR IS NOT INNOCENT.
Taylor asserts that he "has credibly pled that he is actually innocent." (Taylor's br. at

11). He then argues that his claim of innocence is a "gateway through procedural bar." Id.
Taylor's innocence claim is not a "gateway" through procedural bar because he is not
innocent and his claims do not otherwise meet any exception to the procedural bar rules.

10

Taylor founds his claim of innocence on his premise that there is some evidence
calling into question whether he fired any of the shots that killed Kay and Beth. Taylor's
claim is based on a misleadingly incomplete recitation of the undisputed facts, and rests on
erroneous legal assumptions.5 In addition, Taylor previously raised and lost these same
allegations in his first post-conviction action, when he claimed that there was no factual basis
for his guilty plea (R1275).
Taylor's claim that he is innocent is legally insupportable. It rests on the faulty
premise that he can be guilty of capital murder only if he fired a kill shot. But Taylor could
also be guilty as an accomplice, and he admitted that he "was a participant in the events that
led to the deaths of Ms. Tiede and Ms. Potts." (R672). Therefore, even if his claims were
true, that he did not fire the shots that actually killed Beth Potts and Kay Tiede, Taylor is not
"innocent" because his admitted participation makes him guilty as an accomplice and guilty
of felony murder.
Finally, the undisputed evidence refutes Taylor's claim that he may not have fired any
of the fatal shots. Taylor's "innocence" claim rests on the premise that the fatal shots most
likely came from the .44 caliber gun, and that Deli had that gun. But Taylor ignores other
undisputed evidence demonstrating that he fired the shots that killed Beth and Kay, and may
have fired all of the shots.
5

The State has never argued that Taylor would not be entitled to relief if he could
establish that he is innocent. If Taylor did not actually engage in the conduct for which he
was convicted, he could file a petition for determination of factual innocence under Utah
Code § 78B-9-401 through 405 (West 2010). He has not done so and his innocence claim
cannot meet the requirements of that statute.
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Taylor admitted to Dr. Moench that he was the actual shooter who killed both victims
(R496A, Pet's Ex. 57, addendum C). That statement has not been retracted or refuted.
Taylor has never provided any affidavit or declaration asserting that he did not shoot Kay or
Beth. At his own trial, Deli testified that Taylor did all of the shooting and that Deli shot no
one (R974, State's Ex. 28 - affidavit of Robina Levine, addendum D).
Taylor's argument rests on misstatements of the evidence. Taylor asserts that Linae
"unequivocally stated that Mr. Taylor carried a .38 caliber handgun and Edward Deli carried
a .44 caliber weapon." (Taylor's br. at 5). That is not accurate. Linae testified that when
she first saw Mr. Taylor, he was holding the gun marked as State's exhibit 10, which was the
.38 handgun (TR316:499). She also saw a rifle sitting next to the couch, about 5 or 6 feet
from Taylor, and Mr. Deli was holding a rifle (State's Exhibit 11-A). Deli also had a gun in
his belt (TR316:502-03). Numerous shots were fired (R316:510, 562). Linae never saw
Taylor with the .44 (emphasis added) (TR316:547). But Linae did not see who fired most of
the shots or which guns were used because she turned facing the fireplace wall and started to
pray (TR316:510). Linae was also tied up in the bedroom during part of the crime
(TR316:511-512).
Taylor asserts that "with the possible exception of a bullet graze to Kay Tiede's arm,
and the non-fatal pellet shots fired by Mr. Taylor, all of the other injuries to Kay Tiede and
Beth Potts were in fact caused by the .44 caliber weapon carried by Mr. Deli." (Taylor's br.
at 6). Taylor is wrong. The medical examiner, Dr. Schnittker, testified that the fatal wound
to Kay was consistent with a .38. The other wound, which could have been fatal, was
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consistent with a .44 (TR317:704-07, 713). She also testified that Beth had a .44 wound to
the head and a .38 wound to the chest, both of which would have been fatal (317:712).
The FBI crime scene investigator recovered eight bullets from the scene, including .22
pellets, .38 and .44 caliber bullets, and numerous casings, including "22's 38's and 44
calibers" (R316:562). He also testified that the .22 caliber weapon was the lever action rifle,
State's Exhibit 11-A(R316:576). That rifle, State's Exhibit 11-A, is the gun Linae identified
as the rifle carried by Deli (R316:502). In addition, Dr. Schnittker testified that the nonfatal
pellet wounds were going back to front, therefore the shooter would have to be off to the side
and to the back of the victim (R317:719).
The forensic and eye-witness evidence establishes that Taylor fired a fatal shot into
Kay. Linae saw Taylor shoot Kay in the left upper chest area (TR319:16, 316:509). Kay
grabbed herself where she had been shot and fell over (TR316:509). Dr. Schnittker testified
that the fatal wound to Kay entered near her left shoulder and exited from her right back.
The bullet passed through Kay's lungs and aorta (TR317:707, 710; PCR1370, 1538, 1540,
1554-62). She also testified that the size of the wound was "consistent with a medium
caliber or 38." (TR704). Another wound through her back was consistent with either a .38 or
a .44, but the diameter of the wound more closely matched a larger caliber, such as a .44
(TR317:705-07). That wound "might have been fatal." (R317:709).
Taylor has presented a declaration from Dr. Schnittker, which he claims "calls into
question many of the facts relied upon by the State, and raises substantial concerns
surrounding whether Mr. Taylor was even guilty of the two murders he pled guilty to."
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(Taylor's br. at 44). However, Dr. Schnittker's declaration does not dispute, contradict, or
discredit her autopsy results and testimony (TR317:699-722, R496GG, Pet.'s Ex. 117).
Dr. Schnittker found a .38 caliber bullet in Kay's sweatshirt when she performed the
autopsy. She testified that the .38 bullet found in Kay's sweatshirt was consistent with the
fatal wound (TR317:707). That statement has not been disputed or refuted. Taylor argued
below that "it appears that the coroner was incorrect when she assumed that the .38 she
found in Kay Tiede's clothing had passed through her body." (R676). However,, in her 2007
statement, Dr. Schnittker merely concludes that "[t]he location of this bullet is consistent
with Gunshot Wound #2, but I cannot be certain that this bullet caused the injuries of
Gunshot Wound #2." (R496GG, Pet.'s ex. 117, t 5).
In addition, Taylor admits that two .38 caliber bullets were recovered (R675). FBI
agent Bell testified that they recovered a .38 bullet at the scene, which tested positive for
blood, indicating that it had passed through somebody's body (TR573-74). Finally, Taylor
admitted to Dr. Moench that he emptied the .38 into Kay and Beth, then grabbed the .44
from Deli and emptied that gun into the women as well (TR 479, addendum C). All available
evidence establishes that Taylor fired the shot that killed Kay Tiede.
Similarly, the forensic and eye-witness evidence establishes that Taylor fired a shot
that did kill or would have killed Beth. Police recovered two .44 caliber bullets from the
basement that had passed through Beth's body and the living room floor. The police report
indicates that it appeared two additional rounds had been fired through Beth's body, but
police never recovered those rounds (PCR1369-70.)
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The medical examiner testified that Beth suffered a head wound and a wound near
her feet that were more consistent with a .44 caliber bullet. She also testified that Beth
suffered a right breast wound more consistent with a .38 caliber bullet. The breast wound
would have been fatal if the .44 head wound had not killed Beth first. (TR317:704,710-11).
Both the .38 shot to the chest and the .44 shot to the head would have been fatal. Therefore,
even if Taylor only used the .38, the shot he fired would have killed Beth.
Beth was shot in the head, and Linae testified that Taylor said he "had to shoot the
bitch in the head twice." (TR317:513; 319:21, PCR1538). Plus, Taylor admitted to Dr.
Moench that he was the actual shooter who killed both victims (R496A, Pet's Ex 57,
addendum C). All available evidence demonstrates that Taylor fired at least one and
possibly both fatal shots into Beth. As the medical examiner noted, "one shooter could use
two different guns." (TR317:715).
Taylor admitted to Dr. Moench that he emptied the .38 into Kay and Beth, then
grabbed the .44 from Deli and emptied that gun into the women as well (R496A, Pet's Ex 57,
addendum C). Taylor told Dr. Moench that Deli looked at him "as if to say 'what in hell are
you doing?'" Taylor said, "T shot two people with no motive, out of cold blood, with my
gun, then Ed's [Deli's].'" Id. Taylor has never submitted any affidavit or declaration
claiming that he did not shoot Kay Tiede or Beth Potts. Deli testified at his own trial that
Taylor did all of the shooting and that Deli shot no one (R974, addendum D). All of the
testimony and evidence, including Taylor's own statements, establish that Taylor fired fatal
shots into Kay and Beth. Taylor's claim of innocence is meritless.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT CLAIMS
ALREADY RAISED ARE PROCEDURALLY BARRED.

The district court ruled that claims already raised and addressed are procedurally
barred. Claims 1-4, 6-8, 11, 13, 15-18, 20, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29 and 30 "were raised and
addressed in a prior proceeding, either at trial, on direct appeal, in Petitioner's initial postconviction case, or in his appeal from the denial of his initial petition for posl-conviction
relief and, therefore, they are procedurally barred under the PCRA" (R1229-80).
Taylor has not challenged the district court's ruling on this issue (Taylor's br. at 12).
However, he states that he "raises and preserves, but does not brief at length any of the
claims deemed successive by the district court." Id. "Issues not briefed by an appellant are
deemed waived and abandoned." American Towers Owners Assoc, Inc., v. CC1Mechanical,
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1185, FN 5 (Utah 1996) (abrogated on other grounds, 2009 UT 65). By
failing to brief the claims, Taylor has waived them on appeal.
Taylor states that he "will not burden this Court with arguments" unless this Court
determines that it has not had a full opportunity to review any of these claims or "if
Respondent reverses course and contends that any or all of these claims have not previously
been presented to this Court for consideration."6 (Taylor's br. at 13). Taylor cannot shift the
burden to the court. A "reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with
6

It is not and has never been the State's position that all of the claims previously
raised were presented to this Court. As the State pointed out below, it does not concede that
all claims previously raised were fully exhausted for federal habeas purposes (Rl 031-32). A
claim raised and addressed at trial or in a prior post-conviction action would be procedurally
barred under the PCRA. If the claim was not then raised on appeal in the Utah Supreme
Court it may not be exhausted for federal habeas purposes. Exhaustion requires presentation
to the highest state court. O'Sullivanv. Boerckel, 526U.S. 838, 847,119 S.Ct. 1728 (1999).
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pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may
dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988)
(overruled in part by 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23).
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT CLAIMS
THAT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY RAISED ARE
PROCEDURALLY BARRED, AND NO EXCEPTION APPLIES TO
EXCUSE TAYLOR FROM THAT BAR.
The only issue Taylor raises on appeal is whether the district court erred in dismissing
claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19,21, 24, 25 and 27 (Taylor's br. at 1,12). The district court ruled
that all of these claims are procedurally barred because they could have been, but were not
previously raised at trial, on appeal, or in his prior post-conviction petition, and Taylor has
"not shown that any statutory or common law exceptions apply that would permit the Court
to consider the merits of these claims." (R1306).
Under the PCRA, a petitioner is not eligible for relief upon any ground that "could
have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal" or that "could have been, but was not,
raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (West
2007); § 78B-9-106 (West 2008).7 Taylor has failed to establish that the district court
misinterpreted or misapplied the PCRA or the common law.
A. Taylor has failed to establish that he meets any common-law
exception to the procedural bar.
Taylor claims that the "good cause" common law exception to the procedural bar
applies to him (Taylor's br. at 17). "[Ejven where a claim of error could have been raised
The common law procedural bar rule is the same. Gardner v. Galetka, 2007 UT 3,
Tfl7, 151 P.3d968.
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earlier, post-conviction relief may be available in those 'rare cases' or 'unusual
circumstances' where 'an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a
constitutional right has occurred' that would make it 'unconscionable' not to reexamine the
issue." Gardner v. Galetka, 2007 UT 39 ^ 17, 151 P.3d 968. The district court correctly
concluded that Taylor failed to establish that any exception applies to excuse his claims from
being procedurally barred.8
1. Taylor has failed to establish that his claims are not
frivolous or were not withheld for tactical reasons.
Taylor claims that the "fundamental unfairness" exception applies to him because he
is innocent (Taylor's br. at 17). But as shown in point I, Taylor is not innocent. Taylor also
argues that the procedural bar should not apply because his claims were "overlooked in good
faith with no intent to delay or abuse the writ." (Taylor's br. at 18). However, before a postconviction court is required to consider whether any of the common law exceptions apply to
excuse the procedural bar, a determination must be made that the claims "are not frivolous
and were not withheld for tactical reasons." (R1248, 1297); see Gardner v. Galetka, 2007
UT3,1f26, 151P.3d968.
Taylor argues that if the district court believed that prior post-conviction counsel may
have had a tactical basis for not bringing these claims, it should have held an evidentiary
8

Under the procedural bar section, Taylor also claims that his petition was timely
(Taylor's br. at 14). However, the PCRA statute of limitations is not relevant to the
procedural bar. If Taylor's claims could have been raised at trial, on appeal, or in his
previous post-conviction petition, then the procedural bar applies. § 78B-9-106. If he could
not have previously raised the claim, then the procedural bar would not apply, although the
claim might still be untimely under § 78B-9-107. The State addresses the timeliness of
Taylor's claims in point IV below.
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hearing to examine the issue (Taylor's br. at 19). Taylor is mistaken. The burden is his.
Under the PCRA, the respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion, such
as a procedural bar, "but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to
disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence." § 78B-9-105.
As the district court correctly held, "if the substance of a successive claim was not
raised in a prior post-conviction petition, it must be presumed that the reason for not raising
it was tactical or strategic in nature. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003)."
(R1249). In order to overcome this presumption, a petitioner must show that "there was no
'conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions.'" State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, *| 6, 89 P.3d
162 (quoting Bryant, 965 P.2d at 542) (R1298).
The district court held that Taylor "nowhere demonstrates that [the claims] were not
withheld for tactical reasons." (R1297). In fact, the district court held that "[n]ot only has
Petitioner not even attempted to specifically meet this burden, it is unlikely that he could do
so." (R1298). On appeal Taylor merely argues that "[tjhere was no conceivable tactical basis
for counsel's withholding of claims that could potentially yield relief for Mr. Taylor."
(Taylor's br. at 48). Taylor's conclusory statement assumes that his claims are meritorious.
However, as addressed in point IV below, none of his claims are meritorious. In addition,
counsel is not obligated to raise every7 colorable issue. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 75153, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (1983).
The district court held that "[a]ll of the claims raised in Petitioner's successive
petition that were not previously raised are claims for which a reasonable basis can be

19

articulated as to why they were not raised in a prior proceeding." (R1298). For example, the
claims might not have been raised because they were weaker or less persuasive than other
claims. Id. Raising weaker claims could have been futile and might have distracted the postconviction court from fuller consideration of the stronger claims. Id.
2. Taylor failed to establish that his claims meet the PCRA
requirements for newly discovered evidence.
Taylor asserts, as an exception to the procedural bar, that two of his claims are based
on newly discovered evidence (Taylor's br. at 16). However the district court correctly
noted that this former common law exception has been codified in the PCRA, which
specifically sets out the grounds for relief based on newly discovered evidence (R1283). As
this Court stated, the PCRA "provides for relief on the basis of'newly discovered material
evidence,' thereby incorporating the second Hurst factor.'" Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT
42, ^j 14, 94 P.3d 263.
Taylor asserts that claim 14, alleging exclusion of non-Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints (LDS) members from the jury, and claim 24, Scott Manley's declaration,
are based on newly discovered evidence (Taylor's br. at 16). Under the PCRA. a petitioner
must establish that "neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the
time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial
motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered
through the exercise of reasonable diligence." § 78B-9-104(l)(e)(i) (West 2009).
Prior counsel either knew or could have discovered with the exercise of reasonable
diligence the evidence on which Taylor bases his successive claims 14 and 24. In claim 14,
20

Taylor argues that the prosecutor excluded non-LDS venire members from the jury. Taylor
asserts that this claim presents new facts not previously known, because it is based on
prosecutor notes that were not provided to any of his former counsel (Taylor's br. at 16,33).
However the issue is not whether the notes themselves were provided, but whether Taylor or
his counsel knew of or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have discovered the
evidence contained in the notes.
The notes show the venire members names, with notes written under each name.
Under some of those names is the notation "LDS." The notes also show who was stricken
(R496A, Pet's Ex. 77, addendum E). Taylor's trial counsel certainly knew how venire
members had answered voir dire questions, and therefore knew who stated they were LDS or
not. He also knew which venire members were stricken by the State. Regardless of whether
any of Taylor's prior counsel actually received or reviewed the voir dire notes, Taylor fails to
establish that his claim that venire members were stricken because of their religion is based
on evidence that his trial counsel did not already know.
In claim 24, Taylor argues that the 2007 declaration obtained from Mr. Manley is
newly discovered evidence and claims that his prior post-conviction counsel could not locate
and interview Manley because of lack of funding (Taylor's br. at 17).9 But as the district
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Manley's 2007 declaration claims that on the way to his taped interview, one of the
parole officers told him that they knew Taylor was guilty and they expected him to make the
story on Taylor bigger, and that if he didn't they were going to send Manley "back to the
joint on some big heavy time." However, Manley also acknowledges in his declaration that
since 1994 he has been on medication for mental illness, and that he hears and see things that
are not there. (R496GG, Pet/s ex. 115).
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court noted, Taylor "does not discuss nor demonstrate that the new evidence he now
possesses is evidence that could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence." (R1285). Instead, he merely contends that the evidence was not discovered as a
result of inadequate funding for prior post-conviction counsel (R1286).
However, as the State argues in point 111(C)(2) below, Taylor has not established that
post-conviction counsel's funding was inadequate. Taylor has essentially conceded that
prior counsel could have obtained the declaration if they had located and interviewed
Manley. That fact alone defeats Taylor's claim. In addition, Taylor has never asserted that
trial or appellate counsel lacked the funding to locate and interview Manley (especially since
Manley was present and testified at Taylor's penalty phase hearing).
Taylor has also failed to establish that he meets the additional PCRA requirements for
newly discovered evidence. For example, the Manley declaration is merely impeachment
evidence. § 78B-9-104(e)(iii). And, as to both claims 14 and 24, Taylor "fails to discuss or
demonstrate that, when viewed with all of the other evidence presented in the case, no
reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty of the offense to which he pleaded guilty
or subject to the sentences of death he received." (R1288); § 78B-9-104(e)(iv).
Taylor has failed to establish that any exception applies to his claims that would allow
him to proceed with procedurally barred claims.
B. The district court correctly concluded that there is no ineffectiveassistance exception to the successive petition procedural bar.
Taylor asserts that he has a statutory right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel (Taylor's br. at 20). He then argues that his claims could not have been
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raised in his previous post-conviction petition because his "post-conviction counsel was
prevented from developing these claims by his lack of funding." Id. This, he claims, opens
the door to merits review of those claims.
In 1997, the Legislature passed 78-35a-202, which requires courts to appoint funded
counsel who meet the competency standards established by rule to represent death-sentenced
post-conviction petitioners.10 In Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480, this Court
concluded that the Legislature intended to create a right to post-conviction counsel who
would perform at the levels guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights that
apply during criminal proceedings. Id. at l[f78-82.
Taylor argued that he could rely on the Menzies right as an exception to the PCRA's
proscription against raising in his successive petition any claim that he could have raised in
his first petition (R1250-51). The district court rejected Taylor's argument, concluding that
the PCRA included no ineffective-assistance exception to the successive petition bar
(Rl 269-71). The district court ruled that "unlike the procedural bar rule that applies to initial
post-conviction petitions, . . . which includes a statutory exception based upon ineffective
assistance of trial or appellate counsel

no exception based upon the ineffective assistance

of post-conviction counsel is expressly included in the PCRA" (R1295-96). The court
reasoned that, because the Menzies right is statutory, the Legislature could limit its scope.
And, because the Legislature included no ineffective-assistance successive-petition-bar
exception, Taylor could not rely on a violation of the Menzies statutory right to excuse his
10

This provision, as amended in 2008, is now found in section 78B-9-202.
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failure to raise his successive-petition claims in his first petition (R1269-71, 1295-96).
The district court's analysis was correct. First, the court correctly concluded that,
because Menzies's right was statutory, the Legislature had authority to define its reach
(R1269). As the court recognized, Menzies itself supports that conclusion. Id. There, the
State argued that "writing an effective assistance requirement into section [202] would make
capital post-conviction litigation interminable and end the finality of death sentences."
Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at ^J 84. This Court responded that "Utah's post-conviction legislation
and associated rules contain appropriate limitations to assist courts in streamlining postconviction review in death penalty cases. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-106(2002)
(discussing various grounds under which relief may be precluded); Utah R. Civ. P. 65C
(containing procedural provisions governing the progression of post-conviction litigation)."
Id. This Court made it clear that, even though a death-sentenced petitioner has a statutory
right to post-conviction counsel, the Legislature may limit the scope of that right by statute.
Second, the district court correctly interpreted the PCRA. Courts must "look first to
the plain language of the statutes to determine their meaning and to discern the intent of the
legislature." Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ^[12,223 P.3d 1128. And "[provisions within
a statute are interpreted win harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other
statutes under the same and related chapters.'" Id. (citation omitted). The plain language of
section 202 merely created a right to funded, competent counsel to pursue post-conviction
relief in death-penalty cases. § 78B-9-202. It says nothing about the successive-petition
procedural bar, much less create an exception to it based on the right to counsel.
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The PCRA clearly defines the procedural bars and its exceptions in section § 78B-9106. Section 106( 1 )(b) procedurally bars post-conviction relief for claims that were raised at
trial or on appeal. Section 106(l)(c) bars relief for claims that could have been, but were not
raised at trial or on appeal. And section 106(d) bars relief for claims that were or that could
have been, but were not raised in a prior post-conviction action. Section 106(3) creates an
ineffective-assistance exception only for section 106(l)(c): claims that could have been, but
were not raised at trial or on appeal. By limiting the ineffective-assistance procedural-bar
exception to claims that could have been but where not raised at trial or on direct appeal, the
PCRA makes clear that any statutory right to the effective assistance of post-conviction
counsel is not an exception to the successive petition procedural bar.
Taylor has not established that the district court erred. On appeal, he argues only that
the district court erroneously rejected his claim because counsel in his first post-conviction
action "was prevented from developing [the claims Taylor first raised in his successive
petition] by [the] lack of funding." (Taylor's br. at 20). But Taylor's argument only goes to
whether any right to effective post-conviction counsel was violated. It says nothing about
whether the violation of the right is an exception to the procedural bar. For the reasons
argued, the district court correctly concluded that no such exception exists (R1271).
C. The Court may affirm on the alternative bases either that Taylor
never established that the right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel had been violated or that the right does not exist.
In addition to affirming the district court ruling, this Court may affirm on the
alternative, independent bases that 1) Taylor never proved ineffective assistance of prior
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post-conviction counsel, or 2) he had no right to the effective-assistance of post-conviction
counsel. As to the second, the right does not exist either because 1) the 2008 statutory
amendment disavowing it applies to Taylor's case, or 2) this Court erred in Menzies when it
read that right into the unamended statute.11
1. Taylor never established that prior post-conviction counsel was
ineffective.
In Menzies, this Court equated the statutory right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights that apply at trial and on
direct appeal. Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ^ 87. Therefore, in order to establish that his postconviction counsel were ineffective, Taylor had to prove both 1) that prior post-conviction
counsel's representation was objectively deficient; and 2) prejudice. See, e.g., Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523, 525 (2003); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88,690,
695 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994).
To prove the deficient-performance element, Taylor had to overcome a "strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997),
cert denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998); Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522.
To prove prejudice, Taylor had to prove that, but for counsel's deficient performance,
there would be a reasonable probability of a more favorable result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
11

The district court also rejected Taylor's argument that he had a state constitutional
right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel and could rely on a denial of that
right to excuse the successive petition procedural bar (Rl250-62). On appeal, Taylor relies
only on the statutory right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. He has not
argued that he has an independent constitutional right.
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695. A convicted person challenging counsel's performance on direct appeal must prove that
counsel overlooked a claim that probably would have resulted in reversal. See, e.g., Lafferty
v. State, 2007 UT 73, 1f48,175 P.3d 530, cert, denied, 129 S. Ct. 43 (2008). Post-conviction
review, like direct appeal, is an attempt to overturn the conviction or sentence. Therefore,
Taylor had to prove that post-conviction counsel overlooked or mishandled a claim that
probably would have resulted in post-conviction relief from his conviction or sentence.
Taylor argues only that his prior counsel "was prevented from developing [the
procedurally barred] claims by lack of funding." (Taylor's br. at 20). That bare assertion
does not prove ineffective assistance. Taylor has not established that the funds provided
were insufficient, or that objectively reasonable representation required counsel to develop
the claims that prior post-conviction counsel did not develop in Taylor's first post-conviction
action. And Taylor has not proved the requisite prejudice. As shown in point IV below,
none of Taylor's claims are meritorious. Therefore, Taylor cannot establish that prior postconviction counsel omitted any claim that was reasonably likely to have succeeded.
2. Taylor failed to prove that inadequate funding to his prior
post-conviction counsel allows him to proceed with his
successive post-conviction claims.
Taylor argues that his prior post-conviction counsel was denied critical funds
necessary to properly challenge his conviction and sentence (Taylor's br. at 21). He
therefore argues that he should be excused from the procedural and time bars and be allowed
to proceed with his post-conviction claims. But Taylor failed to establish that the funding
was actually inadequate, or that even if the funding was inadequate, that he was prejudiced.
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a. Taylor failed to establish that the funding was
inadequate.
Taylor has not supported the factual predicate that the funding was inadequate.
Taylor's prior post-conviction counsel might not have received as much money as he wanted
or even asked for, but that does not establish that he did not or could not have received
enough to provide effective assistance of counsel. In addition, Taylor's counsel failed to
•J *y

follow proper procedures to request that the funding be increased (Rl 024-30).
Taylor's prior post-conviction counsel was entitled to $20,000 for reasonable
litigation expenses. Utah Admin. Code R25-4-5. The district court found that prior postconviction counsel only requested litigation expenses in the amount of $11,555.16, leaving
unused the amount of $8,444.84 (R1287). Because there were unused litigation funds still
available, the district court found it difficult to conclude that the new evidence Taylor now
possesses could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence as a
result of insufficient funding (Rl 287-88). Taylor concedes as much (Taylor's br. at 24).
Taylor argues that the district court's calculations are not correct based on information
that was not before the district court (Taylor's br. at 24). However, he does not argue or

Taylor also erroneously argues that the State deliberately interfered with funding
(Taylor's br. at 21). However, Taylor fails to ever identify how the State "interfered" with
funding. In the district court below, Taylor complains about the fact that the State objected
to his ex parte requests for funding. He then states that "[t]his unnecessary litigation by the
State further depleted Mr. Mauro's already scarce resources." (R693). The State disagrees
that its actions were unnecessary, or that its objections "interfered" with funding. The State
believes the ex parte communications exceeded those to which the parties agreed and
potentially prejudiced the State's position in future federal litigation (R1022-23). Like
Taylor's counsel, State's counsel is entitled to protect his client's interests.
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establish that the district court was incorrect based on the record in front of it.
Taylor mentions some of the things his counsel spent money on, and some of the
things on which he wanted to spend more money. But even assuming that counsel did not
have enough money to spend on everything he wanted, this does not establish that his
choices were reasonable or necessary. The fact that counsel may not have been able to do
everything he wanted, does not establish ineffectiveness. "A reasonable investigation is not,
however, the investigation that the best criminal defense lawyer in the world, blessed not
only with unlimited time and resources but also with the inestimable benefit of hindsight,
would conduct." Thomas v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 513, 515 (7th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 525
U.S. 1123(1999).
b. Taylor failed to establish that he was prejudiced by
inadequate funding.
The district court ruled that even if it were to conclude that the available funding
hampered prior post-conviction counsel's ability to perform the investigation he believed
was necessary, and for that reason, the new evidence he now has could not have been
discovered, Taylor "fails to discuss or demonstrate that, when viewed with all of the other
evidence presented in the case, no reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty of the
offenses to which he pleaded guilty or subject to the sentences of death he received."
R1288). Taylor has not shown that the district court ruling was incorrect.

Taylor's addendum C is comprised of documents that are not part of the record
because they were never provided to the district court below. The State has filed a separate
motion asking the Court to strike Taylor's addendum C.
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In Taylor's direct appeal, he argued that his trial counsel's "minimal compensation
created a per se conflict of interest preventing him from giving Taylor adequate assistance of
counsel." Taylor, 947 P.2d at 688. This Court found that Taylor had "failed to allege, let
alone identify, anything in this particular case to support the theory that his defense
suffered." Id. The same is true here. Taylor has failed to identify any prejudice because he
has failed to establish a reasonable probability that his first post-conviction petition would
have been granted if his counsel had received additional funds.
Taylor has failed to establish that additional money spent on investigation or
additional money spent by the mitigation expert would have provided information that would
establish a reasonable probability that his first post-conviction petition would have been
granted. As addressed in point IV below, all of Taylor's claims are meritless. "If an omitted
issue is meritless, then counsel's failure to raise it does not amount to constitutionally
ineffective assistance." Hawkins v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999).
3. Alternatively, Taylor had no right to the effective assistance of
post-conviction counsel.
This Court also may affirm on the alternative basis that Taylor had no right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel at all either 1) because the 2008 amendment
to section 202 disavowing that right applies to Taylor's case, or 2) because this Court
decided Menzies incorrectly in the first place.
a. The 2008 amendment to § 202 applies to Taylor's case.
A little over a year after the Court decided Menzies, the Legislature amended the
PCRA and added section 202(4). It provides that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be
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construed as creating the right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, and
relief may not be granted on any claim that post-conviction counsel was ineffective." Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-9-202(4) (West 2008). That amendment applies to Taylor's case, and the
district court erroneously concluded otherwise.
Generally, the law that exists at the time a plaintiff initiates a lawsuit will govern that
suit. See, e.g., Marshal v. Industrial Common of Utah, 704 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985).
There are, however, exceptions. Amendments that are procedural, as opposed to substantive,
apply retroactively. Amendments that "neither create new rights nor destroy existing rights,"
but "operate in furtherance of a remedy already existing," "appl[y] retrospectively to
accrued or pending actions." Id. at 582. Amendments that "control[] the mode and form of
procedure for enforcing the underlying substantive rights apply to pending actions." Evans
& Sutherland v. Utah State Tax Comm % 953 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1997).
An amendment is substantive, as opposed to procedural, if it changes the factors a
court must consider in determining whether to grant relief. See, e.g., In re: Disconnection of
Certain Territory from Highland City, 668 P.2d 544, 548-49 (Utah 1983). Therefore,
statutory amendments that broaden, narrow, or eliminate the availability of relief do not
apply to pending actions. Amendments that change only how a litigant will go about
obtaining or defending against that relief do.
State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, 40 P.3d 611, illustrates the point. Daniels was charged
with capital murder. Id. at <|13. While Daniels' case was pending, the Legislature changed
the sentencing statute to permit a sentence of life without the possibility of parole on the vote
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often of twelve jurors. But when Daniels' case began, LWOP could be imposed only on the
unanimous vote of all twelve jurors. Id. at *[[ 37-41. This Court held that the amendment
was procedural; therefore, it applied to Daniels. The Court reasoned that the change from a
unanimous verdict to a majority of ten jurors had "nothing to do with the substance of
[Daniels'] crime or the amount of punishment specified for it; it deals with the procedure by
which the jury arrives at a decision on the amount of punishment to impose from sentencing
alternatives." Id. at f 41.
This Court recently applied the same analysis to an appellate rule adopted after the
action at issue began. In Counties v. Utah State Tax Comm % 2010 UT 50,

P.3d

,

the substantive right at issue was the proper valuation method used to assess the value of
taxable property. The new rule affected the standard for reviewing the tax commission's
valuation. But the Court held that the rule applied because it "controlled' the mode and
form of procedure for enforcing" the right to a proper valuation. Id. at ]f 12.
Similarly, section 202's right to counsel - including the 2008 amendment that it does
not include a right to the effective assistance of counsel - has "nothing to do with the
substance" of Taylor's post-conviction action. Section 104 delineates the claims that will
support post-conviction relief. § 78B-9-104; Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a). Even when Taylor's
successive post-conviction action began, section 104 limited relief for ineffective
representation to situations where that representation would violate an independent
constitutional right. § 78-35a-104(l)(d). The United States Constitution contemplates no
right to the effective assistance of state post-conviction counsel. Coleman v. Thompson, 501
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U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct 2546, 2566 (1991). This Court has never recognized a state
constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Menzies, 2006 UT
811! 84. Taylor apparently has abandoned the claim that he has such a right.
The Legislature limited ineffective-assistance as a procedural bar exception to claims
that could have been, but were not raised at trial or on direct appeal. Even if narrowing a
procedural bar exception affects a substantive right, §202(4) changed nothing. The addition
of §202(4) does not narrow or eliminate a substantive basis for post-conviction relief. It
affects only 1) whether and under what circumstances a petitioner may prosecute a postconviction action with a state-funded attorney, 2) funds available to pay counsel and to cover
litigation expenses, and 3) whether the statutory right to post-conviction counsel creates the
right to the effective assistance of counsel. It affects only "the machinery available" by
which a petitioner may prosecute his action for post-conviction relief. Section 202(4) is not
substantive and applies to Taylor's action.
Nevertheless, the district court erroneously concluded otherwise. It ruled that the
statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel was substantive because, in Menzies,
post-conviction counsel's ineffective assistance "affected [Menzies'] substantive rights"
(R1268).

But the procedural changes that applied retroactively in both Daniels and

Counties also "affected" substantive rights. In Daniels, the procedural change made it easier
for the State to obtain a harsher sentence. In Counties, the procedural change affected the
standard of appellate review of a decision on the substantive right. In those cases, as here,
the changes did not eliminate or limit the rights themselves.
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Another exception to the general rule against retroactivity provides that amendments
that clarify a prior enactment apply to pending actions. See e.g., Okland v. Industrial
Comm 'n.9 520 P.2d 208, 210-11 (Utah 1974). See also Dep 't of Social Services, v. Higgs,
656 P.2d 998, 1001 (Utah 1982). Newly added 202(4) merely clarifies the Legislature's
original intent when it provided for state-funded counsel in 1997.
When Menzies was decided, §202 provided that "[i]f the court finds that the defendant
is indigent, it shall promptly appoint counsel who is qualified to represent defendants in
death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(a) (Supp. 2001). It further provided for reasonably funded
counsel. Id. at 202(2)(c). But, while it provided for qualified, funded counsel, it said
nothing about performance standards, let alone performance standards that paralleled those
that applied during the criminal proceedings. Subsection 202(4)'s provision that "[njothing
in [the PCRA] shall be construed as creating the right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel" is consistent with the plain language in the unamended 1997 statute.
The 1997 legislative history to 202 further demonstrates that 202(4) merely expresses
the Legislature's original intent.14 The Legislature passed section 202 to meet the federal
opt-in conditions for expedited federal habeas review established in .28 U.S.C. §§ 2261
14

For example, in the House floor debates, Representative Martin Stephens stated,

By passing this piece of legislation, and funding these appeals so that they are not pro
bono, that's one of the requirements to get into the federal speed up process that Senator
Hatch passed with the Anti-Terrorist Act. It was part of the federal prosecution. Without
this bill and the funding of these indigent defendants, we can't get into that federal act and
speed up process . . . .
Floor Debate on H.B. 76, 1997 Gen. Session, Day 10, January 28, 1997.
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through 2266 (1996). See, e.g. Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ^ 12, 223 P.3d 1128
(recognizing that a statute's purpose provides insight into its meaning). Section 2261
conditions the opt-in benefits in federal review on the State 1) "establishing] . . . a
mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation
expenses of competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings;" and 2) "providing]
standards of competency for the appointment of such counsel." 28 U.S.C. § 2261(c).15
Consequently, section 202 provided for both 1) reasonable funds to pay for state postconviction review in death-penalty cases; and 2) competency standards for the counsel
appointed to represent death-sentenced state post-conviction petitioners.
At the same time, the federal opt-in provisions did not condition opting in on a state
establishing performance standards for post-conviction counsel. And the federal opt-in
requirements nowhere intimate that they apply only where state post-conviction counsel
performs to the level required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment during trial and direct
appeal. Not surprisingly, then, section 202 included no such requirement.
And, a little over one year after this Court read a right to effective-assistance of
counsel into section 202, the Legislature amended section 202 to say that it created no such
right. In this context, the 2008 amendment does not remove a right that the Legislature
originally granted. It merely clarifies that the 1997 statute did not include the right that this
Court read into it. See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 486 (Utah 1988) ("[w]hen a statute is
amended, the amendment is persuasive evidence of the legislature's intent when it passed the
15

These requirements are now found in 2265(a)(1).
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former, unamended" statute), overruled on other grounds as recognized by State v. Baker,
884 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah App. 1994). That is, to give Utah the benefit of the expedited
federal habeas review procedures, section 202 provided for funded counsel with certain
qualifications and nothing more.
The district court erroneously concluded that the amendment was not clarifying. It
ruled that the amendment was intended as a response to Menzies, not as a clarification. The
State agrees that section 202(4) was a response to Menzies. That is what makes it clarifying.
This Court founded Menzies on its interpretation of the Legislature's intent. In response, the
Legislature amended the statute to state that it shall not be "construed" the way this Court
construed it in Menzies. If the Court had correctly discerned the Legislature's original intent,
there would have been no reason to amend the statue.
b. This Court should overrule Menzies.
The Menzies court founded its holding solely on its assessment that the Legislature
intended to create a right to the effective assistance of counsel. The sum of the Court's
analysis was that, by creating the right to funded counsel, the Legislature must have intended
to create a right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel because the Legislature
could not have meant "that a petitioner in a post-conviction death penalty proceeding is only
entitled to ineffective assistance of appointed counsel." Menzies. 2006 UT 81, ^f 82.
Of course, the State never argued in Menzies and nothing in section 202 suggests that
the Legislature intended to provide petitioners with ineffective assistance of counsel. That
does not mean that the Legislature intended to create a right to post-conviction representation
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that parallels the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights that apply during a criminal case.
As detailed in the prior subsection, section 202's plain language, legislative history, and the
2008 amendment refute the Menzies court's contrary surmise. That is, the Legislature
intended to provide for funded counsel who had the requisite qualifications and no more.
This case further demonstrates that the Court misapprehended the Legislature's intent.
Taylor is here arguing that he is entitled to merits review of claims filed in a voluminous
successive petition. Nothing in unamended 202's plain language or Legislative history
suggests that the Legislature intended to generate this kind of additional litigation. Rather,
the legislative history evinces that the Legislature intended to streamline post-conviction
review, not to bog it down.
In sum, the district court correctly concluded that Taylor may not rely on prior postconviction counsel's alleged ineffective assistance to excuse the successive-petition
procedural bar. This Court may affirm on the alternative bases that Taylor did not prove his
ineffective assistance claim or that Taylor has no right to the effective assistance of counsel
in post-conviction actions.
IV. THIS COURT MAY AFFIRM THE DISMISSAL OF THE POSTCONVICTION PETITION ON THE ALTERNATIVE BASIS THAT
TAYLOR'S CLAIMS ARE TIME BARRED.
The PCRA provides that "[a] petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed
within one year after the cause of action has accrued." § 78R-9-107(1). A cause of action for
claims based on newly discovered evidence accrues on "the date on which petitioner knew or
should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the
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petition is based." § 78B-9-107(2)(d) & (e).

However, as addressed above, none of

Taylor's claims qualify as newly discovered evidence. Therefore Taylor's cause of action
accrued on October 5, 1998, the date of "entry of the denial of the petition for writ of
certiorari." § 78B-9-107(2)(d). Taylor's second petition was not filed until November 5,
2007, long after expiration of the one-year time limit. The district court ruled that Taylor's
petition was filed "over eight years too late, and therefore it is untimely." (R1271).
When Taylor filed his successive petition, §107 included an "interests of justice"
exception that may excuse a late filing. The district court did not analyze the interests of
justice exception, which requires a merits analysis. In order to avoid reviewing the merits,
the district court "opted to simply assume that Petitioner's successive petition was timely
filed and consider first whether the successive claims are procedurally barred." (R1273).
When Taylor filed his petition, the PCRA provided that "[I]f the court finds that the
interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the time
limits." § 78B-9-107(3).16 Taylor asserts that his claims would not be subject to timeliness
restrictions because the "interests ofjustice" exception applies (Taylor's br. at 14). He then
asserts that no statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied and that proper
consideration of meritorious claims will always be in the interests of justice. Id.

16

Taylor filed his petition in 2007. During the 2008 legislative session the interests of
justice exception was removed from the PCRA and replaced with an equitable tolling
provision. The State argued below that the amended equitable tolling provision applied to
Taylor's successive petition. The district court disagreed (R1235). In this particular case,
the State has chosen not to challenge that portion of the district court's ruling.
38

Under the PCRA, Taylor has the burden of proving that the "interests of justice"
exception excuses his late filing. § 78B-9-105. In order to prove the interests of justice
exception, Taylor must 1) state why his claims were not timely filed and 2) point to
"sufficient factual evidence or legal authority to support a conclusion of meritoriousness."
Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62 at ^f 20. In asserting that his claims were not time barred, Taylor
ignored this Courf s analysis in Adams. Taylor never met his burden to establish either that
he filed his claims timely or that the interests of justice demand excusing his late filing.17
A, Taylor did not provide any legally sufficient excuse for filing an
untimely petition.
Under Adams, in order to determine whether the interests of justice excuse Taylor's
untimely filing, a court should consider the reasons for the delay and whether the claims are
meritorious. Adams, 2005 UT 62 at f 16. Although not entirely clear, it appears that Taylor
claims that prior post-conviction counsel could not have timely discovered certain evidence
due to lack of funding. Taylor asserted below that "additional evidence [was] discovered
once adequate funding was obtained." (R734). He also claimed that "[h]ad Mr. Mauro been
granted the appropriate funding when needed, ... Mr. Taylor could have presented the
evidence he now presents in his original petition (R731-32). But Taylor has not proven that
the funding was inadequate, that more funding was not available if properly requested, or
that his prior post-conviction counsel was ineffective (see argument in point III above).

1

Taylor asserts that because he has "pled" actual innocence, the interests of justice
exception applies. The State agrees that a meritorious claim of innocence would meet the
interests of justice exception. But Taylor is not innocent. Merely claiming innocence does
not meet the interests of justice exception when the claim lacks merit.
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B. Taylor failed to establish that his claims are meritorious.
Whatever the reason for filing an untimely petition, Taylor cannot meet the interests
of justice exception unless he can also establish that his claims are meritorious. In order to
establish that the claims are meritorious, a "petitioner bears the burden of pointing to
sufficient factual evidence or legal authority to support a conclusion of meritoriousness."
Adams, 2005 UT 62 at ^f 20. Taylor failed to meet that burden.
Taylor conceded that claims 1-4, 6-8, 11, 13, 15-18, 20, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29, and 30
were raised and addressed in prior proceedings (Rl274-79). Taylor has not challenged the
district court ruling that these claims are procedurally barred (Taylor's br. at 12). In addition
I O

to being procedurally barred, claims already raised and lost are not meritorious.

Therefore,

in making its alternative argument for affirmance, the State does not repeat its argument as to
why these claims are not meritorious.
Claim 5 - Change of venue motion. Taylor alleges that the trial court erred and that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his change of venue motion
(Taylor's br. at 27, R233-34). Taylor made a motion for a change of venue in the trial court,
but the motion was denied.

Taylor claims that trial counsel was ineffective in his

presentation of the motion and for not renewing the motion after it was denied. Taylor also
argues that the trial court erred by denying the request for a change of venue. Id. However,
Taylor waived the issue of whether the court properly denied his motion for change of venue
by entering a guilty plea. It is well settled that a voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of
18

Taylor does not allege that any of these claims are meritorious except 29 and 30.
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all non-jurisdictional defects, including pre-plea constitutional violations. See State v.
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App.
1988). Taylor has not established that this did not also waive the issue for the penalty phase.
Alternatively, Taylor has failed to establish that this issue is meritorious. Both the
Utah and United States Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to trial "by an
impartial jury." U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12. To protect that right, rule
29(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, permits a trial court to change venue. State v.
James, 161 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah 1989). In order to establish that the trial court deprived him
of his constitutional right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal, Taylor must demonstrate either
actual or presumed juror prejudice. Breechen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1350 (10l Cir.
1994). Taylor has established neither.19
Post-trial, the issue is whether any biased juror actually sat.

Taylor has not

established that any biased juror sat, or that his jury was not fair and impartial. In fact,
having passed the jury for cause - which necessarily conceded that the jury he faced was
impartial - Taylor may not now claim otherwise. See State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1350
(Utah 1997). "When a change of venue decision is challenged on appeal following a jury
verdict, the determinative question is whether [the] defendant was ultimately tried by a fair
19

In the district court below, Taylor argued presumed prejudice where the "publicity
is so inflammatory that the defendant cannot receive a fair and impartial trial." (R234).
However, "presumed prejudice is rarely invoked and only in extreme situations." United
State v. Ahello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1177 (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 835
(1992). It is "a difficult standard, even in cases in which there has been extensive media
coverage." Stafford v. Saffle. 34 F.3d 1557, 1566 (10th Cir. 1994). Taylor did not meet this
standard. Taylor appears to have abandoned this argument by not raising it on appeal.
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and impartial jury." Laffertyv. State, 2007 UT 73,fflj41-43,175 P.3d 530 (internal cites and
quotations omitted). Taylor failed to meet this standard, and therefore failed to establish that
his counsel was ineffective or that a refusal to change venue prejudiced him.
On appeal, Taylor claims that by interviewing the jurors he was able to establish that
he was not tried by a fair and impartial jury (Taylor br. at 28-29). For support, Taylor claims
that juror number five, Blaine Moore, was neither open-minded nor impartial (Taylor's br. at
29). However, Taylor's bare statement that Mr. Moore was biased does not establish bias.20
During voir dire, Moore stated that he was acquainted with the prosecutor because he
worked with his mother at the temple. When asked whether that would prevent him from
being fair and impartial to both sides, Moore answered "No Sir." (TR53-54). As support for
his claim that Moore was biased, Taylor cites a different juror's explanation of an
acquaintance in a small town (R274, Pet.'s Ex. 40, at ^f 5). The explanation is irrelevant,
because it is not juror Moore's definition of an acquaintance. In addition, it does not in any
way refute Mr. Moore's answers to the court. Mr. Moore specifically told the court that his
acquaintance with the prosecutor would not prevent him from being fair and impartial to
both sides. The mere fact that a juror may be acquainted with the prosecutor does not
establish that he was not fair and impartial. State v. Cobb, 11A P.2d 1123, 1126 (UT 1989).

~ In the district court below, Taylor asserted that Mr. Moore was neither fair nor
impartial based on statements he made during voir dire (R274-77). A full reading of the voir
dire establishes that juror Moore was not biased or partial (TR248-49). Taylor appears to
have abandoned that claim, since he now argues that claim 5 could not have been brought
earlier because it was only discovered "[ajfter conducting interviews with approximately
three-quarters of the jurors." (Taylor's br. at 28).
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Taylor also claimed below that Mr. Moore was inattentive (R276). In support of his
claim Taylor provided a different juror's statement saying: "I recall that Mr. Moore was
always tired during the trial. He sat next to me, in the back row of the jury box. He fell
asleep in the jury box on one occasion. I had to hit him in order to wake him up. He said,
'Thank you, Navee.'" (R271, Pet's Ex. 40 at Tf 7). The fact that a juror was tired does not
establish inattentiveness. At the most, Taylor's proffer shows that the one time Mr. Moore
fell asleep, the juror next to him immediately woke him, and Mr. Moore thanked her.
Taylor also quotes statements from two jurors who claim that when Mr. Moore came
into the jury room he immediately called for death (R276, Pet.'s Ex. 20 and 21). It is not
appropriate to ask jurors what occurred in the jury room. Rule of Evidence 606 precludes
jurors from "testifying] as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or
emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or
concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith." Id. "Nor may a juror's
affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror
would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes." Id. See also State v.
Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah 1992); State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1993).
Taylor's proffer merely shows Mr. Moore's opinion following the conclusion of the
penalty hearing. It does not show that his opinion was based on anything other than an
impartial assessment of the evidence. And it does not show that he refused to listen to any
discussion about the appropriate penalty.
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Taylor also asserts that the town of Coalville, Utah was too small for him to get a fair
trial in such a high profile case (Taylor's br. at 28). However, Taylor cites no statute, rule, or
case law in support of his claim that a defendant cannot have a fair trial in a small town.
Claim 9 - Claim of trial court error in not striking jurors for cause. Taylor
alleges that he was prejudiced because the trial court erroneously failed to strike venire
members for cause (Taylor's br. at 30, R294). The only sitting juror Taylor complains about
is Mr. Moore.21 And, as shown, Taylor has failed to establish that Mr. Moore was biased.
Defense counsel had not used all of his peremptory challenges before he got to Mr.
Moore (R496A, Pet.'s Ex. 77, addendum E) and could have used a peremptory challenge to
99

strike Mr. Moore if he had chosen to.

Counsel chose to strike other jurors instead. Taylor

argued below that he was entitled to relief because he had to use a peremptory challenge to
strike a juror who should have been stricken for cause (R307-8). But Taylor would have
been entitled to post-conviction relief only if he had proved a constitutional violation. A
defendant does not have a constitutional right to unfettered use of his peremptory challenges.

Taylor claimed that the trial court erred by not excusing Janet Jones, Robert Lewis,
Jeff Rylee, Cindy Lou Schumann, Blaine Moore, and Loreene McNeil (R297-304).
However, Janet Jones was struck by a prosecution peremptory challenge, Robert Lewis, Jeff
Rylee, Cindy Lou Schumann, and Lorene McNeill were struck by defense peremptory
challenges (R307).
22

Taylor erroneously asserts that the State's main argument was that Taylor did not
use all of his peremptory challenges (Taylor's br. at 30). The State's main argument was that
Taylor failed to establish that Mr. Moore was biased (Rl 119-1126). The State also clarified
that part of its argument was that defense counsel had not used all of his peremptory
challenges before he got to Mr. Moore. The State acknowledged that Taylor eventually used
all of his peremptory challenges (R576, 1125, FN 41, R1338:39-40).
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And Taylor had a duty to cure any erroneous denial of a for-cause challenge by removing the
juror with a peremptory challenge.
A constitutional violation occurs only when a defendant exhausts his peremptory
challenges removing jurors who should have been dismissed for cause, and a biased juror sits
because the defendant has no more peremptory challenges with which to remove him. State
v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ^ 24, 24 P.3d 948 (citing State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 400 (Utah
1994)). In that circumstance, the constitutional violation is the denial of the right to trial by
an impartial jury. That did not happen here. Taylor had peremptories left which he could
have used to remove Moore, and he has not shown that Moore was unconstitutionally biased.
This Court has already held that counsel did not perform deficiently during the jury
selection process. In the appeal of his first state post-conviction petition, Taylor argued that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use a peremptory challenge to remove Mr.
Moore. This Court stated that it "cannot conclude that trial counsel had no strategic reasons
for keeping . . . Moore and instead exercising his peremptory strikes on other jurors."
Taylor, 2007 UT 12 at Tf 86. The Court concluded that "trial counsel did not perform
deficiently during the jury selection process. Id. at % 88.
Taylor asserts that the above point is irrelevant because "this claim is against the trial
court, not trial counsel." (Taylor's br. at 31). If the claim is against the trial court, then
counsel's decision to leave Moore on the jury defeats the claim. Taylor did not argue on
appeal that the trial court erred in passing Moore for cause. This Court said: "it does not
appear that he could have challenged the trial court's decision where he did not attempt to
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cure the court's failure to remove Moore by exercising a peremptory strike. State v. Baker,
935 P.2d 503, 506 (Utah 1997)." Taylor, 2007 UT 12 at Tf 80, n. 3. Taylor fails to address
this insurmountable problem with his claim.
Claim 10 - Voir dire questions. Taylor alleged that the trial court failed to ask
certain voir dire questions, resulting in a flawed jury selection process (R311). Although
Taylor asserts that he is appealing claim 10 (Taylor's br. at 12), Taylor fails to ever address
this claim in his brief, and has therefore waived it on appeal.
In any event, Taylor has never established that this claim is meritorious. There is no
constitutional right to a particular form of voir dire, and Taylor had no constitutional right to
have certain specific questions asked. "The Constitution does not dictate a catechism for
voir dire." Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222 (1992). The purpose of
voir dire is to ensure that jurors are impartial, and to assist counsel in exercising peremptory
challenges. MuMin v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431, 111 S.Ct. 1899 (1991). As addressed
above, Taylor has failed to establish that any biased juror sat.
In addition, although this exact claim was not raised on appeal, Taylor previously
claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging trial counsel's failure
to submit proposed voir dire questions. Taylor, 2007 UT 12 at ^j68. In ruling on the issue,
this Court found that the voir dire process was adequate to ensure a fair and impartial jury
decided Taylor's sentence. Id. Therefore Taylor's claim of a flawed jury selection process
cannot be meritorious because this Court has already found that the voir dire process was
adequate to safeguard the only constitutional right at issue.
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Claim 12 - Blood atonement. Taylor alleges that the jury venire was prejudicially
biased by the trial court's introduction of blood atonement into the voir dire (Taylor's br. at
32, R318). Taylor concedes that it "is not per se impermissible to inquire into a venire
member's belief in blood atonement" (R325). However, he alleges that it was improper here
because the jurors were asked about blood atonement in a manner that suggested the desired
answers, and as a result, Blaine Moore and Ron Wilde were not excused for cause despite
their belief in blood atonement (R326).
The fact that potential jurors state a belief in blood atonement is not sufficient to
establish that they should have been removed for cause. See State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70,7980 (Utah 1993) (overruled on other grounds). Below, Taylor quoted language from Wood,
arguing that "it is prejudicial error if a defendant uses all of his peremptory challenges and
one of them was used to remove a juror who should have been removed for cause." (R325).
However, that portion of Wood was overruled by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah
1994). To prevail on a claim of error based on the failure to remove a juror for cause, a
defendant must "show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent." Id. Taylor has
failed to make that showing.
Claim 14 - Allegation that non-LDS jurors were excluded. Taylor's exhibit 77 is a
document which shows jurors names, with notes below, and also shows which jurors were
stricken by the prosecution or defense (R496A, Pet's Ex. 77, addendum E). Taylor alleges

Taylor also complains again about the State's reading of the voir dire challenges
(Taylor's br. at 32). In response, see footnote 22 above.
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that exhibit 77 shows that the prosecutor excluded jurors who were not LDS. He then argues
that the exclusion of non-LDS from the jury because of their religion deprived him of the
right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community (Taylor's
br. at 33, R336). But religion is not a protected category like race and gender, and Taylor
had no right to have the seated jurors form a representative cross-section of the community.
Taylor acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court has not extended the
Equal Protection Clause to any other categories aside from race and gender (Taylor's br. at
35, R345). But he argues that this Court should do so under the Utah State Constitution. Id.
Taylor has not provided, and the State has not found any Utah case holding that it is a
violation of the Utah Constitution to use a peremptory challenge to strike a juror based on
religion. A post-conviction petition is not an appropriate forum to argue for new law. Postconviction relief is generally unavailable for claims that rest on a new rule announced or
created after direct appeal. See e.g. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989).
Taylor also argues that a "qualified citizen may not be excluded from jury service on
account of... religion . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-103 (West 2009), formerly §78-46-3
(addendum F) (Taylor's br. at 35). But Taylor raised no challenge to the composition of the
jury in the trial court below. This Court has consistently held that "a party seeking relief
based on a 'failure to comply with this act in selecting a . . . trial jury' must move for relief
"before the trial jury is sworn.'" State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 3 9 , \ 30, 140 P.3d 1219, citing
State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986); see also 78B-1-113 (West 2009).
Because Taylor did not move for relief before the jury was sworn, he is precluded from now
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raising a claim based on this statute. ~
Taylor asserts that his claim evolved from federal counsel's acquisition of Exhibit 77,
which shows peremptory strikes. He claims that despite prior post-conviction counsel's
request for all records from the district court, he never received Exhibit 77 (Taylor's br. at
34). Taylor claims that this "shifts the burden of proof to the State to explain the
impermissible peremptory strikes. Id.

First, as stated above, the strikes were not

impermissible.
Second, Taylor is wrong about shifting the burden of proof. Under the PCRA, "[t]he
petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the
facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief." § 78B-9-105; Wickham v. Galetka, 2002
UT72,1f 13,61 P.3d978;5rwnerv. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153,1155 (Utah 1996). Taylor bears
the burden of proof, and he cites no argument or case law for his claim that the burden shifts.
Taylor also asserts that "[a]s the State withheld this document from state habeas
counsel, there is no credible argument in favor of barring this claim." (Taylor's br. at 37).
First, there is no evidence that "the State" wrongfully withheld this document, creating a
Brady violation. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). According to
Taylor's own account, he requested the documents from "the district court" not the

In addition, the title of this statute is "Jurors selected from random cross section Opportunity and obligation to serve." §78B-1-103 (addendum F). It requires that "persons
selected for jury service be selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of
the county." Id. As addressed below, Taylor's claim is that the seated jurors did not form a
representative cross-section of the community, not that the persons selected for jury service
did not represent a fair cross-section of the community.
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prosecutor or the attorney general (Taylor's br. at 34). The Brady rule does not apply to the
court. Second, the Brady rule does not require a prosecutor to automatically turn over voir
dire notes to defense counsel. And Taylor never alleges that his prior post-conviction
counsel ever asked the prosecutor to turn over voir dire notes.
In addition, Exhibit 77 is merely a hand-written document with notes on the potential
jurors, showing who was stricken by the State ("St.") and by the defense ("D") (R496A,
Pet's Ex. 77, addendum E). It does not support Taylor's allegation that the prosecution
systematically excluded non-LDS jurors. It merely shows that the State struck some jurors
where the note about that juror included "LDS" and some jurors where the note about the
juror did not include "LDS." Exhibit 77 provides no indication as to why jurors were
stricken. Taylor concedes that the prosecution struck four people who were LDS, and the
defense struck two people who were not LDS (R339).~ Taylor provides no evidence to
establish that potential jurors were stricken because of their religion. Given the fact that the
prosecution struck potential jurors who were both LDS and non-LDS, it is more likely that
the reasons they were stricken had nothing to do with their religion.
Next, although Taylor asserts that he was deprived of "the right to trial by a jury
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community" (Taylor's br. at 33, R336), his
claim is actually that the seated jurors did not form a representative cross-section of the
community. But Taylor is not entitled to have the seated jurors form a representative cross-

In addition, Taylor never established that the persons who were stricken and did not
have "LDS" under their name were in fact not LDS or identified themselves as not LDS.
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section of the community. See Lockhart v. McCree, 47'6 U.S. 162,173,106S.Ct. 1758,1765
(1986) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538, 95 S.Ct. 692, 701-02 (1975). "The
point at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the
names are put in the box from which the panels are drawn." Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174
(citing Pope v. U.S., 372 F.2d 710, 725 (C.A. Neb 1967) (vacated on other grounds, 392
U.S. 651, 88 S.Ct. 2145 (1968)).26
Taylor also asserts that "[t]he striking of Ms. Conner constitutes structural error,
therefore no inquiry pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(e)(i)-(iv) is necessary."
(Taylor's br. at 36). First, Taylor never raised below that a claim of structural error does not
have to meet the PCRA newly discovered evidence requirements (R350); therefore, he is
precluded from raising it for the first time on appeal. Tschaggeny v. Milbank Insur. Co.,
2007 UT 37, \ 20, 163 P.3d 615. Second, even if Ms. Conner was stricken based on her
religion, that it not a Batson violation or a violation of the Utah Constitution, and therefore
cannot constitute structural error. Finally, Taylor merely concludes without analysis or
support that he can raise a claim of structural error at any time regardless of whether it meets
the newly discovered evidence requirements.
Claim 19 - Alleged juror misconduct. Taylor argues that the jury was prejudiced by
its consideration of extrinsic evidence and by juror misconduct (Taylor's br. at 37, R390,
394). He alleges that at the end of each day, the jurors met to compare notes and discuss the

In addition, Taylor has failed to provide any information as to the religious makeup
of the community. Therefore, he has never established that the venire panel or the seated
jurors in fact did not form a representative cross-section of the community.
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case.

He also alleges that the jury foreman, Richard Andrews, "said something like, i f it

was your mother or daughter, how would you vote?'" (Taylor's br. at 38).
Even if Mr. Andrews did make this statement,28 Taylor has failed to establish that it
was improper, or that he was prejudiced by it. In arguing that the statement was improper,
Taylor cites case law holding that it was improper closing argument for counsel to ask a jury
to put themselves in the shoes of the plaintiff (Taylor's br. at 39). Taylor cites no case law,
and counsel could find none, stating that it is improper for a juror, during deliberation and
within the confines of the jury room, to ask another juror how they would vote if it was their
mother or daughter. Taylor merely argues that it should be impermissible (R394 14).
Taylor also argues that juror Jerry Lewis said that at the end of each day, the jurors
would meet to compare notes and discuss the case (Taylor's br. at 38, R394,). However,
jurors comparing notes is not "extraneous" information. Taylor has not alleged that the
In his petition below, Taylor also asserted that the jury was influenced by the
relationship of the Tiede family to LDS church president Monson, who attended the funeral
(R392). He also asserted that the jurors were influenced by the LDS church practice of
sealing families in the temple (R393). Taylor does not repeat these arguments on appeal, and
they are therefore waived. Even if not waived, they are without merit. Taylor failed to
provide any evidence that jurors were aware of or considered the victims' visit to an LDS
temple, or that President Monson attended the victims' funeral. Certainly, temple going LDS
jurors would have been aware of the LDS practice of "sealing" families in the temple. But
again, Taylor provided no evidence that it was ever discussed or considered by the jury.
z8

In its motion to dismiss, the State pointed out that Taylor had failed to provide an
affidavit from Mr. Andrews. Taylor responded that Mr. Andrews is dead. Taylor then
asserted that the fact that Mr. Andrews has died is a prime example of the prejudice suffered
by Taylor. However, this is actually a prime example of why petitioners should not be
allowed to file successive petitions many years after the conviction, appeal, and prior postconviction petition. The State is prejudiced when people have died and are therefore not
available to admit or deny statements the petitioner claims they made.
29

This page is not Bates stamped, but it falls between pages stamped 394 and 395.
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jurors discussed matters outside the evidence. In addition, Taylor has failed to establish that
this information is admissible, or that it prejudiced him. Jurors may not testify as to how
they or other jurors were subjectively affected by extraneous information. Under Utah Rule
of Evidence 606, "a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror." Utah R. Evid. 606(b). However, "a juror
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the
juror's mental processes in connection therewith." Id. "Nor may a juror's affidavit or
evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be
precluded from testifying be received for these purposes." Id. "[A] juror may not testify as
to the effect any outside information had upon the juror." United States v. Simpson, 950 F.2d
1519, 1512 (10th Cir. 1991).
"[EJvidence by affidavit or testimony of a juror will not be received to impeach or
question the jury verdict or to show the grounds upon which it was rendered, or to
show . . . their opinions, surmises and processes of reasoning in arriving at a verdict." State
v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah 1992); and see State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah
1993) (holding that trial court properly refused to consider affidavit containing information
about the jury's deliberations).
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Claim 21 - Admission of evidence. Taylor alleged that his constitutional rights were
violated by the improper admission of evidence at the penalty phase of his trial (R3 86-408).
On appeal, Taylor states that he does not oppose dismissal of parts (a), (c), (d), and (f) of
claim 21 (Taylor's br. at 41). However, he never addresses parts (b) or (e). Id. By failing to
address this claim on appeal, Taylor has waived all of claim 21.
Even if Taylor had appropriately appealed claims 21(b) and (e), he failed to establish
that those claims were meritorious. In arguing that evidence was improperly admitted at the
penalty phase, Taylor relied on language and case law related to the admissibility of evidence
at the guilt phase of a trial (R386-408). However, the rules that govern admissibility of
evidence at the guilt phase, do not apply at sentencing proceedings. Utah R. Evid.
1101(b)(3). Rather, in a capital felony sentencing proceeding, "[a]ny evidence the court
considers to have probative force may be received regardless of its admissibility under the
exclusionary rules of evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(b)(West2010). Taylor did
not assert that any of the evidence was admitted in violation of the capital sentencing statute.
In claim 21(b), Taylor asserted that the trial court improperly allowed the prosecution
to elicit and perform irrelevant and prejudicial in-court demonstrations (R401). Taylor
argued mat these demonstrations were '"entirely gratuitous" and rendered his trial
fundamentally unfair (R404). Taylor continued that, by not intervening "the trial court led
the jury to believe they could properly use the 'demonstration' rather than the evidence itself,
in determining whether Mr. Taylor should be sentenced to death." (R777). However, Taylor
presented no facts or evidence to support his bald assertion that the jury was led to believe
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they could use the demonstrations rather than the evidence to determine whether Taylor
should be sentenced to death. In addition, there was no reason for the court to intervene,
since the demonstrations were properly used to help the jury understand the nature and
circumstances of the crime, as specifically permitted by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2).
In claim 21(e), Taylor complained that the trial court admitted in-life photographs of
the victims and 14 photographs of the crime scene (R348-49). Taylor alleged that these
photographs were redundant and were offered "solely to inflame the passions of the jury"
(R349). But Taylor ignored the fact that in-life photographs of victims are specifically
admissible under Utah's Rights of Crime Victims Act. §77-3 8-9(7) (West 2010). IfTaylor's
sentences were reversed, and a new sentencing procedure took place, the life photos of the
victims would be admissible. In addition, even though this portion of the statute was not yet
in effect at the time of Taylor's trial, Taylor failed to establish that life photos of victims
were not admissible at a capital felony sentencing proceeding.
Taylor also failed to establish that the crime scene photos were improperly admitted.
In capital sentencing proceedings, evidence may be presented on the nature and
circumstances of the crime and any other facts in aggravation that the court considers
relevant. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(a) permits the sentencer to consider the crime
circumstances in determining the sentence to impose. Therefore, crime scene photographs
are clearly admissible, and Taylor offers no reasoned basis to conclude otherwise.
Claim 24 - Exculpatory evidence- Taylor asserts that the State failed to disclose the
circumstances under which Mr. Manley was interrogated, and therefore failed to disclose
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material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady (Taylor's br. at 42, R437). In a 2007
declaration, Manley states that "one of the two parole officers told me that they knew Von
was guilty and they expected me to make the story on Von bigger. They told me that if I did
not do it they were going to send me back to the joint on some big heavy time." (R496GG,
Pet's Ex 115, \ 5). But in that same declaration, Manly also acknowledged that since 1994
he has been on medication for mental illness, and that he hears and sees things that are not
there. Id. The State does not concede that Manley's recollection of his conversation with the
parole officer is accurate.
Taylor argues on appeal that "[n]either Respondent, nor the district court addressed
the fact that impeachment evidence falls within the Brady rule." (Taylor's br. at 42).
However, Taylor failed to establish that there was a Brady violation. In order to establish a
Brady violation, Taylor must demonstrate that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2)
the evidence was favorable to him, and (3) he was prejudiced. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263,282, 119 S.Ct. 1936(1999).
Even if Manley's statement is true, Taylor has failed to establish that the prosecution
violated the Brady rule. "Brady suppression occurs when the government fails to turn over
even evidence that is known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor."
Yoimghhod"v. West Virginia. 547 U.S. 867, 870, 126 S.Ct. 2188 (internal citation omitted).
Taylor has not established that the prosecution knew what the parole officer said to Manley
or that the prosecutor's level of responsibility for disclosure is the same for parole officers as
it is for police investigators. In addition, even if the prosecution could be held responsible
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for knowing what a parole officer said, Taylor has not established that failing to disclose the
information was a Brady violation. "[S]trictly speaking, there is never a real 'Brady
violation' unless the nondisclosure wras so serious that there is a reasonable probability that
the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict." Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 281, 119 S.Ct.1936, 1948 (1999). This Court has already held that "even if
Manley's testimony was unreliable, any error the court made in admitting [it] was harmless."
Taylor II, 2007 UT 12 at ^f 111. Taylor has not established a reasonable probability that had
information about the parole officer's statements to Manley been disclosed, that Taylor
would not have received the death penalty.
Claim 25 - Culpability. Taylor alleges that his death sentence is disproportionate to
his culpability and therefore violates his constitutional rights (Taylor's br. at 44, R443). This
claim is really just a restatement of Taylor's claim of innocence (see point I above). Taylor's
allegation that he was less culpable than co-defendant Deli is not supported by the facts, the
evidence, or Taylor's own admissions.
Taylor asserts that b6[i]t is a fundamental precept that if Mr. Taylor's co-defendant,
who only received a life sentence, was the actual killer of Kay Tiede and Beth Potts, then
Mr. Taylor's sentence is disproportionate to his culpability and violates his constitutional
rights." (Taylor's br. at 44). Taylor's argument is not supported by the law. A death
sentence is constitutionally permissible even for a defendant who did not actually kill the
victims so long as he was a major participant in the felony murder who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 150, 158 (1987). The evidence
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in this case more than amply meets that standard, even assuming a hypothetical situation in
which Taylor fired no kill shots.
Second, Taylor's hypothetical suggestion that he was less culpable than Deli, and that
Deli was the actual killer, is not supported by the facts, the evidence, or Taylor's own
admissions. Taylor, not Deli, pointed his gun at Linae; Taylor, not Deli, asked Linae who
else had arrived with her; after Linae told Taylor that her mother and grandmother were
downstairs, Taylor, not Deli, ordered her to call them upstairs; Linae saw Taylor, not Deli,
shoot her mother; Linae heard Taylor, not Deli, say that he "had to shoot the bitch in the
head twice;" Linae heard Taylor, not Deli, suggest burning the cabin to destroy their
fingerprints; Linae saw Taylor, not Deli, pouring gasoline around the cabin. When Rolph
and Trisha arrived, Taylor, not Deli, grabbed Linae around the throat, and held a gun to her
back. Taylor, not Deli, ordered Rolph to strip and empty his pockets. Taylor ordered Deli to
shoot Rolph. When Deli hesitated, Taylor shot Rolph in the face. Taylor, not Deli, decided
the girls should drive because they knew how to drive the snowmobiles. And Taylor, not
Deli, drove the get-away car (TR316:499-501, 506, 509,513, 516-517,522-24,527, 529-30;
317:681-89.)30
In addition, Deli testified at his own trial that Taylor did all of the shooting and that
Deli shot no one (R974, State's Ex. 28 - affidavit of Robina Levine, addendum D). And

- Taylor also told Dr. Moench that after taking the Tiedes' daughters to the
snowmobiles, he returned to the cabin and shot Rolph one more time "'to make sure.'"
Taylor "then poured gasoline on [Rolph] and assumed [Rolph] would be consumed in the
house fire." (R496A, Pet's Ex. 57, addendum C).
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Taylor himself told Dr. Moench that he emptied the .38 into Kay and Beth, then grabbed the
.44 from Deli and emptied that gun into the women as well (TR 479, addendum C). He also
told Moench that Deli looked at him "as if to say 'what in hell are you doing?'" Taylor said,
"T shot two people with no motive, out of cold blood, with my gun, then [Deli's].'"
(R496A, Pet's Ex. 57, addendum C). If Taylor was the more culpable participant, and the
one who actually killed both women, then it is not surprising that Deli got a life sentence
while Taylor got the death penalty.
Claim 27 - Claim of inadequate record for appeal. Taylor alleges that there was an
inadequate appellate record, because the transcript of his penalty hearing voir dire appears to
be "possibly" incorrect, and the transcripts of Deli's trial are no longer available (Taylor's br.
at 45). Taylor never showed that either claim was meritorious. The transcript shows that
juror Chamberlain had a son who was married to prosecutor Adkins' sister (TR315:113).
Taylor states that his federal habeas counsel have been unable to confirm that Chamberlain
had a son who was married to Adkins' sister (R455). Taylor then jumps to the conclusion
that the transcript is in error.
First, Taylor has failed to establish that the transcript is in error. Second, even if the
record is in error, that fact alone fails to establish that the claim is meritorious. To prevail on
a claim that the record is incorrect Taylor must show that the record is not "adequate to
review specific claims of error already raised," State v. Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah
App. 1996), and "that his appeal is prejudiced b> the transcription errors." State v. Menzies,
845 P.2d 220, 228 (Utah 1992) (Menzies I). Taylor has not made that showing.
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Next, Taylor claims that no complete transcript exists from co-defendant Deli's trial
(Taylor's br. at 45). Taylor asserts that his federal counsel have been unable to obtain a copy
of Deli's transcript because the court reporter's notes have been destroyed (R455-56). This
claim does not entitle Taylor to relief.
First, Taylor and Deli were tried separately. Taylor has failed to establish that he has
a constitutional right to a transcript of another person's trial. Second, Taylor likely could
have obtained a transcript of Deli's trial if he had requested it within a reasonable time after
the trial. Instead, he waited nearly two decades before complaining that he cannot obtain it.
Third, Taylor failed to establish that his appellate and prior post-conviction counsel did not
consider requesting a transcript of Deli's trial. In fact, counsel may have made a strategic
decision not to request a transcript of Deli's trial, because it would not have been helpful.
The only evidence before the Court is that trial counsel's paralegal attended Deli's
trial and reported that Deli blamed Taylor for firing all of the shots suffered by both women.
There is no evidence that they have attempted to contact Deli's counsel, the court reporter at
Deli's trial, or any other participants or observers who could confirm or contradict this
report. And Taylor's counsel have obviously had access to Deli (R487, Pet's Ex. 14).
Although there is no transcript of Deli's trial, Taylor's counsel have not established that they
have no means of reconstructing any critical portions of Deli's trial, such as Deli's
testimony. For similar reasons, Taylor has failed to establish that he wras prejudiced by the
31

Trial counsel's paralegal attended most of Deli's trial. She heard Deli testify and
blame Taylor for the murders. Therefore, counsel knew that Deli's testimony was damaging
to Taylor (R974, Ex 28, addendum D, and see pages 121-124 of 23B hearing transcript).
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fact that a transcript of Deli's trial is no longer available. A transcript of Deli's trial would
not help Taylor, since Deli testified that Taylor did all of the shooting (R974, State's Ex. 28,
addendum D).
Taylor pled guilty and was sentenced to death. Deli went to trial and was sentenced to
life in prison. Taylor argues that "[gjiven that the State seems to have introduced the same
evidence against both defendants, a proper comparison of the different results must entail a
comparison of the transcripts of both trials." (Taylor's br. at 46). Except, of course, that
there were not two trials. Taylor pled guilty. The State presented evidence at the penalty
phase in Taylor's case. However, evidence at a penalty phase is necessarily specific to each
defendant, since evidence may be presented on "the defendant's character, background,
history, and mental and physical condition." § 76-3-207(2)(a)(ii).
Claim 29 - ineffective assistance of counsel. Taylor makes it clear on appeal that he
is not pleading ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel "as a stand alone claim."
(Taylor's br. at 47). His only reason for raising the issue is to allege that ineffective
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel provides an excuse or exception to the procedural
bar or time bar. That argument is addressed in point III above.
Claim 30 - Cumulative impact. Taylor argues that with the addition of even a single
new claim, the court must conduct a new cumulative error analysis (Taylor's br. at 47). But
the district court ruled that all of Taylor's claims are procedurally barred. In the alternative,
the State argues that all of Taylor's claims are also time-barred. Taylor is not entitled to a
review of the cumulative impact of claims that are procedurally barred and time barred.
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V.

TAYLOR'S CLAIM THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SHOULD BE
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THE PCRA LIMITS ON POSTCONVICTION RELIEF IS FRIVOLOUS.
Taylor asserts that the Utah Attorney General "has been able to craft the PCRA to its

decided advantage. As the [Attorney General] was the drafter of this legislation, they should
be estopped by this Court from arguing in favor of procedural bars now that their impartiality
has resulted in a denial of Mr. Taylor's constitutional rights." (Taylor's br. at 27). Taylor's
argument is legally unsupported and factually wrong.
First, this Court amended rule 65C to state that the PCRA "sets forth the manner and
extent to which a person may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and sentence
after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal." Utah R. Civ. P.
65C(a) (2010). The advisory committee note states that the amendments "embrace[]" the
PCRA "as the law governing post-conviction relief." Taylor offers no explanation why the
State should be estopped from asserting statutory defenses that this Court has endorsed.
Second, Taylor has not established any of the elements of estoppel. To estop the State
from asserting PCRA defenses, Taylor must establish that 1) the State made a statement or
admission that was inconsistent with "'a claim [the State] later asserted;'" 2) Taylor relied on
the State's initial statement or admission; 3) Taylor's reliance was reasonable; and 4) the
State's change in position resulted in injury to Taylor. Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,
2007 UT 28 Tf 14, 158 P.3d 1088 (citation omitted). The State has not taken inconsistent
positions. It has consistently argued that the PCRA's procedural bar and time bars apply to
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Taylor. Because the State has been consistent, Taylor cannot have relied to his detriment on
a prior, inconsistent position.
Finally, Taylor's argument relies on allegations and implications that are wrong.
Taylor implies that the State lobbied the Legislature to adopt and amend the PCRA to give
the State an unfair advantage in post-conviction litigation.

What the PCRA actually does is

strike a fair balance between a petitioner's interest in having all his challenges to his
conviction or sentence heard against the public's and victims' interests in finality and
closure. Fairness and justice do not belong solely to the convicted guilty. Fairness and
justice are also owed to the people of this State and to the innocent persons that the guilty
have victimized. And, after a criminal appeal ends, the right of a convicted guilty person to
challenge his conviction and sentence must begin to give way to the people's right to finality
and, more importantly, the victims' right to closure.
As to convicted persons who do not meet the statutory definition of innocence, the
PCRA demands only that they bring their claims timely. Its tolling and newly-discoveredevidence provisions and its caveats that a petitioner may raise claims that he could not raise
in a prior proceeding demand only that the petitioner proceed with reasonable diligence,

Taylor states that the Legislature "relies on the Utah Attorney General's Office [] to
draft legislation relating to post-conviction proceedings." (Taylor's br. at 27). Taylor implies
that the Legislature has delegated its law making function to the Attorney General. That
implication is false. The Attorney General does not have carte blanche to write postconviction law. Like any other organization, person, or entity, the State, through its
attorneys, may propose legislation. And, like all other proposed legislation, it is subject to
scrutiny by legislators and their counsel. It is vetted in public hearings where all interested
parties have an opportunity to address the appropriate legislative committees and caucuses.
63

unimpeded by State violations of his rights, or by mental or physical impairment. §§ 78B-9104, 106, and 107. The PCRA bars merits review only when a petitioner fails to comply
with those reasonable requirements. And, for those convicted persons who do meet the
statutory definition of innocence, the Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence Act
permits relief, including monetary relief, regardless of whether the petitioner has proceeded
with reasonable diligence. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-401 through 405.
Taylor has not argued how this balance is unfair, and it is not. In fact, Taylor asks the
Court to adopt a rule that would give petitioners, especially death-sentenced petitioners, a
"decided advantage." Taylor insists that "meritorious claims are always subject to review."
(Taylor's br. at 26). But imposing no time limit or procedural limit on raising meritorious
claims completely disregards legitimate interests in closure and finality.

This case

exemplifies that problem. Taylor's guilty pleas and death sentence have been affirmed on
direct appeal, post-conviction review, and post-conviction appeal. Taylor nevertheless filed
a 487-page successive petition and supporting memorandum. He insists that he is entitled to
merits review on his claims. And the briefing to address those claims spans 493 pages.
Under Taylor's proposed rule, he could file endless petitions of unlimited length
requiring the State and the courts to address whether the claims were meritorious. Even if
they were found not to be so, he could forever forestall the execution of his sentence without
ever demonstrating that the sentence or the conviction on which it was based was
constitutionally infirm. Taylor is not entitled to endless review.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm.

Respectfully submitted October
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Utah Attorney General
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Counsel for Appellee
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Addenda

Addendum A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VON LESTER TAYLOR,
RULING and ORDER
Petitioner,
Case No. 070500645

vs.
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

DATE: August 17, 2009

The above matter came before the court on July 14, 2009 for
oral argument on respondent's motion to dismiss.

Petitioner was present through Brian M. Pomerantz and Megan
B. Moriarty and respondent was present through Thomas B. Brunker
and Erin Riley.

Counsel for petitioner waived the appearance of

petitioner.

In this capital homicide case petitioner filed a successive
petition (petitioner calls it a complete petition) for relief
under the Utah Post Conviction Remedies Act and URCP, Rule 65C,
on November 5, 2007.

To explain the delays involved in this case, the court notes
that petition contained 426 pages of argument. It contained just
over 5 volumes of attachments, perhaps 1000 pages of material.

The parties have often either informally or by motion and order
obtained extensions of filing deadlines under the rules given the
complexity, length and importance of the issues.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, consisting of 89
pages, on February 15, 2008. Petitioner filed an opposition
response on May 13, 2008, and it was 129 pages in length.

On

June 13, 2008, respondent moved for permission to file a
supplemental memorandum in support if its motion to dismiss.
Petitioner opposed that on June 23, 2008.

Respondent filed a

reply on that request June 2 6, 2008, and the court on that same
date, June 2 6, 2008, allowed the supplemental memorandum by the
State.

On July 3, 2008, the parties stipulated to substitute the

State of Utah as the correct respondent rather than the warden
named in the petition.

On July 25, 2008, the State filed a

supplemental memo of rather standard length, 23 pages. Petitioner
filed an opposition on August 27, 2008.

On March 4, 2009,

respondent filed a 179 page reply. On March 13, 2009, respondent
filed a request to submit. Based thereon oral argument was
scheduled originally for April 22, 2009, Respondent filed on
March 17, 2009, a notice that permission to file a sur reply may
be filed. Respondent also moved to continue the oral argument due
to the press of other business and unavailability of counsel.
This date was then scheduled for oral argument.

•ii-

Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. The
court has read all of the pleadings and all of the transcripts
that are part of this record, including the preliminary hearing
and penalty phase hearing, that are on file in the office of the
clerk of this court. The court has examined the exhibits which
are attached to the pleadings and has examined the trial exhibits
which still remain in the office of the clerk of this court in
Summit County.

Since taking the issues under advisement, the

court has further considered the law and facts relating to the
issues and the memoranda of the parties.

Now being fully

advised, the court renders the following Ruling and Order,

-iii'

Table of Contents
I.

Background

1

II.

Summary of the Arguments

7

A. Claims Raised in the Successive Petition

7

B. State's Motion to Dismiss

9

C. Petitioner's Response to the State's Motion

....

11

D. Supplemental Memoranda

13

E. State's Reply

14

III. Discussion

15

A. Legal Analysis

15

1. The Interests of Justice Exception

15

a. Introduction

15

b. Retroactive Application of Statutory
Amendments

17

c. Whether the 2008 Amendments to the
PCRA Apply Retroactively

19

2. Procedural Bar Rule

27

a. Introduction

.

27

b. Common Law Exceptions to the Procedural
Bar Rule

30

c. Whether an Exception Exists to the Procedural
Bar Rule Based Upon a State Constitutional
Right to the Effective Assistance of
Post-Conviction Counsel

.....

35

-iv-

U0i21i

d. Whether an Exception Exists to the Procedural
Bar Rule Based Upon a Statutory Right to
the Effective Assistance of Post-Conviction
Counsel

.

48

B. Petitioner's Post-Conviction Claims
1. Timeliness

56
56

2. Claims that Were Raised and Addressed in a
Prior Proceeding

59

3. Claims that Could Have Been, But Were Not,
Raised in Petitioner's Prior Post-Conviction
Petition

78

4. Claim Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Prior
Post-Conviction Counsel
IV.

Conclusion

92
95

-v-

I. Background
Gleaned from the record of court proceedings as found by the
court and jury at the time, almost nineteen years ago, on
December 14, 1990, Petitioner left the Orange Street Community
Correctional Center in Salt Lake City and failed to return. On
December 21, 1990, Petitioner, along with an accomplice, Edward
Deli, broke into the family cabin of Rolf and Kaye Tiede in
Summit County while the Tiedes were in Salt Lake City shopping.
The following day, the Tiedes returned to the cabin.

Part of the

family parked at the gate to the Beaver Springs development and
Ms. Kaye Tiede, together with her mother, Beth Potts, a woman in
her mid-70s, and daughter Linae Tiede, age 20, drove two
snowmobiles to the cabin, which was located approximately two
miles from the gate which was on the Weber Canyon road. Mr.
Rolfe Tiede and his 16 year-old daughter Ticia Tiede drove to a
repair shop to pick up additional snowmobiles which were being
repaired.
Linae was the first to arrive at the cabin and when she
opened the door at the top of the stairs Petitioner confronted
her with his gun drawn.
upstairs.

He ordered Kaye Tiede and Ms. Potts

Ms. Potts needed assistance because she was partially

blind and needed help walking.

Once all three were upstairs,

Kaye Tiede offered Petitioner money and whatever else he wanted.
Petitioner shot Kaye Tiede near her left shoulder.
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The bullet

passed through her lungs and aorta, causing her death.

Ms. Potts

was then shot several times, including at least once in the chest
and in the head, either of which could have been the cause of her
death.

During the shooting, Linae began to pray, but Petitioner

told her that praying would not help because he worshiped the
devil.
Once the shooting ended, Petitioner determined that he,
Deli, and Linae would leave and that the cabin should be burned
in order to prevent the discovery of any fingerprints.

As they

were preparing to leave, Mr. Tiede and his daughter Ticia
arrived.

Petitioner grabbed Linae by the throat and held his gun

to her back.

Mr. Tiede and Ticia were both ordered into the

garage and Petitioner asked Mr. Tiede for money.

Mr, Tiede

complied and then Petitioner ordered Deli to shoot Mr. Tiede.
When Deli hesitated, Petitioner shot Mr. Tiede in the face.
Petitioner said nothing.

Prior to leaving the cabin with Linae

and Ticia, Petitioner returned to the garage, shot Mr. Tiede
again in the head while Mr. Tiede was lying face down on the
ground "pretending" to be dead, and poured gasoline over him.
Gasoline was scattered through the cabin and it was set on fire
before Petitioner and the others left.

When Petitioner, Deli,

Linae, and Ticia arrived at the gate to the Beaver Springs
development at the Weber Canyon Road, Petitioner ordered everyone
into the Tiede's car and they drove away.

-2-

Mr. Tiede, who was not

killed by the attack, was ultimately able to arouse himself, and
take a snowmobile to the Weber Canyon Road where he found a
family member and they called police.

Following a high-speed

chase, Petitioner and Deli were apprehended and the two girls
were safely taken from Petitioner and Deli.
On December 24, 1990, Petitioner was charged with two counts
of capital homicide in the deaths of Kaye Tiede and Ms, Potts, in
addition to several other felony counts of attempted aggravated
murder, aggravated arson, aggravated kidnaping, aggravated
robbery, theft, and failure to respond to an officer's signal to
stop.
On May 1, 1991, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the two counts
of capital homicide and the State agreed to dismiss all of the
other charges.

On May 16, 17, 21, and 22, 1991, a sentencing

proceeding was convened for the purpose of receiving evidence
concerning the appropriate sentence that should be imposed upon
Petitioner by the jury.

Following their deliberations, on May

24, 1991, the jurors returned a unanimous sentencing decision in
favor of death for Petitioner on each count of capital homicide.
Petitioner then sought to withdraw his guilty plea, which
was denied by the trial court.
Through his trial counsel, Elliott Levine ("Levine"),
Petitioner appealed to the Utah Supreme Court on July 8, 1992.
However, after Petitioner's opening brief was filed, on July 20,
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1992, the State requested that the brief be stricken and that
Levine be removed from his representation of Petitioner.
Although Levine was ordered to withdraw and was replaced by J.
Bruce Savage ("Savage") in September 1993, the opening brief was
not stricken.

During the direct appeal, the Supreme Court

remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing
under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 23B, on the claim
that trial counsel had been ineffective.

Evidence was presented

to the trial court at that hearing on May 15, 16, 18, 22, 23, and
24, 1995, The trial court concluded that Petitioner had not been
deprived of his right to effective representation under the Sixth
Amendment,
Savage then pursued the direct appeal by filing Petitioner's
brief on June 3, 1996. On October 24, 1997, the Utah Supreme
Court issued its opinion rejecting all of Petitioner's appellate
claims.

State

v. Taylor,

947 P.2d 681 (Utah 1997) (Taylor I).

The United States Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of
certiorari on October 5, 1998.
On February 23, 1998, Richard P. Mauro ("Mauro") was
appointed as post-conviction counsel pursuant to the PCRA to
represent Petitioner in his post-conviction action. Approximately
one year later Petitioner filed his Petition for Relief Under the
Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act,

On May 30, 2002, Petitioner

filed his First Amended Petition for Relief Under the Utah Post-
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Conviction Remedies Act.

Respondent, Hank Galetka, who was the

warden/respondent at the time, filed a motion for summary
judgment on September 13, 2002.

Oral argument on the motion for

summary judgment was heard on April 18, 2003.

On March 1, 2004,

the post-conviction trial court, granted Respondent's motion for
summary judgment and denied post-conviction relief on all of
Petitioner's claims.

The signed order and judgment was entered

on September 22, 2004.
Petitioner timely appealed that decision and the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed the .post-conviction court, the Honorable
Frank. G. Noel, on January 26, 2007.
12,

156 P.3d 739 (Taylor

II).

denied on March 27, 2007.

Taylor

v. State,

2007 UT

The request for a rehearing was

The Office of the Federal Public

Defender for the District of Utah was appointed to represent
Petitioner in federal court on March 6, 2007.

On September 4,

2007, Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas
corpus and, on November 2, 2007, a first amended petition was
filed in federal court.

Although Petitioner's federal case was,

and is, still pending, on November 5, 2007, Petitioner filed this
successive petition for post-conviction relief.
To explain the delays involved in this case, the Court notes
that the successive petition contained 426 pages of argument and
over five volumes of attachments.

Moreover, the parties have,

either informally or by motion and order, obtained extensions of
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the filing deadlines given the complexity, length, and importance
of the issues raised.

On February 15, 2008, Respondent filed a

motion to dismiss, consisting of 89 pages.

Petitioner filed a

129 page response in opposition on May 13, 2008.

On June 13,

2008, Respondent requested permission to file a supplemental
memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss, which Petitioner
opposed on June 23, 2008.

Respondent filed a reply on that

request on June 26, 2008 and the Court, on that same date,
allowed the supplemental memorandum by Respondent.

On July 3,

2008, the parties stipulated to substitute the State of Utah as
the correct respondent rather than the warden of the Utah State
Prison.

On July 25, 2008, Respondent filed its supplemental

memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss and Petitioner
filed his response in opposition to the supplemental memorandum
on August 27, 2008.

On March 4, 2009, Respondent filed a 179

page reply to Petitioner's opposition to the motion to dismiss.
On March 13, 2009, Respondent filed a request to submit and,
based upon this request, oral argument was scheduled for April
22, 2009.

Petitioner moved to continue that date due to

conflicts with counsel's schedule. On March 17, 2009, Respondent
filed a request for permission to file a sur reply.

Oral

argument on the motion to dismiss was held on July 14, 2009 and
the Court took the issues raised under advisement.
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II. Summary of the Arguments
A,

Claims Raised in the Successive Petition
Petitioner raised thirty (30) separate grounds for relief in

his successive (complete) petition.

These include claims that

trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to properly
investigate the case, failed to conduct an adequate mitigation
investigation, failed to adequately counsel and advise Petitioner
in connection with his pleas of guilty to two counts of capital
homicide, failed to properly litigate and renew the motion for
change of venue, was laboring under an actual conflict of
interest, performed deficiently during the jury selection process
including failing to properly challenge jurors, failed to make
appropriate challenges for cause, failed to uncover potential
juror bias, and failed to submit voir dire questions, failed to
present an adequate mitigation case, and failed to challenge the
State's case in aggravation.

Petitioner has now abandoned one of

those thirty claims.
Petitioner alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective
because he failed to properly argue the correct legal standard
for ineffective assistance of trial counsel and failed to raise
issues that could, and should, have been raised.
Petitioner asserts a claim that because the funding
available for his initial post-conviction petition and counsel
was inadequate, his prior post-conviction counsel was unable to
-7-

provide effective representation.
Petitioner also raises claims asserting that the trial court
committed error including that the court improperly denied
Petitioner's motion for change of venue, improperly conducted
individual voir dire of prospective jurors in chambers, failed to
properly grant Petitioner's challenges for cause, asked
impermissible questions and ignored responses during jury
selection, improperly excluded prospective jurors who were not
members of the LDS Church, provided jurors with confusing and
erroneous jury instructions and a special verdict form, and
improperly admitted evidence.
In addition to the foregoing claims related to alleged trial
court error and ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and
post-conviction counsel, Petitioner also asserts that his
conviction and death sentences should be vacated because he did
not receive the competent assistance of mental health experts, he
is actually innocent of causing the deaths of Kaye Tiede and Beth
Potts, there is no factual basis for his guilty pleas, a
disproportionate number of the jurors who served were members of
the LDS Church, jurors were improperly influenced by LDS Church
practices and the relationship between Church leaders and the
victims' families, there was juror misconduct, there was
prosecutorial misconduct, the State failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence, the sentences of death are disproportionate
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to P e t i t i o n e r ' s c u l p a b i l i t y , the Utah death penalty scheme i s
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l because i t f a i l s to narrow the c l a s s of
murderers e l i g i b l e for the death penalty, t h e r e i s an inadequate
a p p e l l a t e record, l e t h a l intravenous i n j e c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, (that claim i s
now abandoned) and the cumulative impact of a l l the e r r o r s
committed in his case v i o l a t e d his c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s .

B.

State's Motion to Dismiss
The State responded t o P e t i t i o n e r ' s successive p e t i t i o n with

a motion to dismiss.
F i r s t , the S t a t e argues t h a t most of P e t i t i o n e r ' s claims
were r a i s e d and adjudicated in a p r i o r proceeding and, t h e r e f o r e ,
under both the PCRA and the common law they are absolutely
procedurally barred.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a~106(b) and (d)

(2007)- 1
Second, a l l of P e t i t i o n e r ' s claims are ones t h a t could have
been, but were not, r a i s e d in a prior proceeding.

Therefore,

under the PCRA, they are a l l procedurally barred.

See Utah Code

Ann. § 78-35a-106( c) and (d).
Third, the S t a t e i n i t i a l l y argued t h a t a l l of P e t i t i o n e r ' s
claims were time-barred because they were not r a i s e d within one
x

In 1996, the PCRA was found i n T i t l e 78, Chapter 35a. In 2008, the PCRA
was r e - c o d i f i e d as T i t l e 78B, Chapter 9. A l l r e f e r e n c e s i n t h i s r u l i n g t o T i t l e
78, Chapter 35a a r e t o t h e v e r s i o n of t h e PCRA t h a t e x i s t e d a t t h e time
P e t i t i o n e r f i l e d h i s s u c c e s s i v e p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n p e t i t i o n i n 2007.
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year of the petition's accrual date and he had not shown that any
of the claims satisfied the interests of justice exception; i.e.,
he had not established that he had a legitimate reason for not
raising the claim in a prior proceeding nor that any of his
claims were meritorious.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(3).

According to the State, the time frame for "accrual" of the postconviction action under the PCRA, even under the 1996 version,
was the date on which the petition for a writ of certiorari was
denied, which was October 5, 1998.

Thus, Petitioner's successive

post-conviction petition is eight years late.
However, in a supplemental memorandum, the State argues that
the 2008 amendments to the PCRA, which removed the interests of
justice exception to the statute of limitations and replaced it
with an equitable tolling provisions, apply to Petitioner's
successive petition.

Thus, according to the State, the interests

of justice exception cannot be relied upon by Petitioner to
excuse an untimely claim.

Furthermore, because Petitioner has

not shown that the tolling provision applies to any of his
claims, all of his claims are time-barred under 2008 amendments
to the PCRA.
Finally, the State argues that Petitioner's claim of
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel must be
dismissed because it is not a proper claim under the PCRA.
the time Petitioner filed his successive petition, the PCRA
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At

"established] a substantive legal remedy for any person who
challenges a conviction or sentence," Utah Code Ann. § 78~35a102. Because a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel is not a challenge to Petitioner's conviction or
sentence, it is not a claim for which relief can be granted under
the PCRA.

Moreover, in its supplemental memorandum addressing

the applicability of the 2008 amendments to the PCRA, the PCRA
now states that

XN

[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed as

creating the right to the effective assistance of post-conviction
counsel, and relief may not be granted on any claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective>"
202(4).

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-

In light of this new language, the State also argues

that the current version of the PCRA precludes Petitioner from
obtaining relief on his ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel claim.

C.

Petitioner's Response to the State's Motion to Dismiss
In response to the State's motion to dismiss, Petitioner

begins by asserting that he was falsely led to believe that he,
rather than his co-defendant Edward Deli, caused the deaths of
Kaye Tiede and Ms. Potts and therefore he is factually innocent
of the murders to which he pleaded guilty.

According to

Petitioner, his factual innocence necessarily "trumps the
procedural and timeliness bars relied on by the State."
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(Pet'r

Mem. in Opp. at 15,)

The failure to discover this new evidence

concerning his factual innocence and to raise the claims in his
first petition was the result of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, which in turn was the result of the
inadequate amount of funding that was made available to prior
post-conviction counsel.

Petitioner argues that his claims are

not time-barred because the mere passage of time can never
justify the continued imprisonment of one who has been denied
fundamental rights. Moreover, the interests of justice exception
under the PCRA has been satisfied.
In addition, he also argues that he has shown "good cause"
or "unusual circumstances" to overcome the procedural bar raised
by the State.

Specifically, he contends that as a result of the

lack of adequate funding and ineffective assistance of prior
post-conviction counsel his claims could not have been raised in
an earlier petition and new facts not previously known
demonstrate either the denial of a constitutional right, that the
outcome of his trial might have been different, or the existence
of fundamental unfairness in his conviction.

Because his claims

were overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay the postconviction process, Petitioner contends that good cause exists
that permits him to raise these claims in his successive
petition, despite the procedural bar.

-12-

D.

Supplemental Memoranda
Prior to filing a reply to Petitioner's opposition, the

State filed a supplemental memorandum in which it argues that the
2008 amendments to the PCRA that removed the interests of justice
exception to the time-bar and ostensibly clarified that postconviction petitioners do not have a right to the effective
assistance of counsel, apply retroactively to Petitioner's
successive post-conviction petition.

Therefore, the State

asserts, Petitioner cannot rely upon the interests of justice
exception to excuse the untimely filing of any successive claim
and cannot assert as a ground for relief that his post-conviction
counsel provided ineffective representation.

In Petitioner's memorandum in opposition to the State's
supplemental memorandum, he argues that the Utah Supreme Court
has exclusive authority to define post-conviction remedies and
procedures.

Because the Supreme Court has already held that the

mere passage of time can never justify rejecting a meritorious
claim, removing the interests of justice exception from the PCRA
is necessarily ineffectual.

Moreover, Petitioner also argues

that the 2008 amendments cannot apply retroactively because (1)
the interests of justice exception constitutes a vested right
that cannot be removed retrospectively, and (2) he has a right
under the Utah Constitution to the effective assistance of post-
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conviction counsel that the legislature cannot extinguish.

E.

State's Reply
In reply, the State repeats the arguments that were set

forth in its supplemental memorandum concerning the retroactive
application of the 2008 amendments to the PCRA.

In addition,

the State argues that even if the 2008 amendments do not apply,
claims alleging ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel
are not cognizable under the PCRA, Petitioner has no state or
federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel, the statutory right to post-conviction
counsel does not give Petitioner the right to a claim of
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in a successive
petition, and in any event, Petitioner has failed to establish
that his post-conviction counsel was, in fact, ineffective.
Further, the State also contends that Petitioner's claims
are procedurally barred because they are claims that were either
raised and addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in
a prior proceeding and Petitioner has failed to show that any
exception applies or that unusual circumstances exist.

Finally,

although Petitioner frequently asserts that, with appropriate
funding finally provided, his current counsel have discovered new
evidence in the case, Petitioner has not shown that any of the
recently discovered evidence satisfies the requirements of the
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"newly discovered evidence" standard set forth in the PCRA.

At

best he is essentially making a claim of ineffective assistance
of post-conviction counsel, a claim for which no relief may be
granted under the PCRA.

III. Discussion
A.

Legal Analysis
1•

The Interests of Justice Exception
a.

Introduction

Under the provisions of the PCRA as they existed when
Petitioner filed his successive post-conviction petition, a
petitioner was "not eligible for relief . , . upon any ground
that . . • [was] barred by the limitation period established in
Section 78-35a-107." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1) (e).

As with

the current version of the PCRA, the statute of limitations
entitled a petitioner to "relief only if the petition [was] filed
within one year after the cause of action [had] accrued."
Code Ann, § 78-35a-107 (1).

Utah

Nevertheless, at the time Petitioner

filed his successive petition, the PCRA included an exception
that, if satisfied, would excuse an untimely filing.

Under this

exception, nif the court finds that the interests of justice
require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within
the time limitations."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(3).

In considering this exception, the Utah Supreme Court has
-15-

specifically held that a trial court "presented with an untimely
post-conviction petition must consider the interests of justice
exception before disposing of the petition • , . [and] has no
discretion to grant relief on an untimely . . . petition if the
^interests of justice' do not so require,"
2006 UT 21, 116,

134 P.3d 1133.

Johnson

v.

Statef

On the other hand, if the trial

court makes specific findings in support of the interests of
justice exception, then the untimeliness of the successive
petition must be excused.

See id.

at 117.

"An analysis of what

constitutes an exception in the ^interests of justice' should
involve examination of both the meritoriousness of the
petitioner's claim and the reason for an untimely filing.'7
v. State,

2005 UT 62, 116,

123 P. 3d 400.

Adams

However, it is not

necessarily required that both prongs of this test be satisfied.
As noted by the Supreme Court, depending upon the facts of the
particular case under consideration, some claims may require no
justification for an untimely filing—such as a claim of actual
innocence supported by DNA evidence—while uan entirely frivolous
claim would not meet the ^interests of justice' exception even
with the best possible excuse for the late filing."

Id.

In

other cases, a clear assessment of both prongs will be necessary
to determine whether the interests of justice exception is
satisfied.

"[W]e expect that the district court will give

appropriate weight to each of [these] factors according to the
-16-

Id.

circumstances of a particular case."

b.

Retroactive Application of Statutory Amendments

During the 2008 legislative session the interests of justice
exception was removed from the PCRA and replaced with equitable
tolling provisions which toll the limitations period "for anyperiod during which the petitioner was prevented from filing a
petition due to state action in violation of the United States
Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity,"
Code Ann, § 78B-9-107(3).

Utah

This change went into effect on May 5,

2008 and therefore, no interests of justice exception currently
exists in the PCRA to excuse the failure of a petitioner to
timely file a petition for post-conviction relief.

"Ordinarily

the facts and the law in a given lawsuit are to be applied as of
the date of the filing of the original complaint.'' Archer
Utah

State

Land Bd.,

392 P.2d

622,

624

( UT 1964).

v.

It is

generally true that "legislation is not given retroactive
effect."

B.A.M.

120,

128 P.3d

Co.,

2004

Dev., L.L.C.

1161.

UT 80,

v.

Salt

See also Goebel

%39, 104 P.3d

1185

Lake

County,

v. Salt Lake

2006
City

UT 2f
S.

R.R.

("A statute is not to be

applied retroactively unless the statute expressly declares that
it operates retroactively."); Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 ("No part
of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so
declared.").
-17-

However, "[a]n exception to the general rule against
retroactivity applies to changes which are procedural only,"
Olsen

v. Samuel

Mclntyre

Inv.

Co.,

956 P.2d

257,

261

(Utah

1998).

Unlike substantive law, which "creates, defines[,] and regulates
the rights and duties of the parties which may give rise to a
cause of action," procedural law "prescribes the practice and
procedure or the legal machinery by which the substantive law is
determined or made effective/' Petty
593-594

(Utah 1948).

v. Clark,

192 P.2d

589,

Thus, "statutes which operate in

furtherance of a remedy already existing and which neither create
new rights nor destroy existing rights . • . appl[y]
retrospectively to accrued or pending actions to further the
legislature's remedial purpose." Marshall
704 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985).

v.

Industrial

Comm'n,

Furthermore, "statutory amendments

that merely clarify an ambiguity in an original statute will be
Evans

given retroactive effect."
Utah State
added).
P.2d

208,

Tax Comm'n,

953 P.2d

See also Oakland
210-211

(Utah

435,

Constr.
1974)

& Sutherland
440

Co. v.

(Utah

Computer
1997)

Industrial

Corp.

v.

(emphasis
Common,

520

(general principle against

retroactive application "has no application where the later
statute or amendment deals only with clarification or
amplification as to how the law should have been understood prior
to its enactment." (emphasis added)).

That is, "an exception

exists for amendments clarifying statutes, which are applied
-18-

retroactively, so long as they M o not enlarge, eliminate, or
destroy vested or contractual rights.'" Keegan v.
P. 2d 618,
State

620

(Utah

1995)

Tax Comm'n ex rel.

1993)).
held,

State, 896

(quoting Board of Equalization
Benchmark,

Inc.,

864 P.2d

v.

882,

Utah

884

(Utah

Nevertheless, as the Utah Court of Appeals has expressly
>N

[w]hen the Legislature amends a statute, we presume it

intended to make a substantive, rather than procedural or
remedial change."

Wilde

v.

Wilde,

2001

UT App 318,

113,

35

P.3d

341.

c.

Whether the 2008 Amendments to the PCRA Apply
Retroactively

Nowhere in the 2008 amendments is there language declaring
that the removal of the interests of justice exception should
apply retroactively*

In addition, because the amendments also do

not expressly state that they are clarifying in nature, there is
a rebuttable presumption that the amendments are substantive and,
therefore, should not be applied retroactively.

See State

Amador,

("Every

804 P.2d

1233,

1234

(Utah

Ct.

App.

1990)

v.

amendment not expressly characterized as a clarification carries
the rebuttable presumption that it is intended to change existing
legal rights and liabilities.").
Country

Mgmt.,

2004

concurring) (same).

UT 12,

136,

See also Thomas v.
84 P.3d

1201

Color

(Durham, C.J.,

Even without the presumption, however, a
-19-

persuasive argument exists that removing the interests of justice
exception from the PCRA constitutes a substantive change.
Whether an amendment affects substantive rights "should be
x

informed and guided by

familiar considerations of fair notice,

reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.'"

Hadix,

527 U.S.

Prods.,
at

139

511 U.S.

343,

357-58

244,

(1999)

(quoting

270 (1994)).

See also

Martin

Landgraf
Goebel,

v.

v. USI Film
2004 UT 80

("Convenience, reasonableness, and justice are factors we

consider in deciding whether a statute has a merely remedial or
procedural purpose.").
When Petitioner filed his successive post-conviction
petition in November 2007 he had a reasonable expectation that if
the State raised the time-bar as a ground for dismissing the
claims, he would have the opportunity to argue that the interests
of justice exception applies and that his untimely filing should
be excused.

Having reasonably relied on the existence of the

interests of justice exception to excuse his untiraeliness, to now
preclude him from asserting it would constitute an unfair
windfall for the State and would be unfair to some one in
Petitioner's position.

Moreover, in the same way that a

legislative amendment removing the defense of an expired statute
of limitations is a change that affects the vested rights of a

defendant, see Roark v.

Crabtree,

893 P,2d 1058,

1062 (Utah

1995)

("Since 1900, this court has consistently maintained that the

-20-

defense of an expired statute of limitations is a vested
right."), it follows by force of logic that a legislative
amendment removing a statutory exception to the defense of an
expired statute of limitations is also a change that affects the
vested rights of a plaintiff.

Thus, the 2008 amendments are

substantive in nature because they eliminate a vested right held
by Petitioner at the time he filed his successive post-conviction
petition.

See Smith

v. Cook, 803 P.2d

788,

192 (Utah 1990) (a

statute is considered substantive if it "eliminate[s] or
destroy[s] vested rights,").
Notwithstanding language in Keegan suggesting that
clarifying statutes cannot be applied retroactively if they
eliminate vested rights, Keegan, 896 P.2d at 620, the State
argues that Keegan does not state the governing law.

The State

contends that the purpose of the 2008 amendments was to clarify
the unamended PCRA, and therefore the amendments should be
applied retroactively to Petitioner's case.

The court does not

find this argument to be persuasive.
First, despite the State's contention otherwise, more recent
cases appear to provide support for Keegan.

The case of Evans &

Sutherland,

specifically states

which was decided after Keegan,

that "under a long-standing exception to the general rule against
applying statutes retroactively, statutory amendments that merely
clarify an ambiguity in an original statute will be given

-21-

retroactive effect."

Use of the word "merely" certainly

suggests that amendments that do more than simply clarify should
not be applied retroactively.

Clearly, as the Keegan case holds,

changes that enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual
rights do more than merely clarify and, therefore, are not
applied retroactively.
Wiley,

2001 UT 107,

Furthermore, the case of Kilpatrick

37 P. 3d 1130,

v.

which the State cites as an

example of a recent case that ostensibly treats the clarifying
exception as independent from the general rule against
retroactivity, also can be read as supporting Keegan.

After

stating that legislative amendments may be applied retroactively
when the purpose of the change is to clarify the meaning of an
earlier statute, the Supreme Court went on to state that
"[f]urther, in light of the fact that we have now reversed the
jury's verdict, the plaintiffs have no vested or contractual
right that would prohibit application of the amended statute,"
Id,

at 159.

In other words, because the clarifying amendments do

not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights,
i.e. they are procedural, they may be retroactively applied to
the case.
Second, the Utah Court of Appeals has directly held that
clarifying amendments are procedural in nature.

See Wilde,

2001

UT App 318 at 114 ("A procedural or remedial law ^provides a
different mode or form of procedure for enforcing substantive
-22-

rights,' or clarifies the meaning of an earlier enactment."
(quoting Pilcher

(Utah 1983)

v.

Department

of Soc.

(emphasis added)).

Servs.,

663 P.2d

450,

455

Based upon the foregoing

analysis, the principle enunciated in Keegan that clarifying
amendments may be applied retroactively as long as they do not
enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights,
appears to be controlling law.
However, even if the principle set forth in Keegan is
incorrect, the State has nevertheless failed to persuasively
demonstrate that the 2008 amendments are clarifying in nature.
Relying on State v. Bishop,

753 P.2d

439

on other grounds as recognized by State
1283 (Utah 1994),

(Utah

1988),

v. Baker,

overruled

884 P.2d

1280,

the State contends that legislative acts

amending a statute constitute "persuasive evidence of the
legislature's intent when it passed the former, unamended
statute,'' Id.
to clarify.

at 486,

i.e., that the amending statute was meant

Because, according to the State, the Utah Supreme

Court incorrectly interpreted the interests of justice exception
in the Adams case to allow a petitioner to escape the time-bar
any time the petitioner could explain the delay and show that the
claim was potentially meritorious, the fact alone that the
legislature amended the PCRA to remove the interest of justice
exception and replace it with an equitable tolling provision is
persuasive evidence that the legislature intended to clarify what
-23-

it meant when the i nterests of justice exception was originally ••.

However,

..rule the State correctly quotes Bishop?

the

entitled "Clarifying Child Kidnaping and Sexual Abuse Ad."'

" it

quoteo by the State cr^w? i s meaning from this context and

language of tna amenaing statute itself i-tciirg that it is
clarifying the prior enactment,

Tims, 6lm

v because tne

legislature amended the PCRA 'after the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the i nterests of justice exception in

Adams,

this does not necessarily mean that the legislature intended the
2008 amendments to be clarifying in nature.,, parti cularly in ligau
of the fact that, unlike Bishop,

no legislati ve 1 ai iguage was

. .

i ncluded in the amendments suggesting that the amendments were
ii i Lei ided or ily It : » be clarifyii lg.

•.

In addition, citing to the case of Horton
Da u g h t er,

.

.
\ n Go 1dm ine.rfs

7 85 P, 2d 1Q 6 ; ( £ 't ' 3 h 19 89) , t) Ie S t a t e a 1 s o a r g'u e s 11 i at

because a "purpose of a statute of limitations is to cut off
un t line J y c ] a in is r e qa r d 1 e s s o f t h e c 1 a. iui.' s p of en t i a. I. me.: ^ t , ,f
(State's Supplemental Mem. :i i I Supp. at 9) (emphasis added) f the
Supreme Court's broad i nterp

-?'

•-

--

exception is illogical insofar as :i t defeats the purpose . :

having a limitations statute in the first place.

The Horton case

states that "[i]n general, statutes of limitation are intended to
compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time
and to suppress stale and fraudulent claims so that claims are
Id.

advanced while evidence to rebut them is still fresh."
1091.

at

Nothing in this language suggests that statutes of

limitations are intended to cut off claims regardless of their
potential merit*
Horton

Indeed, following the above-quoted language,

case cites to Burnett

v\ New York Central

R,R>, 380

U.S.

424 (1965) which held that
[sjtatutes of limitations are primarily designed to
assure fairness to defendants. Such statutes "promote
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared.

The theory is that even if one has a just

claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice
to defend within the period of limitation and that the
right to be free of stale claims in time comes to
prevail over the right to prosecute them." . . • The
policy of repose, designed to protect defendants, is
frequently outweighed, however, where the interests of
justice require vindication of the plaintiffrs rights.
Id.

at 428 (quoting Order of Railroad
-25-

Telegraphers

v.

Railway

z

" >::: z -: :

;: >~- r.

added 1 •,

Tms

3 2 1 I " ='

8 - !' 2

: ' 4 8 4 9 ( 1 < ' !' !
'
" ) (eiiipl Ia s I s •

language suggests that it is not true that a

ciair..'' s potential meri*

Anile :.ne State argues that the Utah

i;^:: • t defeated t::e purpose or :ne statute •:•: _in.itat.icns, ''
S"^~';/ Suoplemental Mem, in f ^ : . .u:.
the

.. anu Lr-f:'--r-^-»

_-^o amendments removing the interests of justice

-1 . -

-jx^i-on

shouiu be viewed as ciarif'^rT in nature, * M s

i'^oument is not

particularly persuasive given the fact that the

>N

rule" relied

upon by the State may not stand for the precise proposition the
State s u g g e s t ! .LL ... :>es»,

11: ie Sta te's arguments simply do not show

that the 2008 amendments mere] y cl arify the prior unamended

PCRA,

E • i :i r t h e i n t c • i e , a s P e t i t i o i i e r p o i n t s c i 11, p r i o r t o 1: i I e A d a m s
case being decided, the Utah Supreme Court held in Julian
t

-.; - ,

s r c J-..

.

meritorious claims raise:3 \r

v.

roper consideration of

r, habeas corpus petition will always

be i i i LI: ie i n t e r e s t s :::)f ji i s t i c e .

. •- - -

.

•.

-

statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied to bar a
habeas petitioi )

Z :: i

at

25 1

E ased i i]: :>i I thi s J anguag e, ti ie

legislature should have been on notice of the broadness of the
Supreme Court's interpretatl" r
exception,

Yet f

*-•--'•-,-

-

•

2 f the 200° arend-uer.to wei-j yjhair.eb

*

3
'^tended

to clarify the legislature's original intent with respect to the

o

interests of justice exception, the State has failed to
adequately explain why the legislature waited nearly ten years to
ultimately remove the interests of justice exception from the
PCRA.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is the court's
conclusion that the 2008 amendments removing the interests of
justice exception from the PCRA are not necessarily clarifying in
nature.

Moreover, even if their purpose is to clarify, the

amendments do more than clarify insofar as they eliminate a
vested right held by Petitioner at the time he filed his
successive post-conviction petition, namely his right to raise
the interests of justice exception as a reason to excuse the
untimely filing of his successive petition.

The 2008 amendments

are substantive in nature and, consistent with the general rule
against retroactive application of substantive changes, they
cannot be applied retroactively.

Petitioner is entitled,

therefore, to assert the interests of justice exception to excuse
the untimeliness of his successive post-conviction petition,

2.

Procedural Bar Rule
a.

Introduction

The PCRA ''establishes a substantive legal remedy for any
person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal
offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies." Utah
-27-

defenaa: "" i n -

-j>opoi~cun: t y t o ruv a n i s cor:\ . . o t i c , and

vacated
State,
r

r

2007

i.

.

>s. 5'--><i* i ~ :> ? , 3 o

- ~ - - —•** -^-

- "*

1

-

1 ±/ 2u07

^iJ,

b e c a m e :i p e t i t i o n

tor

-*

sentence [mu
Tayiojs

sentenie

UT lz

dt

uriv:r.te i -r -ppei^ate review,''

n

* -.

- ^

relief on claims that were "^raised or addressed' on direct appeal.'7

Kell

v.

UT 13 at

20G8 UT 62,

5 ^9-35a-!06 '1 w b ^

I ^ii Code Ann
2CC~

State,

$44

11 \- '94

P. 3d 5 Z 3 (oi t. i rig ~e a.30 l-affer-.y,

T:UJ^:

(^Claims m a t were bro-jc" ' —~ -,---^-- --- .

i n elicihls f ^r consideration z n t^o ^ t — con v i r i .L o n c* Jt1o11s

3 „<cn

issues are ^i^missed as ar iruse of the ^-~ot-conviction process
v. i * n o l J t ^ " *

n cf on i~ h e rp & 2" 11 j.

No exceptions exist fcr this

p^ooe~rir-~l r -

jn^::1: ~ ::e PCRA* :ncludina a c r e r t i o n s th-T-

a._:L

;-.

.

issues en appeal,
t - -

~n

~ .:.:.:*. a-^oq^ate^y ra^.rd or aroue;: one
"ee KeJ J *

,j^-.

/n*? *T ~:~ "-

!;T

_ • ..•_, -j ; ;., i

" , .after opportunely
' ,s court crave "f\. _.-

consideration t o the claims, reQardless of whether

[oetitioner f s]

counsel raised ^h-^n1 'in f V-> \n\jpA effective niannc r M ,

In addition t ;) pormi 1 ti rui t lv- ii sun r s'\ I ri r ^nrce.s 3 ive p o s t conviction claims previously raised and addressed at trial or on
direct appeal f

the PCRA also precludes a petitioner from

2 .8

• ' "

obtaining "relief . . . upon any ground that was raised or
addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or
could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for
post-conviction relief."

Utah Code Ann, § 78-35a-106 (1) (d),

same is true under the common law.

P.2d

608,

613 (Utah 1994)

See Gardner

(Gardner I)

v. Holden,

The

888

("Issues that could and

should have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, may not
properly be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding absent unusual
circumstances.").

Unlike the procedural bar rule that applies to

initial post-conviction petitions, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a106(1) ( c ) , which includes a statutory exception based upon
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, see Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2), no exception based upon ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel is expressly included in
the PCRA that would apply to claims raised in a successive
petition for post-conviction relief that could have been, but
were not, raised in a prior proceeding.

Thus, any successive

claim that was raised or that could have been raised, but was
not, in a prior post-conviction petition is procedurally barred
and no exceotion exists under the PCRA to excuse this failure.

-29-

-Common Law Exceptions to the Procedural Bar R u l e 2

b.

Notwithstanding th^ linquaqe of the PCRA, under the common
law as set toitti by the Utjh Supreme Court, the merits of a claim
that ^-- rrevi-^sly ra 4 ceri ana addressed in a prior proceeding
ma y 1.»_ c ^:. s -. u - ^.- a ,

\ - c i .a1 c on T* t

demonstrate ^unusual circumstances/ 7
1029,

2036"" ( Utah 1989)

:

h e p e 1111 c:~ •=: .. /I

See Hurst v. Ccck,

+• o

i-\2d

(a 'ground for re] i ef from a c^iv^i- .->n or

sentence that has once been fully and fa: rl y adjudicated on
a p p e a 1 :> r :i i I a p r i o i: 1 I afc• e a s p r o c e e i i i i g s h o u 1 d n o t b e
readjudicated unless it: can be shown that there are ^unusual
\ . - ri

c .
F.Sd

See d,Lso Allow

)

/'i .- • , ii'

1 94

I .' i , /

903 ("When the ground for preclusion is that the petitioner

a.r--- '

.:::essed . . . Uie it.-Mii', u u | "I M i JIK I '

1 nun i, i i

not: he allowed in a post-conviction relief proceeding absent
v

• .mustarK'er. """") ; Lei I

"

(Utah

1990)

b •=•

(same).

' . - . ' - , -T - -

reiroact-ve

{

I n i n \:

"For example,

'

.

_n \ e ii* .

suppressed evidence,

' 8

a prior adjudication

t

chance

/

subsequent

-

i s not

a

a

d i s c o v e r y of

o r newly d i s c o v e r e d ev i den.ee , "

/!

Hi rrst

777

'When P e t i t i o n e r f i l e d h i s s u c c e s s i v e p e t i t i o n for p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f ,
t h e PCRA " e s t a b l i s h e [ d ] a s u b s t a n t i v e l e g a l remedy for any person who
c h a l l e n g e [ d ] a c o n v i c t i o n or sentence for a c r i m i n a l offense and who ha[d]
exhausted a l l o t h e r l e g a l r e m e d i e s . " Utah Code Ann, § 78-35a-102(1), However,
i n 2008, t h e p h r a s e "a s u b s t a n t i v e l e g a l remedy" was removed and r e p l a c e d with
" t h e s o l e remedy."
N e v e r t h e l e s s , although t h e "amendment appears t o have
e x t i n g u i s h e d [the] common law w r i t a u t h o r i t y for f u t u r e c a s e s [ , b]ecause
[ P e t i t i o n e r ] sought p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f p r i o r t o t h e implementation of t h e
2008 amendment, r e l i e f through [the] common law w r i t a u t h o r i t y i s s t i l l a v a i l a b l e
to him."

P e t e r s o n v.

Kennard,

2008

UT 90,
-30-

116,

201 P.3d

956.

P.2d

at

1036.

With respect to claims not previously raised, the Utah
Supreme Court has "consistently recognized exceptions to [the
procedural bar] rule in ^unusual circumstances' where xgood
cause' excuses a petitioner's failure to raise the claim
earlier."

Tillman

(citing Hurst,

v.

State,

2005

UT 56r

777 P.2d at 1036).

120,

128 P.3d

1123

See also Utah R. Civ. P.

65C( c) ("Additional claims relating to the legality of the
conviction or sentence may not be raised in subsequent [postconviction] proceedings except for good cause shown.").
According to the Supreme Court, it has
long been our law[] that a procedural default is not
always determinative of a collateral attack on a
conviction where it is alleged that the trial was not
conducted within the bounds of basic fairness or in
harmony with constitutional standards.

Therefore, even

where a claim of error could have been raised earlier,
post-conviction relief may be available in those "rare
cases" or "unusual circumstances" where "an obvious
injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a
constitutional right has occurred" that would make it
"unconscionable" not to reexamine the issue.
Gardner

v. Galetka,

See also Medel

v.

2007
State,

UT 3,
2008

117,
UT 32,

-31-

151 P.3d
120,

968

184 P.3d

(Gardner
1226

III).

{ss [P]rocedura 1 defau 11s {such as the ban oi 1 successive petitions)

[raised] ") .

,• •

The Supreme Court has identified five Mgoo;i cause" c c m c n
r

law exceptions 3 to the procedural bar rule,, thr- :

been codiiied either by statute or procedural ru_e.

*' **• ' *•*
"hese ::nunon

law exceptions are;
(1) the denial . i a const: t.ct\ zi.a i z':ji z pnrsuar4" ^c
r-troa^1* •-

new law that is, ^ Tjght L>C
facts

IIMI.

previa«_ j

>v

'

. v _„„ t ..... *w:.w

.nown w

.: i.l

of a constitutions~ jic K t :\ :. :ah^ -harae "-a outcome
c >f tl I 5 trii a] , (

fc-

-

-

. - ^

.-I

unfairness in a conviction, . •. 1 irn i-leoal-L/ :i a
s

_. r - .. .?

,

wiui": no ;n:en: re delay or abuse tie writ.
""' 3\ " •

#--.--*

'! Mm l mi.' r- f 11 noner f i U M I his

successive peti;icn, exception ti) was implicitly included in the
PCRA via Sect i on 7 8-35a-106(d), except i on (2) was express 1 y
provided" for in Section 78-35a-104 (1) (e), and exception (4) was
covered by Rul e 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
I 'rap o r t a i 111y, b ecause t h e c ommon law exceptions "retain the ir
3

The Utah Supreme Court has also made clear that the list of common law
exceptions set forth in Hurst v. Cook, 111 P,2d 1029 (Utah 1989) is not an
exhaustive list. See Gardner v. Galetka,
2001 UT 3, 118, 151 P. 3d 968 p W e later
clarified that this list of Agood cause' exceptions is not exhaustive.").

-32-

independent constitutional significance," Gardner

2004 UT 42, 115,

94 P. 3d 263 (Gardner

II),

v.

Galetka,

they can be asserted

by petitioners raising successive post-conviction claims
regardless of whether the exception has been included in the
PCRA.
However, the Utah Supreme Court has also held that because
frivolous claims and claims previously withheld for tactical
reasons must be summarily denied, see Hurst/ 777 P.2d

at

1037,

post conviction petitioners must first demonstrate that a claim
is neither frivolous nor was it withheld for tactical reasons
before the post-conviction court is required to consider whether
any common law exceptions apply that would excuse a petitioner's
failure to raise the successive claim in a prior proceeding.

Gardner

III,

See

2007 UT 3 at 126 (because "[frivolous claims, . . .

and claims that are withheld for tactical reasons should be
summarily denied[,] • • . a separate and distinct procedural
determination for successive post-conviction claims
made before

[must be]

[the trial court] reach[es] an analysis under the

^good cause' common law exceptions/').

In other words, the trial

court is required to summarily dismiss all successive postconviction claims that are frivolous or that were withheld for
tactical reasons before considering the applicability of the
common law exceptions.
A claim is frivolous if it is facially implausible.

-33-

See

id.

at 121.

Thus, a petitioner raising a successive post-conviction

'~" aim must Z±LZ. ' "' " ~
_mo—ausibis bsfoi1;" rs^ufeiLii/1 ^r,^ the cn<jr re j^r consider the
coiiim^n law except j_ono.

rib iux tidii:\

"* n nearly a] 1 cases, if ^v,c- substance

reasons

claim '*?? rr** * ^iced in a -

'i pose-conviction pet:*

LV

-e lazbcrough

ftratecric in nature.

. ^

—

others

: a successive

~n~t * :.e reaso.. :,-. not raising "I4"T*-^ -cvtixd. :

z„-j\.?.~z

i

'

_

Washington,

Y

.
46c

c -r.

Gentr\r.

540 U.S.

±f u

:wCuses on some issues to the exclusion of

t'ere -- -. --r—

i.^z-:

v.

resumption tha~ v e did so for tactical

r*.

*\ :~.

c

- 9.

t-\

fw

_. -t

f :;^-^

"T

Strickland

jjeer neglect

" •; : ne defendant must

. ;.-. *r- circumstances, the
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State v. Clark , 2004 UT 25,

(quoting State v." Bryant,

1998)),

See also

State

965 P,2d

\ t, Crosby,
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539,

927 P,2d

.542
638,

(Utah
644

16, 89 P.3d
Ct
(Utah

App,
1996)

("[W]e give trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical
decisions and will not question such decisions unless there is no
reasonable basis supporting them/'); State
P.2d 914,

915 (Utah 1962)

v. Farnsworth,

368

(defendant charged with burglary did

not have incompetent counsel where the "record indicate[d] no
action or inaction by the trial attorney which could not
rationally find explanation in a legitimate exercise of
strategy,").

c.

Whether an Exception Exists to the Procedural Bar
Rule Based Upon a State Constitutional Right to
the Effective Assistance of Post-Conviction
Counsel

In addition to raising an independent claim of ineffective
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, Petitioner also
argues that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel
constitutes a common law exception to the procedural bar rule
and, therefore, many of his other claims are not procedurally
barred because the failure to raise these claims in his prior
post-conviction petition was the result of ineffective
representation.

In his memorandum opposing the State's

supplemental motion to dismiss, he provides support for this
argument by arguing that he has both a state constitutional right
and a statutory right to the effective assistance of post-35-
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to counsel includes effective assistance of counsel," State
Bums,

2000 UT 56, 123,

v.

4 P. 3d 795, it follows that Petitioner

had a state constitutional right to the effective assistance of
counsel both at trial and on appeal.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Utah Constitution guarantees
a criminal defendant the right to effective representation at
trial and on appeal does not, in and of itself, warrant the
conclusion that a state constitutional right .to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel exists.

The Utah Supreme

Court has never held that post-conviction petitioners in a death
penalty case4 have a state constitutional right to post-conviction
counsel.

In Menzies

v. Galetka,

2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480, the

Supreme Court expressly avoided the issue when it declared that,
[w]hile we have not yet considered whether such a right
exists under the Utah Constitution, there is no need to
do so in this case . . . . We do not foreclose the
possibility that an indigent death row inmate may have
a right to the effective assistance of counsel under
the Utah Constitution, but that question must wait for

4

In the case of Hutchings

v,

State,

2003

UT 52,

84 P.3d

1150,

the Utah

Supreme Court considered a decision by the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the
trial court's dismissal of a successive, non-capital petition for post-conviction
relief. One of the claims raised by the petitioner was that he was ,,vwrongfully
denied counsel for purposes of . , . his first petition for post-conviction
relief. Id. at 119, The Supreme Court held that while the petitioner "may have
benefitted from professional assistance in the drafting and presentation of his
[first] petition, there is no statutory or constitutional right to counsel in a
civil petition for post-conviction relief.'" Id. at 520 {emphasis added).
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another day. .
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Constitution -.nciudos the rign; *. .* n e effective assistance of
post-conviction counsel.
First, Petitioner argues that he has a state constitutional
right to post-conviction counsel under Article I ,„ ^rfiori i;1.
However, any reliance on A r t n . e I, Section 12! s guarantee of the
right to counsel i s misplaced.

While if may be true that the

under 1 yii Ig fac !::s assoc iated vi th a post-convicti on petition
concern a criminal conviction and sentence, post-conviction
proceedings thRinsel ^ 'es a re

I
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upreme

Court has specifically held that "a petition for post-conviction
relief is a civil action, specifically governed by rule 65C of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."

12, $10,
120,

61 P. 3d 978.

84 P.3d

1150

Wickham

See also Hutchings

v.

Galetka,

v. State,

2002

UT

2003 UT 52,

P[T]here is no statutory or constitutional

right to counsel in a civil petition for post-conviction
relief.").

Moreover, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that, to

"avoid any misconceptions

. . ., it is reiterated that the Utah

Const. Art. I, § 12 declares the right to be defended by counsel
applies only in criminal prosecutions, not civil actions."

Walker

v. Carlson,

(emphasis added).

740 P.2d 1372,

1373-74

(Utah Ct. App.

1987)

Thus, because post-conviction proceedings are

civil in nature, Petitioner cannot justifiably rely upon Article
I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution to argue that he had a
state constitutional right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel while prosecuting his first post-conviction
petition.
Second, although Petitioner claims that there has been a
steady movement toward the recognition of a state constitutional
right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, his
argument relies primarily on language from cases emphasizing the
need for state-funded post-conviction counsel and he does not
cite to any language suggesting that a state constitutional right
to effective post-conviction counsel is or may be necessary.
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See, e.g., Julianf
(bee a/i ise
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~ t i v e nil es

- * 10 former statutory

funding scheme, with i t s absolute caps on the payment of
attorneys fees and l i t i g a t i o n c o s t s , could impose a c r i p p l i n g
burden on c a p i t a l p e t i t i o n e r s .

While i t may be argued t h a t t h e

Supreme Court was suggesting t h a t without s u f f i c i e n t funds, p o s t conviction counsel may be unable to properly represent his
c l i e n t , i . e . provide effective r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , nowhere in the
decision, e i t h e r impliedly or expressly, did the Supreme Court
link inadequate s t a t e funding with the existence of a s t a t e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to the effective a s s i s t a n c e of counsel.
Thus, P e t i t i o n e r has f a i l e d to show t h a t there has been a "steady
movement" toward recognizing a s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to
e f f e c t i v e post-conviction counsel or t h a t such a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
r i g h t i s required where inadequate funding i s provided.
Fourth, P e t i t i o n e r argues t h a t because the due process
clause in A r t i c l e I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution has been
i n t e r p r e t e d by the Utah Supreme Court to provide broader
p r o t e c t i o n s than i t s federal counterpart, the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s
due process clause should be i n t e r p r e t e d to guarantee the
e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of post-conviction counsel, 5

This i s

P r e s u m a b l y , P e t i t i o n e r makes the argument t h a t t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e
under t h e s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n i s broader than i t s f e d e r a l c o u n t e r p a r t because he
r e c o g n i z e s t h a t he had no f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o t h e e f f e c t i v e
a s s i s t a n c e of p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n counsel d u r i n g h i s i n i t i a l s t a t e p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n
p r o c e e d i n g . The United S t a t e s Supreme Court has e x p r e s s l y h e l d that,, under t h e
f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n , x v [ t ] h e r e i s no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o an a t t o r n e y i n s t a t e
post-conviction proceedings.
Consequently,
a petitioner
cannot
claim
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel i n such p r o c e e d i n g s . " Coleman
v.

Thompson,

501 U.S.

722,

152 (1991).

See a l s o Menzles

v.

Galetka,

2006

UT 81,

184, 150 P. 3d 480 ("We do, however, note t h a t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court has
previously declined t o recognize a federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to the e f f e c t i v e
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consistent

he argues, with other jurisdictions that have

recognized a state constitutional right to effective postconviction counsel under the due process clause of their state
constitutions.

However, the case law from Alaska, Florida, and

Mississippi upon which Petitioner relies and the arguments he
makes are unpersuasive.
P. 3d 889

(Alaska

2003)

It is true that in Grinols

v.

State,

74

the Alaska Supreme Court held that "the

right to counsel in a first application for post-conviction
relief is of a constitutional nature, required under the due
process clause of the Alaska Constitution,'7 id.

at

894,

and, not

surprisingly, that this includes the right to effective
representation which may be challenged in a second petition for
post-conviction relief.

See

id.

at

895.

However, whether the

Florida Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to
the effective assistance of counsel under the Florida
Constitution is, at best, unclear.

As noted in the concurring

opinion in Arbelaez

738 So. 2d 326 (Fla.

v. Butterworth,

1999),

the Florida Supreme Court has "sent out an ambiguous, if not
implicitly contradictory signal, when [it] declined to recognize
a specific constitutional obligation of the State for provision
of post-conviction counsel in capital cases, while at the same
time recognizing a limited constitutional due process right to
counsel in all post-conviction proceedings."

Id.

at

assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings."').

-42-

329

(Anstead, J,, concurring).
The same is true of the Mississippi case, Jackson
132 So.2d

187 (Miss.

1999),

cited by Petitioner,

v.

State,

Although the

concurring opinion in that case stated that the majority erred in
suggesting that a right to post-conviction counsel is found in
the Mississippi Constitution, see id.

at 191-92,

opinion itself makes no such express conclusion.

the majority
Rather, in the

context of encouraging the Mississippi legislature to establish a
statewide public defender system, the Mississippi Supreme Court
stated, "[w]e therefore find that [the petitioner], as a death
row inmate, is entitled to appointed and compensated counsel to
represent him in his state post-conviction efforts."

Id.

at

191.

No mention was made whether this entitlement was constitutional
or statutory in nature.
Moreover, it is at least noteworthy that the supreme courts
of other states have specifically held that their state
constitutions do not include a right to post-conviction counsel.
See In re Beasley,

107 S.W.3d

696r

697

(Tex.

App.

2003)

("Similarly, the Texas Constitution provides no right to counsel
in a post-conviction collateral attack."); McKague v.
Nevada

State

Prison,

912 P.2d

255,

258

(Nev.

1996)

Warden,

("The Nevada

Constitution also does not guarantee a right to counsel in postconviction proceedings. . . . " ) ; State v. Crowder,
652,

653-654

(Ohio 1991)

573

N.E.2d

(>xWe agree with the court of appeals
-43-

that an indigent petitioner has neither a state nor a federal
constitutional right to be represented by an attorney in a postconviction proceeding,").
Finally, in its reply to Petitioner's memorandum in
opposition to the motion to dismiss, the State raises a
noteworthy policy argument against the position that the Utah
Constitution should be interpreted to guarantee a right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. According to the
State, if the Utah Constitution guarantees a right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, it will allow
petitioners "to file endless successive petitions re-litigating
claims that they previously lost and raising new claims that they
should have raised in a prior proceeding, and arguing that the
court must reach their merits because any one of a seemingly
endless string of post-conviction counsel had been ineffective."
(State's Mem. in Reply at 31.)

Under this "infinite continuum of

litigation" argument, a state constitutional right to postconviction counsel would result in "an infinite continuum of
litigation in many criminal cases." Bonin v. Vasquez,
425,

429

(9th

Cir.

1993).

As the Bonin

999

court noted, if a

petitioner
has a [constitutional] right to competent counsel in
his or her first state post-conviction proceeding
because that is the first forum in which the

-44-

F.2d

ineffectiveness of trial counsel can be alleged, it
follows that the petitioner has a [constitutional]
right to counsel in the second state post-conviction
proceeding, for that is the first forum in which he or
she can raise a challenge based on counsel's
performance in the first state post-conviction
proceeding. . . . And so it would go.
Id.

at 429-30.

The same conclusion was reached by the Arizona

Supreme Court when it considered this same issue.
Mata,

916 P.2d

1035

(Ariz.

1996),

In State

the Arizona Supreme Court held

that
if defendant deserved effective representation on his
first [post-conviction petition] to litigate effectiveness on appeal, then it must follow that he be
effectively represented on the second in order to
litigate the first. This is because defendant's
argument is based on the ill-begotten notion that the
right to effective counsel on appeal is empty without
effective counsel to challenge appellate counsel's
performance.

v.

According to defendant's own logic, the

right to effective assistance on the first [postconviction petition] would also be meaningless without
another proceeding in which defendant could argue that
counsel on that petition was inadequate.
-45-

We reject

this infinitely regressive notion.
Id.

at

1052-53.

In light of the foregoing policy argument, if the Utah
Constitution is interpreted to include a right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel, then any capital
petitioner would be in a position to effectively delay and even
halt the full effects of his sentence.

In order to avoid this

arguably unjust and one-sided result, the Utah Constitution
should not be interpreted to include a right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel.

Support for this

conclusion is found in Menzies

There the State argued

itself.

that a state constitutional right to the effective assistance of
post-conviction counsel "would make capital post-conviction
litigation interminable and end the finality of death sentences."
Menzies,

2006 UT 81 at §84.

The Utah Supreme Court side-stepped

making a direct ruling on this argument by stating that "Ma]s
important as finality is, it does not have a higher value than
constitutional guarantees of liberty.'"
P.2d at 1035).

Id.

(quoting Hurst,

111

Nevertheless, in the context of the State's

infinite continuum of litigation argument, the Supreme Court
specifically noted that the PCRA prevents this from occurring
because "Utah's post-conviction legislation and associated rules
contain appropriate limitations to assist courts in streamlining
post-conviction review in death penalty cases."
-46-

Id.

Since a

constitutional right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel would not be subject to the statutory and rule
constraints the Supreme Court has held exists to prevent the
possibility of endless post-conviction litigation, the Supreme
Court's statement is at least an implied rejection of the notion
that the Utah Constitution includes a right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel.
Based upon a careful assessment of the arguments provided by
Petitioner in support of his contention that capital petitioners
enjoy a state constitutional right to the effective assistance of
post-conviction counsel, it is the Court's conclusion that
Petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated that a proper
interpretation of the Utah Constitution includes a right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel.

Therefore,

Petitioner cannot assert an exception, common law or otherwise,
to the PCRA's procedural bar for claims that were raised and
addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in a prior
post-conviction petition based upon a state constitutional right
to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel because he
has failed to demonstrate that a proper interpretation of the
Utah Constitution guarantees him such a right.

-47-

d.

Whether an Exception Exists to the Procedural Bar
Rule Based Upon a Statutory Right to the Effective
Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel

Although Petitioner has not shown that he had a state
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel during his
initial post-conviction proceedings, nor that a coininon law
exception to the procedural bar rule exists based upon
constitutional and common law considerations, under the PCRA he
had a statutory right to post-conviction counsel.

During the

pendency of his initial petition for post-conviction relief, the
PCRA required the trial court to determine whether the petitioner
was indigent and, if so, "promptly appoint counsel who is
qualified to represent [petitioners] in death penalty cases as
required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(1)(2)(a). In the Menzies

case, the

Utah Supreme Court considered whether the statutory right to
post-conviction counsel entitled capital petitioners to the
effective assistance of counsel*

The Supreme Court noted that

"[g]iven the high stakes inherent in such [capital postconviction] proceedings—life and liberty—providing a petitioner
the procedural safeguard of appointed counsel is an important
step in assuring that the underlying criminal conviction was
accurate."

Menzies,

2006 UT 81 at 182.

In order to take

seriously this legislatively created protection, the Supreme
-48-

Court concluded that the statutory right to post-conviction
counsel necessarily includes "a statutory right to effective
assistance of counsel."

Id,

When the State filed its memorandum in support of the motion
to dismiss on February 15, 2008, the State did not contest that
Petitioner had a statutory right to the effective assistance of
post-conviction counsel.

However, new amendments to the PCRA

that went into effect on May 5, 2008 added language specifically
stating that

>N

[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed as

creating the right to the effective assistance of post-conviction
counsel, and relief may not be granted on any claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective."
202(4).

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-

In light of this change, in both a supplemental pleading

filed on July 25, 2008 and its memorandum in reply filed on
February 26, 2009, the State argues that the "no effective
assistance of counsel" provision in the PCRA retroactively
applies to Petitioner's case and, as a result, while he may have
had a statutory right to post-conviction counsel, he did not have
a statutory right to the effective assistance of post-conviction
counsel.

Therefore, the State argues, Petitioner cannot overcome

the PCRA's procedural bar for claims that were raised and
addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in a prior
post-conviction petition by relying on a statutory right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel because the PCRA
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now expressly denies Petitioner this statutory right.
The State provides three reasons in support of its
contention that the new "no effective assistance of counsel"
amendment applies retroactively: First, the new amendment is
merely procedural in nature because it neither narrows nor
eliminates Petitioner's cause of action and only affects how
Petitioner will proceed with his litigation.

Second, the new

amendment merely clarifies the Legislature's original intent with
respect to the right to effective representation in postconviction proceedings that may have been put into question by
the Utah Supreme Court's erroneous conclusion in Menzies

that the

prior Section 202 of the PCRA included the right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel.

Third, the Legislature

intended that the new amendment apply to Petitioner's case.
During the 2008 legislative session, Petitioner's case was
pending and counsel for the State testified before the Senate
Judiciary, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Justice Committee and
enumerated the problems the new amendment was intended to remedy
and that the amendments were needed immediately.

Petitioner argues in response that the Menzies

decision

effectively vested him with a statutory right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel and that this Court does
not have the authority to overrule the Utah Supreme Court.

-50-

In

addition, he also contends that his right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel is substantive in nature
and that the amendment does more than simply clarify the PCRA, it
eliminates this substantive right.

Therefore, according to

Petitioner, the "no effective assistance of counsel" amendment
should not be applied retroactively.

After carefully considering the arguments, it is the Court's
conclusion that the "no effective assistance of counsel"
amendment to the PCRA does not retroactively apply to
Petitioner's case and, therefore, that Petitioner was entitled to
the effective representation of post-conviction counsel during
his initial post-conviction proceeding.
First, the Court finds unpersuasive the State's argument
that the Legislature intended the new amendment to apply
retroactively.

Nowhere in the 2008 amendments to the PCRA is

there language that either impliedly or expressly declares that
the new legislation should apply retroactively.

Moreover, the

fact that counsel for the State argued before a Senate committee
that

>%

[w]e need these amendments now for the reasons that I've,

I've already said," (State's Supplemental Mem. in Supp. at 18,)
does little, in the Court's view, to suggest that the Legislature
itself intended the 2008 amendments to apply retroactively.
Second, because Petitioner was appointed counsel under the
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PCRA and the Utah Supreme Court has held that capital postconviction petitioners are statutorily entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel under the PCRA, the mandate rule requires
this Court to abide by the Supreme Court's ruling*

Under the

mandate rule,
pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in
a case become the law of the case and must be followed
in subsequent proceedings of that case.

The lower

court must not depart from the mandate, and any change
with respect to the legal issues governed by the
mandate must be made by the appellate court that
established it or by a court to which it, in turn, owes
obedience.

Thurston
1995).

v.

Box Elder

County,

892 P. 2d 1034,

1037-1038

(Utah

The fact that the Supreme Court held in a separate case

that capital petitioners have a statutory right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel does not alter the
application of the rule.
Menziesf

In light of the Supreme Court ruling in

this Court must afford Petitioner the right to the

effective assistance of post-conviction counsel.
Third, while it is true that "statutory amendments that
merely clarify an ambiguity in an original statute

given retroactive effect," Evans

& Sutherland,

[must] be

953 P.2d

at

440,

they can only be "applied retroactively[] so long as they M o
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not

enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights.'"
Keeganr
at 884).

896 P.2d at

620 (quoting Board of Equalization,

864 P. 2d

While not dispositive, the timing of the >xno effective

assistance of counsel" amendment certainly suggests that it was
intended not as a clarification of the prior PCRA, but as a
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Menzies.

In

addition, the amendment nowhere includes language indicating that
it was enacted for purposes of clarification.

Moreover, as noted

above, Petitioner had a vested right to the effective assistance
of post-conviction counsel during his initial post-conviction
proceedings which the amendment would eliminate if applied
retroactively.
Finally, the right to the effective assistance of counsel is
a substantive right.

In the Menzies

decision, the Supreme Court

set aside the trial court's judgment against the petitioner
because the deficient performance of his attorney "effectively
forfeited the entire post-conviction proceeding itself."
Menziesr

2006 UT 81 at 51100.

Clearly, post-conviction counsel's

failure in that case to provide effective representation
literally undermined every substantive right the petitioner was
entitled to during the course of the proceedings.

The fact that

the failure to provide effective representation affected the
petitioner's substantive rights is a good indication that the
right to the effective assistance of counsel is itself a
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substantive right.
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is the Court's
conclusion that the "no effective assistance of counsel"
provision cannot retroactively apply to Petitioner's case and,
therefore, that Petitioner had a statutory right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel during his initial postconviction proceedings.
Despite this conclusion, however, it is not accurate that
Petitioner's statutory right requires the Court to read into the
PCRA an exception to the procedural bar for successive claims
that were raised and addressed, or could have been, but were not,
raised in a prior post-conviction petition based upon ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel.

The statutory right to

the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel is a
legislatively created protection and, therefore, it is the
Legislature that has the power, and the prerogative, to determine
whether this statutory right constitutes an exception to the
procedural bar rule with respect to successive post-conviction
claims that were raised and addressed, or could have been, but
were not, raised in a prior post-conviction proceeding.
language from the Menzies

Indeed,

decision itself does not demonstrate

otherwise and, in fact, supports this general principle. As
previously explained, on appeal in Menzies

the State presented

the Supreme Court with the "infinite continuum of litigation"
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argument contending "that ^writing an effective

assistance

requirement i n t o section [78-35a-202] would make c a p i t a l p o s t conviction l i t i g a t i o n interminable and end the f i n a l i t y of death
sentences.'7'

Id. at 184.

In response to t h i s argument, the

Supreme Court s t a t e d t h a t , while n [w]e would be remiss in our
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r o l e i f we were t o allow f i n a l i t y to trump the
i n t e r e s t s at stake in post-conviction death penalty
proceedings[,] . . . Utah's post-conviction l e g i s l a t i o n and
associated rules contain appropriate l i m i t a t i o n s t o a s s i s t courts
in streamlining post-conviction review in death penalty c a s e s , "
Id.

For support, the Supreme Court cited to Section 78-35a-106,

where the Legislature excluded from the PCRA any reference t o
i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of post-conviction counsel as an exception
to the procedural bar for successive claims t h a t were r a i s e d and
addressed, or could have been, but were not, r a i s e d in a p r i o r
post-conviction p e t i t i o n . 6
Based upon the foregoing a n a l y s i s , i t i s the C o u r t ' s

6
In a d d i t i o n , i n concluding t h a t the s t a t u t o r y r i g h t t o p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n
counsel i n c l u d e s t h e r i g h t t o t h e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l , t h e Supreme
Court e x p l a i n e d t h a t , by p r o v i d i n g for t h i s r i g h t , i t b e l i e v e d t h e L e g i s l a t u r e
had e x p r e s s l y r e c o g n i z e d t h e "high s t a k e s i n h e r e n t in such p r o c e e d i n g s . "
Menzies
v, Galetka,
2006 UT 81, 182, 150 P. 3d 480.
In o r d e r t o t a k e s e r i o u s l y t h e
L e g i s l a t u r e ' s p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e appointment of c o u n s e l , i t was e s s e n t i a l , i n t h e
Supreme C o u r t ' s view, t o conclude t h a t t h e r i g h t t o p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n counsel
i n c l u d e d the r i g h t t o t h e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . See i d . ("We r e f u s e
merely t o pay l i p s e r v i c e t o t h i s l e g i s l a t i v e l y c r e a t e d p r o t e c t i o n by h o l d i n g
t h a t a p e t i t i o n e r in a p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n death p e n a l t y proceeding i s only e n t i t l e d
t o i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of appointed counsel. T h e r e f o r e , we hold t h a t [the
p e t i t i o n e r ] has a s t a t u t o r y r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel under Utah
Code s e c t i o n 7 8 - 3 5 a - 2 0 2 . " ) .
There was never any i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e Supreme
C o u r t ' s reasoning t h a t t h i s c o n c l u s i o n was somehow c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y mandated.
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conclusion that because the right to post-conviction counsel is a
legislatively created protection, it is constitutionally
permissible, and within the Legislature's power, to exclude from
the PCRA an exception to the procedural bar for successive claims
that were raised and addressed, or could have been, but were not,
raised in a prior post-conviction petition based upon ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel.

Therefore, Petitioner

cannot rely on a statutory right to the effective assistance of
post-conviction counsel to overcome the procedural bar for
successive claims that were raised and addressed, or could have
been, but were not, raised in a prior post-conviction proceeding.

B,

Petitioner's Post-Conviction Claims
1.

Timeliness

The statute of limitations set forth in the PCRA required
Petitioner to file his successive petition for post-conviction
relief within one year from the time his cause of action accrued.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(1).

In Petitioner's case, his

post-conviction action accrued on October 5, 1998, the date on
which the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review of
his direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.

Thus, Petitioner

had until October 5, 1999 to file his current post-conviction
action.

Because his petition was not filed until November 5,

2007, it is over eight years too late, and therefore it is
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untimely.

With the exception of claim I, 7 P e t i t i o n e r does not

d i r e c t l y contest the untimeliness of his successive p e t i t i o n
other than to quote language from Julian

i n d i c a t i n g t h a t "the

mere passage of time can never j u s t i f y continued imprisonment of
one who has been denied fundamental r i g h t s . "
254 (emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) .

Julian,

966 P. 2d at

Rather, P e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t s t h a t the

Court should excuse the untimeliness pursuant to the PCRA's
" i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e " exception.

As explained previously in

Section I I I , A . l , a . , the Utah Supreme Court has s p e c i f i c a l l y held
t h a t a t r i a l court "presented with an untimely post-conviction
p e t i t i o n must consider the i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e exception before
disposing of the p e t i t i o n . "

Johnson,

2006 UT 21 at 116.

An

analysis of what c o n s t i t u t e s an exception "in the i n t e r e s t s of
j u s t i c e " involves more than simply making a determination t h a t
the successive claim i s non-frivolous.

The Court must go one

step further and examine both the meritoriousness of the
p e t i t i o n e r ' s claim and the reason for [the] untimely f i l i n g . "
Adams,

2005

UT 62 at

116.

The apparent advantage of t h i s approach i s t h a t , by engaging
in a merits a n a l y s i s of each untimely successive claim, the p o s t -

7

In claim 1, P e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t s t h a t he could only have brought t h i s claim
a f t e r l e a r n i n g of t h e Utah Supreme C o u r t ' s use of an erroneous l e g a l s t a n d a r d t o
e v a l u a t e whether he had been p r e j u d i c e d by t r i a l c o u n s e l ' s d e f i c i e n t performance
during the p e n a l t y phase of t h e t r i a l .
Since t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n
affirming t h e d e n i a l of h i s i n i t i a l p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n p e t i t i o n was not e n t e r e d
u n t i l January 26, 2007, he a s s e r t e d t h a t he had one year from t h a t d a t e t o r a i s e
t h i s claim.
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conviction court will presumably be ensuring that "truly"
legitimate claims are not overlooked, i.e., those claims "where
x

an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of

a constitutional right has occurred' that would make it
^unconscionable' not to reexamine the issue."
UT 3 at

12 7.

Gardner III,

2007

However, a merits review of claims is generally

inconsistent with the purposes of the procedural bar rule- to
promote finality, conserve judicial resources, and encourage the
orderly and prompt administration of justice.

v. Wiseman,

297 F.3d

975,

979-80

(10th

Cir.

See United States

2002)

(procedural bar

rule promotes "^the interests of judicial efficiency,
conservation of scarce judicial resources, and orderly and prompt

administration of justice.'" (quoting Hines
F.2d 506,

509 (10th

Cir.

1992)).

v.

United

States,

971

Indeed, in the case of

successive claims that are untimely, this purpose is undermined
by the interests of justice analysis which requires that a merits
review of each claim be performed even for those claims which
may, ultimately, be procedurally barred and, hence, would
otherwise not require a merits review.
In order to avoid having to engage in an unnecessary review
of the merits of Petitioner's successive claims, the Court has
opted to simply assume that Petitioner's successive petition was
timely filed and consider first whether the successive claims are
procedurally barred.

If, and only if, the Court determines that
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a claim would not be procedurally barred had it been timely filed
will the Court then conduct an interests of justice analysis on
that claim to determine whether the untimeliness of the claim
should be excused.

2.

Claims that Were Raised and Addressed in a Prior
Proceeding

Petitioner candidly and commendably concedes that the
following claims were raised and addressed in a prior proceeding:
Claim 1, alleging that Petitioner's constitutionally
deficient legal representation at the penalty phase of his
capital trial requires reversal of his death sentence.

This

claim was previously raised as claim 1 in the direct appeal of
his conviction and sentence, and as claims 4, 17, 18, and 21 in
his initial post-conviction petition, and as claims 1, 3, and 10
in the appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction
petition.

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 34);

Claim 2, alleging that Petitioner's conviction and sentence
of death were obtained in violation of his constitutional right
to the competent assistance of mental health experts.

This claim

was previously raised as claim 1 in the direct appeal, and as
claims 3 and 21 in his initial petition for post-conviction
relief, and as claims 1 and 7 in the appeal from the denial of
his initial post-conviction petition.
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(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp.

at 133-34);
Claim 3, alleging that Petitioner's guilty plea is
constitutionally defective.

This claim was previously raised as

claim 1 in the direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, and
as claims 1, 1(a)(1), 1(a)(2), 1(a)(3), 2, and 17 in his initial
petition for post-conviction relief, and as claim 2 in the appeal
from the denial of his initial post-conviction petition.

(See

Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 1 4 0 ) ;
Claim 4, alleging that Petitioner is actually innocent of
Kaye Tiede's and Beth Potts' homicides and there is no factual
basis for his guilty plea.

This claim was previously raised as

claims 17 and 18 in is initial petition for post-conviction
relief,

(See Pet'r Mem, in Supp. at 157);

Claim 6, alleging that Petitioner's conviction and sentence
are invalid because defense counsel labored under actual
conflicts of interest that adversely impacted his representation
of Petitioner.

This claim was previously raised as claim 24 in

his initial post-conviction petition and as claim 12 in the
appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction petition.
(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 190);
Claim 7, alleging that Petitioner's penalty phase voir dire
was infected by trial court error, prosecutorial misconduct, and
the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

This claim was

previously raised as claim 14 in his initial petition for post-
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conviction relief and as claims 5 and 6 in the appeal from the
denial of his initial post-conviction petition.

(See Petfr Mem.

in Supp, at 201);
Claim 8, alleging that Petitioner was prejudiced by trial
counsel's constitutionally ineffective assistance throughout the
penalty phase voir dire.

This claim was previously raised as

claim 14 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief and
as claim 5 in the appeal from the denial of his initial postconviction petition.

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 221)/

Claim 11, alleging that trial counsel did not submit written
proposed voir dire questions to the court and failed to take
steps to insure that the jury selection process would result in a
fair and impartial jury.

This claim was previously raised as

claim 14 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief.
(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 255);
Claim 13, alleging that the trial court unconstitutionally
limited the scope of voir dire and asked inappropriate questions
regarding the religion practiced by the jurors.

This claim was

previously raised as claim 15 in the initial petition for postconviction relief.

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 270);

Claim 15, alleging that the trial court erred in giving jury
instructions and a special verdict form that were
unconstitutionally weighed in favor of aggravation over
mitigation.

This claim was previously raised as claims 7, 9, and
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11 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief and as
claim 4 in the appeal from the denial of his initial postconviction petition.

(See Pet'r Mem, in Supp. at 2 9 4 ) ;

Claim 16, alleging that the jury instructions contained no
option for imposition or consideration of a life sentence in
violation of Petitioner's constitutional rights.

This claim was

previously raised as claims 12 and 13 in the initial petition for
post-conviction relief and as claim 4 in the appeal from the
denial of his initial post-conviction petition,

(See Pet'r Mem.

in Supp, at 3 1 0 ) ;
Claim 17, alleging that the reasonable doubt instruction was
unconstitutional.

This claim was previously raised as claim 6 in

the initial petition for post-conviction relief and as claim 4 in
the appeal from the denial of his post-conviction petition.

(See

Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 3 2 2 ) ;
Claim 18, alleging that the trial court erred in giving jury
instructions at the penalty phase that improperly shifted the
burden of proof to Petitioner.

This claim was previously raised

as claims 5 and 8 in the initial petition for post-conviction
relief.

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 327);

Claim 20, alleging that Petitioner's conviction is
unconstitutional because there was a complete breakdown in the
adversarial process.

This claim repeats the claims alleged in

claim 1 and claim 6 of his current post-conviction petition.
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As

noted above, the allegations raised in these claims were
previously raised as claims 1 in the direct appeal of his
conviction and sentence, and as claims 4, 17, 18, 21, and 24 in
his initial post-conviction petition, and as claims 1, 3, 10, and
12 in the appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction
petition.

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 34, 1 9 0 ) ;

Claim 22, alleging that Petitioner's constitutional rights
were violated by the improper admission of the taped statement of
Scott Manley.

This claim was previously raised as claim 22 in

the initial petition for post-conviction relief and as claim 8 in
the appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction
petition.

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 3 5 0 ) ;

Claim 23, alleging that Petitioner's convictions,
confinement, and sentence are unconstitutional due to
prosecutorial misconduct.

This claim was previously raised as

claim 23 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief and
as claim 9 in the appeal from the denial of his initial postconviction petition.

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 3 6 8 ) ;

Claim 26, alleging that the instructions, taken as a whole,
fail to narrow the category of persons eligible for the death
penalty in violation of Petitioner's constitutional rights.

This

claim was previously raised as claim 10 in the initial petition
for post-conviction relief.

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 3 9 0 ) ;

Claim 28, alleging that lethal injection violates
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P e t i t i o n e r ' s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment.

This claim was previously r a i s e d as claims

20 and 25 in the i n i t i a l p e t i t i o n for post-conviction r e l i e f and
as claims 11 and 13 in the appeal from the denial of his p o s t conviction p e t i t i o n .

(See P e t ' r Mem. in Supp. at 401); 8

Claim 29, a l l e g i n g i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of s t a t e counsel.
With respect to the i n e f f e c t i v e assistance of t r i a l and a p p e l l a t e
counsel, t h i s claim was previously raised as claim 19 in the
i n i t i a l p e t i t i o n for post-conviction r e l i e f and as claim 10 in
the appeal from the denial of his post-conviction p e t i t i o n .

(See

P e t ' r Mem. in Supp. at 409);
Claim 30, a l l e g i n g t h a t P e t i t i o n e r was denied his
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s because of the cumulative impact of e r r o r s .
This claim was previously raised as claim 2 in the d i r e c t appeal
of h i s conviction and sentence.

(See P e t ' r Mem. in Supp. at

416) .

All of the foregoing claims were raised and addressed in a
p r i o r proceeding, e i t h e r at t r i a l , on d i r e c t appeal, in
P e t i t i o n e r ' s i n i t i a l p e t i t i o n for post-conviction r e l i e f , or in
his appeal from the denial of his i n i t i a l p e t i t i o n for post8

In a d d i t i o n t o acknowledging t h a t t h i s claim was p r e v i o u s l y r a i s e i n h i s
i n i t i a l p e t i t i o n e r f o r p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f and i n t h e a p p e a l from t h e d e n i a l
of h i s p e t i t i o n , in h i s memorandum i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e S t a t e ' s motion t o
d i s m i s s , he moved t o withdraw t h i s claim on the b a s i s t h a t , M [ i ] n t h e wake of new
developments, [ P e t i t i o n e r ] does not b e l i e v e t h a t t h e P e t i t i o n i s t h e proper forum
for t h i s claim i n i t s c u r r e n t form."
( P e t ' r Mem, in Opp, a t 123).
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conviction relief and, therefore, they are procedurally barred
under the PCRA and no statutory exception exists that would
permit the Court to consider the merits of these claims.

See

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1) (b) and (d). See also Kell,

2008 UT

62 at 113 (a post-conviction petitioner "is not eligible for
relief on claims that were xraised or addressed' on direct
appeal.").

This is so even for claims that appellate counsel

failed to raise in the most effective manner.

See id.

at $17

(after opportunity to be heard on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
"presume[s] that [it] gave full consideration to the claims,
regardless of whether [petitioner's] counsel raised them in the
most effective manner."). See also State v. Carter,
889 (Utah 1989)

776 P.2d

886,

(Supreme Court has, "after fully considering the

substance of particular claims raised on appeal, summarily (and
often without written analysis) dismissed the same as meritless
or of no effect. . . . Accordingly, after fully reviewing every
claim raised in [a] case, we discuss at length only those issues
critical to th[e] appeal.").
However, in Hurstf

the Utah Supreme Court stated that a

"ground for relief from a conviction or sentence that has once
been fully and fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a prior [postconviction] proceeding should not be readjudicated unless it can
be shown that there are ^unusual circumstances.'"
P.2d at 1036 (emphasis added).

Hurst,

777

Broadly speaking, the Supreme
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Court has defined "unusual circumstances" to mean circumstances
"where an obvious i n j u s t i c e or a s u b s t a n t i a l and p r e j u d i c i a l
denial of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t has occurred."

Id, at 1035.

Nevertheless, although i t remains unclear what, p r e c i s e l y r
c o n s t i t u t e s the f u l l range of "unusual circumstances," the
Supreme Court provided several p o s s i b i l i t i e s , " [ f ] o r example, a
p r i o r adjudication i s not a bar to reexamination of a conviction
if there has been a r e t r o a c t i v e change in the law, a subsequent
discovery of suppressed evidence, or newly discovered evidence,"
Id.
P e t i t i o n e r makes several arguments for the proposition t h a t
unusual circumstances e x i s t that excuse the procedural bar as i t
applies to the successive claims he r a i s e s t h a t have already been
raised and addressed in a p r i o r proceeding. 9
9

In t h e s e c t i o n of h i s memorandum i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e S t a t e ' s motion t o
d i s m i s s where he p r e s e n t s h i s d i s c u s s i o n t h a t t h e claims t h a t were p r e v i o u s l y
r a i s e d a r e not p r o c e d u r a l l y b a r r e d f P e t i t i o n e r r a i s e s two i s s u e s t h a t , i n t h e
C o u r t ' s view, a r e not r e l e v a n t t o whether "unusual c i r c u m s t a n c e s " e x i s t t h a t
would excuse t h e p r o c e d u r a l b a r .
F i r s t , P e t i t i o n e r informs t h e Court t h a t t h e Utah A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s Office
i s engaged in a two-pronged e f f o r t " t o e l i m i n a t e the Utah Supreme C o u r t ' s common
law e x c e p t i o n s t o f a i l u r e s t o r a i s e claims i n p r i o r p r o c e e d i n g s r e g a r d l e s s of t h e
resulting unfairness."
( P e t ' r Mem. in 0pp. a t 4 5 ) .
The f i r s t prong i s t h e
Attorney G e n e r a l ' s u n i l a t e r a l attempt t o amend t h e PCRA t o i t s advantage and t o
t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e of p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n p e t i t i o n e r s . The second prong i s t o amend
t h e Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n t o allow t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , r a t h e r than t h e Supreme Court,
t o d e f i n e p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n p r o c e d u r e s , r i g h t s , and r e m e d i e s .
Even i f what
P e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t s i s t r u e , simply because t h e Attorney General may be s e e k i n g
t o amend t h e PCRA, with or without t h e input and a s s i s t a n c e of o t h e r i n t e r e s t e d
p a r t i e s , has no b e a r i n g whatsoever on whether "unusual c i r c u m s t a n c e s " e x i s t t h a t
would excuse t h e p r o c e d u r a l bar in t h i s c a s e . Obviously, t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s
Office i s e n t i t l e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e in the l e g i s l a t i v e p r o c e s s and seek t o a f f e c t
t h e laws of t h e s t a t e j u s t as any o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n or governmental agency or
i n d i v i d u a l i s e n t i t l e d t o do. Moreover, P e t i t i o n e r ' s b a l d a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e
Attorney G e n e r a l ' s motive i s t o " s e e k [ ] g r e a t e r power t o e x p e d i t e e x e c u t i o n s
r e g a r d l e s s of t h e m e r i t s of t h e c l a i m s , " i d . a t 45, i s unhelpful and simply
i r r e l e v a n t t o any d i s c u s s i o n concerning t h e e x i s t e n c e of common law e x c e p t i o n s
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F i r s t , P e t i t i o n e r argues t h a t , a f t e r having received
adequate funds and performing a more thorough i n v e s t i g a t i o n of
the case than was previously performed by p r i o r post-conviction
counsel, new f a c t s not previously known were discovered which (1)
e s t a b l i s h the denial of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t ,

(2) might have

changed the outcome of the t r i a l , and (3) e s t a b l i s h the e x i s t e n c e
of fundamental unfairness in P e t i t i o n e r ' s conviction. 1 0
P e t ' r Mem. in Opp. at 48).

(See

P e t i t i o n e r ' s b a s i c argument i s t h a t ,

on the basis of new evidence he discovered as a r e s u l t of more
funding and a more thorough i n v e s t i g a t i o n of his case, an

to the procedural bar r u l e .
Second, with r e s p e c t t o s e v e r a l of h i s s u c c e s s i v e claims, i n c l u d i n g c l a i m s
a s s e r t i n g i s s u e s t h a t were r a i s e d and addressed in a p r i o r proceeding, P e t i t i o n e r
argues t h a t " t h e PCRA has been c r a f t e d by t h e S t a t e t o i t s decided advantage .
, . [because t ] h e S t a t e has made t h e o r i g i n a l t r i a l c o u r t t h e f i r s t s t o p [for
p e t i t i o n e r s seeking post-conviction r e l i e f ] . "
I d . a t 73,
According t o
P e t i t i o n e r , t h i s model c r e a t e s a c o n f l i c t because i t i s *commonsense t h a t
a t t a c k i n g a j u d g e ' s d e c i s i o n s i s an i n e f f e c t i v e way of g a i n i n g an i m p a r t i a l
h e a r i n g from a c o u r t . "
Id.
As a r e s u l t , p r i o r p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n counsel was
prevented from r a i s i n g c l a i m s , or was r e q u i r e d t o "water down" claims, i n o r d e r
t o avoid p o t e n t i a l l y r a i s i n g t h e i r e of t h e p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n judge who was t h e
same judge who p r e s i d e d a t P e t i t i o n e r ' s t r i a l .
Contrary t o P e t i t i o n e r ' s
a s s e r t i o n s , i t was not t h e Attorney General who was t h e d r a f t e r of t h e r u l e t h a t
r e q u i r e d the t r i a l c o u r t t o p r e s i d e over h i s p r i o r p e t i t i o n for p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n
r e l i e f . Rather, i t was mandated by a r u l e of c i v i l procedure promulgated by t h e
Utah Supreme C o u r t .
See Utah R. Civ, P. 65C{f).
Furthermore, i t i s not
commonsense, but more a jaded view of U t a h ' s j u d i c i a l system, t h a t c h a l l e n g i n g
a j u d g e ' s d e c i s i o n p r e c l u d e s an i m p a r t i a l h e a r i n g on whether t h e j u d g e ' s p r i o r
r u l i n g s or a c t i o n s were c o r r e c t . Judges a r e e t h i c a l l y r e q u i r e d t o be i m p a r t i a l ,
r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i s s u e s t h a t a r e being c o n s i d e r e d . See Utah Code of J u d i c i a l
Conduct, Canon 1 and Canon 3(B)• P e t i t i o n e r has p r e s e n t e d no evidence whatsoever
t h a t h i s p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n judge a c t e d u n e t h i c a l l y or was incapable of being
i m p a r t i a l when p r e s e n t e d with i s s u e s r e l a t i n g t o how the judge conducted t h e
trial.
Again, t h i s argument i s unhelpful and i r r e l e v a n t t o any d i s c u s s i o n
concerning t h e e x i s t e n c e of common law e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e p r o c e d u r a l bar r u l e .
10

P e t i t i o n e r a l s o argues t h a t t h e c l a i m s were "overlooked i n good f a i t h
with no i n t e n t t o d e l a y o r abuse t h e w r i t . " Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 1031
(Utah 1989).
This p a r t i c u l a r common law e x c e p t i o n c l e a r l y cannot apply t o t h e
claims t h a t were r a i s e d and addressed i n a p r i o r p r o c e e d i n g . Obviously, i f t h e
claims were p r e v i o u s l y r a i s e d , they were not overlooked.
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exception to the procedural bar exists for all of the claims he
has raised in his successive post-conviction petition that were
raised and address in a prior proceeding.

Therefore, he

contends, the Court should reconsider these previously raised
claims in light of the new evidence.
As noted above, in 1989 when the Hurst

case was decided, the

Supreme Court indicated that newly discovered evidence
constitutes "unusual circumstances" under the common law that
would justify reconsidering a previously adjudicated claim.
However, in Gardner

II,

the Supreme Court explained that, with

the .passage of the PCRA in 1996, the legislature effectively
codified the common law "newly discovered evidence" exception to
the procedural bar.

See Gardner

II,

2004

UT 42 at

114

("Likewise, the [PCRA] also provides for relief on the basis of
^newly discovered material evidence,' thereby incorporating the
second Hurst

factor.").

104 (1) (e).

In doing so, rather than identifying newly discovered

See also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-

evidence as an exception to the procedural bar rule, the
legislature reformulated it as an independent statutory ground
for post-conviction relief.

As a result, technically there is no

exception under the PCRA to the procedural bar rule on the basis
of newly discovered evidence.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court has held that "despite
the statutory enactment of the majority of the Hurst
-68-

factors, all

five common law exceptions retain their independent
constitutional significance and may be examined by this court in
our review of post-conviction petitions/' Gardner

II,

2004 UT 42

at 115, the Supreme Court also expressly stated that it will
"defer to the legislature unless these fundamental safeguards are
repealed or otherwise restricted."

Id.

Because the legislature

has neither repealed nor otherwise restricted the PCRA's "newly
discovered evidence'7 ground for relief since Gardner

II was

decided, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(1); Utah Code Ann. § 7835a-104(l) (1996), the requirements for relying upon newly
discovered evidence under the PCRA and as a common law exception
are co-extensive.

It follows that because Petitioner has

asserted an exception to the procedural bar rule on the basis "of
new facts not previously known which show the denial of a
constitutional right or might have changed the outcome of
[Petitioner's] trial [, and] the existence of fundamental
unfairness in [Petitioner's] conviction," (Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at
48) (emphasis added), he cannot overcome the procedural bar for
the successive claims he raises that were raised and addressed in
a prior proceeding unless he satisfies the requirements set forth
in the PCRA for raising a ground for relief based upon newly
discovered evidence.
Under the PCRA, reliance upon newly discovered evidence
requires a petitioner to establish that
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(I) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's
counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or
sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any
previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction
proceeding, and the evidence could not have been
discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely
cumulative of evidence that was known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely
impeachment evidence; and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly
discovered material evidence demonstrates that

no

reasonable trier of fact could have found the
petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the
sentence received.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104 (1) (e) (I)-(iv).

Nowhere in his

pleadings does Petitioner specifically address any of these
requirements for relying upon newly discovered evidence.

At

best, and entirely by implication, he suggests that the new
evidence is material, is not merely cumulative, and is not merely
impeachment.

Significantly, however, Petitioner does not discuss

nor demonstrate that the new evidence he now possesses is
evidence that could not have been discovered through the exercise
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of reasonable diligence and included in a prior post-conviction
petition.

That is, he does not affirmatively establish that the

State, or any other governmental agency, purposefully withheld
material evidence or failed to provide material evidence when
requested.

Moreover, there is no indication that the affidavits

and additional reports submitted by Petitioner in his current
successive petition could not have been presented in support of
the claims he raised in his prior post-conviction proceeding.
Rather than argue that the new evidence he now possesses could
not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, Petitioner instead contends that the evidence was not
discovered as a result of inadequate funding for prior postconviction counsel.
There appears to be little question that prior postconviction counsel was frustrated at the funding mechanism in
place at the time Petitioner's initial petition for postconviction relief was filed and that post-conviction counsel
believed the funding provided was inadequate and permitted him to
perform only a perfunctory investigation into Petitioner's case.
Petitioner alleges that prior post-conviction counsel requested
payments in excess of the funding caps from the Division of
Finance ("Finance") pursuant to the administrative rules
governing the payment of counsel, but that these requests were
denied despite the fact that the post-conviction court authorized
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the requested funding. Two separate judges deemed the funding to
be reasonable and necessary. Initially, the funding available to
prior post-conviction counsel was $25,000 in attorney fees and
$10,000 in litigation expenses.

Prior post-conviction counsel

indicated to the post-conviction court that the $10,000 limit was
insufficient to perform an adequate investigation and,
ultimately, the court authorized up to $40,258.59 in litigation
expenses beyond the $10,000 limit.

Upon request from prior post-

conviction counsel for payment, Finance denied the request.
Subsequently, Finance modified its rules and raised the
amount of attorney fees by $5,000, for a maximum of $30,000, and
the amount for litigation expenses by $10,000, for a maximum of
$20,000.

However, based upon the information provided by

Petitioner and the State in their pleadings, it appears that,
although the post-conviction court authorized up to $40,258.59 in
litigation expenses beyond the $10,000 maximum at the time, prior
post-conviction counsel ultimately only requested actual
litigation expenses in the amount of $11,555,16, leaving unused
the amount of $8,4 44.84 by the court's math.
the principle is sound.

Even if incorrect,

Even if prior post-conviction counsel

could not do all he wanted, funding in some amount existed to do
more.

Despite the apparent funding problems Petitioner argues

existed during his prior post-conviction proceedings, it is
difficult for the Court to conclude that, with unused litigation
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funds still available in some amount, the new evidence that
Petitioner now possesses is evidence that could not have been
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence as a
result of insufficient funding.
In any event, even if the Court were to conclude that the
funding available hampered prior post-conviction counsel's
ability to perform the type of investigation he believed was
necessary in the case and, for that reason, the new evidence he
now has not only was not discovered, but also could not have been
discovered, Petitioner fails to discuss or demonstrate that, when
viewed with all of the other evidence presented in the case, no
reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty of the
offense to which he pleaded guilty or subject to the sentences of
death he received following the penalty phase proceedings.
Thus, because Petitioner has failed to satisfy all of the
requirements set forth in 78-35a-104(e)(I)-(iv) for relying upon
newly discovered evidence, either as an independent postconviction claim or as a common law exception to the procedural
bar rule, the State is entitled to a dismissal of Petitioner's
successive claims that were raised and addressed in a prior
proceeding.
Second, in addition to asserting an exception to the
procedural bar on the basis of newly discovered evidence,
Petitioner also specifically argues that ineffective assistance
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of trial, appellate, and prior post-conviction counsel are common
law exceptions to the procedural bar rule.
Supp. at 32-33).

(See Pet'r Mem. in

Ineffective assistance of counsel is not one of

the common law exceptions enumerated in Hurst and, although the
list in Hurst was not intended to be exhaustive, see Gardner
2007 UT 3 at fl8

IIIf

(uWe later clarified that this list of ^good

cause' exceptions is not exhaustive/'), it is also true that the
Utah Supreme Court has never formally recognized ineffective
assistance of counsel as a common law exception to the procedural
bar rule.
In any case, it is simply unclear to the Court how
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel can possibly
constitute a common law exception to the procedural bar of
Petitioner's successive post-conviction claims that were already
raised and addressed in a prior proceeding.

For example, the

fact that trial counsel may have ineffectively raised a claim
that Petitioner now raises again in his successive petition is
irrelevant to whether the claim was raised and addressed in a
prior proceeding, although it would be relevant to an independent
claim on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective in
raising the claim.

Thus, while trial counsel's ineffectiveness

in raising a claim may itself constitute a separate claim on
direct appeal, it does not constitute an exception to the
procedural bar rule for successive post-conviction claims that
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were raised and addressed in a prior proceeding.
The same is true for ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel.

The fact that appellate counsel may have ineffectively

raised a claim that Petitioner now raises again in his successive
petition is irrelevant to whether the claim was raised and
addressed in a prior proceeding, although it would be relevant to
an independent claim in an initial post-conviction petition that
appellate counsel was ineffective in raising the claim.

Thus,

while appellate counsel's ineffectiveness in raising a claim may
itself constitute a separate claim in an initial post-conviction
petition, it does not constitute an exception to the procedural
bar rule for successive post-conviction claims that were raised
and addressed in a prior proceeding.
As for Petitioner's assertion that ineffective assistance of
prior post-conviction counsel constitutes a common law exception
to the procedural bar rule, this argument also fails. As the
Court concluded above in Section III.A.2.c, Petitioner did not
demonstrate that a proper interpretation of the Utah Constitution
includes a right to the effective assistance of post-conviction
counsel.

Therefore, Petitioner cannot assert a common law

exception to the PCRA's procedural bar for claims that were
raised and addressed in a prior proceeding based upon a state
constitutional right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel because the Utah Constitution does not

-75-

guarantee him this right.
Moreover, the Court also concluded above that the right to
the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel is a
legislatively created protection.

As a statutory right, rather

than a common law right, Petitioner cannot rely upon this right
as the basis for asserting a common law exception to the
procedural bar rule for successive post-conviction claims that
were raised and addressed in a prior proceeding.
Therefore, because Petitioner has not demonstrated that
ineffective assistance of trial, ,appellate, or post-conviction
counsel constitute common law exceptions to the procedural bar
rule, the State is entitled to the dismissal of Petitioner's
successive claims that were raised and addressed in a prior
proceeding.
Finally, in the same section of his memorandum in support of
the successive petition where Petitioner discusses the law
governing common law exceptions to the procedural bar rule and
where he specifically asserts that ineffective assistance of
counsel constitutes a common law exception, he also appears to at
least imply that the "severe funding limitations [that] ma[de]
proper and thorough investigation impossible," (Pet'r Mem. in
Supp. at 33), constitutes a common law exception to the
procedural bar rule.

If this is Petitioner's contention, it is,

again, unclear to the Court how this is so.
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Common law

exceptions enumerated by the Supreme Court deal with the
discovery of new or suppressed evidence, new law, and fundamental
or constitutional errors.

Lack of adequate funding for post-

conviction counsel may provide an explanation in support of
Petitioner's allegations that prior post-conviction counsel was
ineffective or why counsel was unable to do a constitutionally
adequate investigation or why counsel failed to discover
important evidence in the case.

Indeed, in addressing his claim

related to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel,
Petitioner asserts that

u

[b]ecause of the administrative rule

which severely limit[ed] funding of both the defense and
investigation of post-conviction cases, including the retention
of the services of crucial and fundamental expert services, . . .
[his prior post-conviction] counsel was unable to provide
effective assistance of counsel."'

See also Menzies,

(Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 4 1 5 ) .

2006 UT 81 at 120 n.3

(in the context of

commenting on "the funds needed to secure [the petitioner] a
proper post-conviction proceeding," the Utah Supreme Court noted
that "it may be the case that the statutory

[funding] scheme

imposes a crippling burden on [the petitioner]."}.

Thus, it is

conceivable that the lack of adequate funding may result in
constitutional or statutory violations.

However, inadequate

funding, in and of itself, is neither a violation of Petitioner's
constitutional rights nor, so long as the proper funding rules
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are followed, is it a violation of Petitioner's statutory rights.
In the Court's view, the lack of adequate funding is not
relevant to whether the procedural bar should be excused with
respect to claims raised by Petitioner in his successive postconviction petition that were already raised and addressed in a
prior proceeding•
Based upon the foregoing analysis, all of Petitioner's
successive claims listed above (all but Claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14,
19, 21, 24, 25 and 27) that were already raised and addressed in
a prior proceeding are procedurally barred under the PCRA and
under the common law and Petitioner has not shown that any
statutory or common law exceptions apply that would permit the
Court to consider the merits of these claims.
Therefore, the State is entitled to a dismissal of these
claims, again, all but Claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 24, 25
and 27.

3.

Claims that Could Have Been, But Were Not, Raised in
Petitioner's Prior Post-Conviction Petition

The PCPA specifically precludes Petitioner from obtaining
"relief . . . upon any ground that • . . could have been, but was
not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(1)(d).

precluded by the common law.

Such claims are also

See Gardner Ir
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888 P. 2d at 613

("Issues that could and should have been raised on direct appeal,
but were not, may not properly be raised in a habeas corpus
proceeding absent unusual circumstances.").

With respect to the

following claims, they are all claims that could have been, but
were not, raised in Petitioner's prior post-conviction petition:
Claim 5, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel
and trial court error in connection with Petitioner's motion to
change venue;
Claim 9, alleging that Petitioner was prejudiced by the
trial court's error in failing to properly strike venire-members
for cause during the penalty phase voir dire;
Claim 10, alleging that the trial court failed to ask
numerous voir dire questions resulting in a flawed jury selection
process;
Claim 12, alleging that Petitioner's jury venire was
prejudicially biased by the trial court's introduction of the
concept of "blood atonement" into the voir dire;
Claim 14, alleging that the exclusion from the jury of
persons who were not members of the LDS Church deprived
Petitioner of the right to trial by a jury drawn from a
representative cross-section of the community;
Claim 19, alleging that the jury was prejudiced by it's
consideration of extrinsic evidence in violation of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the United States
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Constitution;
Claim 21, alleging that Petitioner's constitutional rights
were violated by the improper admission of evidence at the
penalty phase of his trial, including (1) the videotape made by
Deli of Petitioner in the Tiede's cabin before the homicides, (2)
allowing the prosecution to elicit and perform irrelevant and
prejudicial in-court ^demonstrations," (3) opinion testimony from
James Bell, (4) testimony from James Holland, (5) photographs of
the Kaye Tiede and Beth Potts before their deaths, and (6) Linae
Tiede's statement regarding Petitioner's purported devil worship;
Claim 24, alleging that the State failed to disclose
material exculpatory evidence;
Claim 25, alleging that Petitioner's death sentence is
disproportionate to his culpability and violates his
constitutional rights; and
Claim 27, alleging that Petitioner has been prejudiced in
investigating and presenting post-conviction claims and in
gathering additional evidence to prove his entitlement to relief
as a result of an inadequate and unreliable appellate record.

Petitioner nowhere argues that the foregoing claims are ones
that could not have been known and raised in a prior postconviction petition.

As explained previously in Section

III.A,2.a., unlike the procedural bar rule that applies to
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initial post-conviction petitions, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a106(1) ( c), which includes a statutory exception based upon
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, see Utah
Code Ann, § 78-35a-106(2), no exception based upon the
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is expressly
included in the PCRA.

Thus, any successive claim that was raised

or that could have been raised, but was not, in a prior postconviction petition, is procedurally barred and no exception
exists under the PCRA to excuse this failure•
However, although no statutory exception applies to excuse
the failure to raise these types of claims in a prior postconviction petition, because the common law exceptions have
"independent constitutional significance," Gardner

II,

2004 UT 42

at $15, the common law exceptions may be relied upon in order to
overcome the procedural bar.

Petitioner asserts that four common

law exceptions apply that excuse his procedural default,
including the three that were previously discussed in Section
II.B.: (1) the discovery of new evidence as a result of more
funding and a more thorough investigation of the case, (2)
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, (3) that
severe funding limitations existed at the time Petitioner filed
his prior post-conviction petition which made a proper and
thorough investigation of his case impossible, and (4) all of the
claims that were not previously raised were overlooked in good
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faith with no intent to delay or abuse the post-conviction
process.
As an initial matter, the Utah Supreme Court has explained
that before the post-conviction court is required to consider
whether any of the common law exceptions apply to excuse the
procedural bar, a determination must be made that the claims that
could have been raised in a prior post-conviction petition, but
were not, are not frivolous and were not withheld for tactical
reasons.

See Gardner

III,

2001 UT 3 at 126 (because

xx

[f]rivolous

claims, . . . and claims that are withheld for tactical reasons
should be summarily denied[,] . . . a separate and distinct
procedural determination for successive post-conviction claims
[must be] made before [the trial court] reach[es] an analysis
under the x good cause' common law exceptions.").
Other than merely asserting that his claims were overlooked
in good faith, Petitioner nowhere demonstrates that they were not
withheld for tactical reasons.

It may well be that all of the

claims he now raises which could have been raised in a prior
post-conviction petition are non-frivolous in nature, but the
Court must presume that post-conviction counsel had a legitimate
tactical reason for not raising them in the prior petition. See
Gentry,

540 U.S.

at 5 ("When counsel focuses on some issues to

the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he
did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.' 7 ).

-82-

As explained above, in order to overcome this presumption,
Petitioner must show that '"there was no ^conceivable tactical
basis for counsel's actions,'"
Bryant,

Clark,

2004 UT 25 at 16 (quoting

965 P.2d at 542) . Not only has Petitioner not even

attempted to specifically meet his burden, it is unlikely that he
could do so.
All of the claims raised in Petitioner's successive petition
that were not previously raised

are claims for which a

reasonable basis can be articulated as to why they were not
raised in a prior proceeding.

For example, given all of the

circumstances of the case and the limitations in terms of time,
funding, and resources, it is certainly plausible that these
claims were not raised in the initial post-conviction petition
because they were weaker or less persuasive than the other claims
that were raised. Raising weaker claims would have distracted the
post-conviction court from fuller consideration of the stronger
claims.

Raising weaker claims could well have been futile and

resulted in a determination the claims were frivolous on their
face.

This could have been seen as reducing the effectiveness of

the arguments as to the stronger claims. Any of these reasons
constitute a conceivable tactical basis why post-conviction
counsel would not have raised them in Petitioner's prior postconviction petition.
Furthermore, in Petitioner's memorandum in support of his
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successive petition, for every claim that could have been, but
was not, raised in a prior post-conviction petition, Petitioner
states that he fairly presented the issues associated with these
successive claims

N>

in state court pleadings, briefs and

associated filings, hearing, and argument."

(Pet'r Mem, in Supp.

at 174, 235, 252, 259, 277, 331, 338, 379, 385, and 394).

If

that is true, then even though the issues related to his current
claims may not have been specifically and discretely raised as an
independent claim in his prior post-conviction petition, they are
issues that must have been known to prior post-conviction
counsel.

They are not, therefore, claims that were overlooked in

good faith because the issues involved were present in various
state court pleadings submitted or argued by Petitioner's prior
trial, appellate, or post-conviction counsel.
Because Petitioner has not satisfied his burden of
demonstrating that the claims he now raises that could have been,
but were not, raised in his prior post-conviction petition were
not withheld for tactical reasons, the Court cannot consider
whether any of the common law exceptions to the procedural bar
rule apply to his successive petition for post-conviction relief.
On this basis alone, the State is entitled to the dismissal of
these claims.
Nevertheless, even had Petitioner satisfied his burden of
demonstrating that his claims were not withheld for tactical
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reasons, he has not shown that any common law exceptions apply
that would overcome the procedural bar.
First, Petitioner asserts an exception based upon the
discovery of new evidence that resulted from a more recent, and
more thorough, investigation of the case because of increased
funding available.

As previously explained in Section II.B.,

however, because the statutory and common law exceptions for
newly discovered evidence are co-extensive, in order to rely upon
this common law exception, Petitioner must satisfy the strict
requirements set forth in Section 78-35a-104 (e) (I)-(iv).
Petitioner has not met this strict requirement.

At best, and

entirely by implication, his pleadings suggests that the new
evidence he has discovered is material, is not merely cumulative,
and is not merely impeachment.

However, he does not discuss nor

demonstrate that the new evidence he now possesses is evidence
that could not have been discovered through the exercise of
reasonable diligence and included in a prior post-conviction
petition.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104 (1) (f) (I) (".

. .

neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the
evidence . . .

in time to include the evidence in any previously

filed . . . post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could
not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence.''}.

He argues that the lack of funding available for

prior post-conviction counsel prevented counsel from performing a
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constitutionally adequate investigation of Petitioner's case.
This argument, however, is at least somewhat contradicted by the
fact that unused litigation funds were still available at the
conclusion of his prior post-conviction proceedings.
Further, most of the claims do not involve "investigation"
but relate to matters in the record-the change of venue issues,
voir dire, the admission of certain evidence, the jury
composition, and others.
Moreover, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that, when
viewed with all of the other evidence presented in the case, no
reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty of the
offense to which he pleaded guilty or subject to the sentences of
death he received following the penalty phase proceedings.

See

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104 (1) (£) (iv), formerly 78-35a-104 (e) (M.
. , viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact
could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject
to the sentence received.").

Because Petitioner has failed to

satisfy all of the requirements set forth in the PCRA, he cannot
rely upon newly discovered evidence as a common law exception to
the procedural bar rule.
Second, Petitioner asserts an exception based upon the
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel.

As the

Court concluded above in Section III.A.2,c, Petitioner cannot
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assert a common law exception to the PCRA's procedural bar for
claims that could have been, but were not, raised in his prior
post-conviction petition based upon a state constitutional right
to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel because
the Utah Constitution does not guarantee him such a right.
Moreover, although Petitioner has a statutory right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, because this is
a legislatively created right, rather than a common law sight,
Petitioner cannot rely upon this statutory right as the basis for
asserting a common law exception to the procedural bar rule.
Third, Petitioner argues that a common law exception exists
based upon the severe funding limitations that existed at the
time Petitioner filed his prior post-conviction petition, which
made a proper and thorough investigation of his case impossible.
As noted above, the lack of adequate funding for post-conviction
counsel may provide an explanation in support of Petitioner's
allegations that prior post-conviction counsel was ineffective or
why counsel was unable to do a constitutionally adequate
investigation or why counsel failed to discover allegedly
important evidence in the case.

However, inadequate funding, in

and of itself, is neither a violation of Petitioner's
constitutional rights nor, so long as the proper funding rules
are followed, is it a violation of Petitioner's statutory rights.
Thus, the lack of adequate funding is not a common law exception
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to the procedural bar rule that excuses claims that could have
been, but were not, raised, in a prior petition for postconviction relief.
Moreover, as to this argument, it is an argument in this
context that relates to the "infinite continuum of litigation"
concept, only in this context it is and could be run amok.

If

$40,000 is provided for post-conviction proceedings, it can
always be claimed that $60,000 was needed; if that is provided,
$80,000 could be claimed as necessary, and there could never be
an end to such a claim.

There is never enough time or money.

However, the argument is not directly made by Petitioner, but
based on this notion, this cannot be a basis for a common law
exception to the procedural bar rule.
Finally, Petitioner argues that all of the claims he now
raises that could have been, but were not, raised in his prior
post-conviction petitioner are claims that were overlooked in
good faith with no intent to delay the post-conviction process.
Without question, this is a legitimate common law exception to
the procedural bar rule that has been expressly recognized by the
Utah Supreme Court.

See Hurst,

111

P.2d

at

1031

PA

showing of

good cause that justifies the filing of a successive claim may be
established by showing . . .

a claim overlooked in good faith

with no intent to delay or abuse the writ.").

However, the

explanations Petitioner provides in his pleadings lead the Court
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to believe that the claims were not f
faith.

in fact, overlooked in good

As noted above, in Petitioner's memorandum in support of

this successive petition, for each claim that could have been,
but was not, raised in a prior post-conviction petition, he
states that he fairly presented the issues associated with these
claims "in state court pleadings, briefs and associated filings,
hearing, and argument."

(Pet'r Mem, in Supp. at 174, 235, 252,

259, 277, 331, 338, 379, 385, and 3 9 4 ) .

Thus, the issues on the

basis of which he now raises claims that were not raised in his
prior post-conviction petition were apparently known, or should
have been known, to prior post-conviction counsel.

They are not,

therefore, claims that the Court can conclude were overlooked in
good faith.

Again, many of the claims in this category are based

on facts in the trial record, not facts that require an
independent investigation beyond examination of the written
record.
Furthermore, even if the Court's inferences from the
language Petitioner uses in his pleadings are not warranted,
other than making the bald assertion that the claims were
overlooked in good faith, Petitioner fails to provide a detailed
argument explaining how the exception applies to his case or the
reasons in support of this exception.

As the State points out,

Petitioner nowhere provides legal support for the proposition
that the "overlooked in good faith" exception applies "merely
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because the evidence

[does] not establish that [Petitioner] held

back his claim[s] for tactical purposes,"
at 89-90),

(State's Mem. in Reply

Indeed, in light of the Utah Supreme Court's view

that exceptions to the procedural bar rule should only apply "in
those rare and unusual cases in which ^an obvious injustice or a
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has
occurred,' making it unconscionable not to reexamine the issue,''

Model,

2008 UT 32 at 120 (emphasis added), if a procedural bar

can be overcome merely by stating that a claim that could have
been, but was not, raised in a prior post-conviction petition was
overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay, the exception
would effectively eviscerate the rule.
Nevertheless, although Petitioner does not set forth a
compelling basis for this argument, presumably the reasons he has
in support of the "overlooked in good faith" exception are based
upon his contention that new evidence exists that went
undiscovered until recently because prior post-conviction counsel
was either ineffective or insufficient funding was available to
perform a constitutionally adequate investigation.
Even these reasons, however, are insufficient for the Court
to conclude that the "overlooked in good faith" exception applies
in Petitioner's case.

In the most recent decision from the Utah

Supreme Court where the "overlooked in good faith" exception was
addressed in the context of the discovery of new evidence, see
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Tillman,

2005 UT 56. The Utah Supreme Court carefully set forth

the grounds in support of the "overlooked in good faith"
exception.

There the Supreme Court held that the petitioner's

post-conviction claim that the State had failed to disclose
material exculpatory evidence "was overlooked in good faith with
no intent to delay or abuse the post-conviction process," Id.

at

125, because (1) the petitioner "had no reason to believe that
there [was] undisclosed [evidence] until the State revealed [its]
existence some nineteen years later," and (2) the State had made
"affirmative representations - • . that no such [evidence]
existed."

In Petitioner's case, he does not argue that he had

no reason to believe that the new evidence he now possesses did
not exist. Nor does he establish that the State, or any other
governmental agency, affirmatively represented to his prior postconviction counsel that this new evidence did not exist.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, all of Petitioner's
claims that could have been, but were not, raised in his prior
post-conviction petition are procedurally barred under the PCRA
and under the common law and Petitioner has not shown that any
statutory or common law exceptions apply that would permit the
Court to consider the merits of these claims.
Therefore, the State is entitled to a dismissal of these
claims, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27.
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4.

Claim Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Prior PostConviction Counsel

In claim 29 of his successive petition, Petitioner argues
that because the funding mechanism in place during his prior
post-conviction proceedings "severely limit[ed the] funding of
both the defense and investigation of post-conviction cases, '
including the retention of the services of crucial and
fundamental expert services, and repeated necessity to litigate
funding,

[Petitioner's prior post-conviction] counsel was unable

to provide effective assistance of counsel."

(Pet'r Mem. in

Supp, at 4 1 5 ) • This claim is not procedurally barred insofar as
it is not a claim that was raised and addressed in a prior
proceeding.

Moreover, it is also not a claim that could have

been, but was not, raised as a substantive claim in Petitioner's
prior post-conviction petition.
On the other hand, it is a claim that, at least in theory,
could have been raised in a prior proceeding.

That is, a claim

of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel could have
been raised in a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment,

see, e.g., Menzies,

2006 UT 81 at 12 ("Following the dismissal of

[the petitioner's] case, [post-conviction counsel] withdrew and
new counsel was appointed.

[The petitioner] then moved to set

aside the district court's dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of
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Civil Procedure."), or on appeal following the post-conviction
court's dismissal of Petitioner's post-conviction petition*
Practically speaking, however, this was not possible because
prior post-conviction counsel continued his representation of
Petitioner through the appeal of the dismissal of the post-

conviction petition.
(Utah

1994)

See Pascual

v. Carver,

876 P. 2d 364, 366

("Counsel on appeal is not expected to allege his own

ineffectiveness as counsel for the defendant at trial,");

Parsons,

871 P. 2d at 521 ("[TJrial counsel cannot reasonably be

expected to raise the issue of his or her own incompetence on
appeal."). However, given the circumstances this issue may have
been properly raised on appeal, not as a per

se

claim that prior

post-conviction counsel was ineffective, but as a claim that he
was rendered ineffective by the inadequate funding.

This court

does not believe that such a claim would be precluded by the
above authorities.
Nevertheless, a claim of ineffective assistance of prior
post-conviction counsel is not a valid basis for relief under the
PCRA or the common law and, therefore, the State is entitled to a
dismissal of this claim.
As the State points out, when Petitioner filed his
successive post-conviction petition, the PCRA provided

M

a

substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense."

-93-

Utah Code Ann. §

78~35a-102 (1) (emphasis added).

However, whether prior post-

conviction counsel was ineffective is immaterial to whether
Petitioner's guilty pleas and the imposition of his death
sentences complied with constitutional and statutory
requirements.

Because Petitioner's claim of ineffective

assistance of prior post-conviction counsel is not a claim that
challenges his conviction or sentence, it is not a cognizable
ground for relief under the PCRA and, therefore, not a claim for
which the PCRA can provide a legal remedy.
Moreover, although the PCRA allows a petitioner to seek
relief on the basis that he "had ineffective assistance of
counsel in violation of the United States Constitution or the
Utah Constitution," Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104 (1) (d), a claim of
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel does not
fall within the ambit of this ground for relief because
Petitioner is not entitled to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel under either the federal or state
constitutions.

The United States Supreme Court has expressly

held that, under the federal constitution, "[tjhere is no
constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction
proceedings.

Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such

proceedings."
See also Menzies,

Coleman v. Thompson,
2006

UT 81 at

184
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501 U.S.

122,

152

(1991).

(NXWe do, however, note that

the United States Supreme Court has previously declined to
recognize a federal constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings.").
In addition, as the Court previously discussed in Section
III.A.2.C, Petitioner does not have a right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel under the Utah
Constitution.

Therefore, because Petitioner does not have a

constitutional right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel under either the federal and state
constitutions, he cannot seek post-conviction relief by asserting
that he "had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of
the United States Constitution or the Utah Constitution."

Utah

Code Ann. § 78-35a-104 (1) (d).
Based upon the foregoing analysis, Petitioner's claim of
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel is not a
recognized ground for relief under the PCRA and, therefore, the
State is entitled to a dismissal of this claim, claim 29.

IV. Conclusion
Almost nineteen years ago, Petitioner was charged with,
pleaded guilty to, and was sentenced to death for the murders of
Kay Tiede and Beth Potts.

On direct appeal to the Utah Supreme

Court, Petitioner's guilty pleas and sentence of death for both
murders were upheld.

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition
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for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty pleas and death
sentence.

After several years of litigation, the post-conviction

trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment and
denied post-conviction relief on all of Petitioner's claims.

On

appeal, the post-conviction court's grant of summary judgment was
affirmed.

Petitioner then sought relief in federal court.

Although Petitioner's federal case was, and is, still pending,
Petitioner filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief
in state district court raising thirty separate claims•

The

State responded with a motion to dismiss.
The parties' arguments for and against dismissal of the
successive petition has required the Court to resolve numerous
legal issues, including: (1) that the 2008 amendments to the
PCRA, which removed the interests of justice exception to the
time-bar, does not apply retroactively to Petitioner's case and,
therefore, that Petitioner is entitled to rely on the interests
of justice exception to argue that, if the filing of his
successive post-conviction petition was untimely, it should be
excused in the interests of justice; (2) that Petitioner has not
shown that he has either a federal or state constitutional right
to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel and,
therefore, that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel
is not a common lav/ exception to the procedural bar rule; (3)
that the 2008 amendments to the PCRA expressly stating that post-
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conviction petitioners do not have a statutory right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, does not apply
retroactively to Petitioner's case and, therefore, in light of
the Menzies

decision, Petitioner had the statutory right to the

effective assistance of post-conviction counsel during his
initial post-conviction proceedings/ and (4) that because the
statutory right to post-conviction counsel is a legislatively
created protection, it is constitutionally permissible, and
within the Utah Legislature's power, to exclude from the PCRA an
exception to the procedural bar rule based upon ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel and, therefore, that
Petitioner cannot rely on his statutory right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel to overcome the procedural
bar for successive claims that could have been, but were not,
raised in his prior post-conviction petition.
Although the parties disagree on whether the untimeliness of
Petitioner's successive post-conviction petition should be
excused, in order to avoid performing a merits review of each
claim to determine whether the interests of justice exception
applies, which has the potential of being both unnecessary and
counter-productive, the Court has proceeded on the assumption
that Petitioner's successive petition is not time-barred.
Relying on the foregoing legal conclusions, and after carefully
considering all of Petitioner's claims, the Court concludes that
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all of his claims, with the exception of his claim alleging
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, are
procedurally barred either because they were raised and addressed
in a prior proceeding or because they are claims that could have
been, but were not, raised in his prior petition for postconviction relief.
As for the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel
claim, the Court concludes that it is not a cognizable claim
under the PCRA because it is not a challenge to Petitioner's
conviction or sentence.

Therefore, it is not a claim for which

the PCRA can provide a legal remedy.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the
State's motion to dismiss Petitioner's successive post-conviction
petition.

Order
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's Motion to Dismiss
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Relief
Under the Utah Posr-Conviction Remedies Act is dismissed.

This Ruling and Order constitute the final order of the
Court.

No further order is necessary to effectuate the Court's
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decision.

DATED th

isjl

, 2009.

day of

BY THE COURT:

Judge Bruce C. Lubeck
Third Judicial District Courl
>•
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'S^cPj

Certificate of Delivery
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Ruling and Order was mailed on the

\ \

day of August, 2009, to

the following:
Brian M. Pomerantz
Office of the Federal Public Defender
321 East 2nd Street
Los Angeles, California
90012
Megan B. Moriarty
Utah Federal Defender Office
405 South Main St, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas B. Brunker
Erin Riley
Utah State Attorney General's Office
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Addendum B

Interviews
t©*
roes
Conducting
Present

S c o t t I* Man l e y
12/26/90

tf&te

of B i r t h ?

November

11.

1959

3:22 P»M.;
Ints Detective Joseph L» Offret, Summit County* Sheriff's Department
Detective* Robert' L, Berry, • Summit Cointy Sheriff's, Department
Representatives? Carl and Hank

'Ds»t, Offrets

Apparently Scott, you know Mr. Von T&ylor* i« that

right?

3r.:c5tt Manl eys

Right

Def. Off rest:

How do yoKA know him, t © U . ras* what th|> circumstances a r e and
how'you kno» him<

Scott Manlev*

We went in ths> Half Way Hpusaes together.

Dst. Offrat&

How long have you known Von Taylor?

Scott Manl^v.j-

Two* months

Det<

Two m o n t h s , i s : t h a t a l l ?
Now a p p a r e n t l y * w e l l f i r s t of a l l
s i a c e you ars?, -for- t h e r & c a r d you arajj h*<ntfcuff eri' r i g h t h a r e
and y o u ' v © . g o t l-©g% i r o n s cfn and w h e n e v e r s o m e b o d y ' s i n cur>t«cSy
I ' v e gofc t o r s a t i tbtsro t h e i r r i e n i s s ofcf&y^ So- what" I w a n t t o
d o i® r e a d y o u - y o u r r i g h t * a l l r i g h t J j u s t l i s t e n t o me.
You
have?, t h e r i g h t t o - r - e ^ i i - i s i l e n t , a n y t h i n g vou s a y c a n ar»c; w i l l
b«h u'&ed a g a i n s t you' i h c o u r t .
You h ^ v e the* r i g h t t o l e g a l
cpunsel,
K you ' cJ&sirs? l a g a d > o u n s a l f and c a n n o t a f f o r d i t
i t w i l l b e oroviri^^
beware any q u e s t i o n i n g .
Anytime you
ri©ci.d©-tp « t o p a n s w © n n g my q b e « t i o n s f s you r a n s t o p a n s w e r i n g
my q u e s t i o n s e v e n t h o u g h . ni-ayt)© y o u >4 V **. a n s w s r e c j a few* ' Do
you u n d ^ r u t i P n ^ y o u r r i g h t s ?
Do ytr-u v | a n t ' t o t a l k ' t o m*:-> a b o u t

Of f r cats-

V's^h
*?*)t* Of • ' • r ^ t j

f. C;.t&&£>

Anyway vjh&t 1 w a n t *:o d o , what t- -havpij 3 reamed, i s a p p ^ r ^ r t l v
you had cc-mmun Ligation wxth Mr. Ttf.yj.tt>"} s»nd whe*r# wsr^r/'vcsir
a p p a r e n t I v her <n«ide <a t e l e p h o n e * c a l l * j So t h a t it
dw<*n'1
l a c k i i k © I ' m l # > d i n g - my w i t n e s s , onojl t h i n g t h a t I w o u l d l i k e
you t o do S c o t t i<* t o . s a y y o u r *u'. I njp.«K» .snd ^ p s j l l i t a n d .
your''dfctfc , pf .b;h"th "fep t h a t thw pers>Dn| t h a t t y p e s t h i s c a n
;--:;>r:ogni2:£> y-.:n,?:- vcr/icev
"
' '
Now let'«s.g-i?t b&ck- t o the., i s s u e . ' Y o u f v ^ to.Sd me how vcru
kn-o»* Vcsn. T a y l o r * '
T a l l M© a ^ o u i ' t ^ l ^ p h o r u ^ "cal in>, wh^n' yov.
. r$vc~n y&d th>r?mv.
'

*; n>t fe r^.n 1 evj
?t«.
' O t'. t

I o n l y •Y*£-c#xv«sd one* f - ^

Von,

Df-fj-^?"tf
?*'•' \>sr* * ;«•< V $

; '•*> ;~

"j r :**.•::»•*

Tsy 3, or

:y cru-^ ..; ses?n- my.
^ a>i t r* 1 k i :'><;^ tci Hi-H; V,

HO w.s.|> t a l K i n c j

i:o fr<e, V-^n

At tlisv i>c»m^ t l b ^ ypur. Rp ivai.; t^&rz?1?
:c-t:t

•%-»\B?vr

W^'i? no v rf:v. P0 was; 1^4} ki rig ;.?^ the? h'al} .-

Vor? a n d :^> v^^r^

oft Manleys

N o , it was right at the place.

•t.

At the Half Way House?

Offrets

ott Nanley:
»t.

Off ret:

At that house.
Well

I know, but the one you're talking

:ott Manley:

Yeah, yeah,

?t.

Is it a pay phone?

Offretr

:ott Manley:

Yeah

*t.

And it's at the Half Way House?

Offrets

rott Ma.nl eys

Yeah

St.

Do you know what the number

Of fret:

is?

rott Manleyu

M o , not really,

at.

Tell me what Half Way House you were at?

Of frets

on?

cott Manley:

Ah, I can't even think of the name of it.

et.

Is it Orange Street?

Offrets

cott Manley:

No, uh tth

itu

Different

Offret 5

one?

cott Man1ey s

I can ' t r®&d

et„ Of fret:

Is thi«» your- information?

cott Man!) ey JJ

That' s al 1 of i t«

et.

Scott J, Marilev who is a r^xidetnt
at the Fremont Community
Correctional Center, 2588 West 2365 South, West Valley
City, 84119.
And it savs here phone number is 801-972-3651
Is that the only phone you have B.CCJSSS
to9

O^frat?

or wri te

k:ott M&nleya

There's a bunch of them there*

)®t*

Is this the one you r*sc^iv&d

Of fret 2

the call o n , do you

Scott Manleys

J don't

)et.

You don't know for sure, we'll find that out.

Offrets

5c o 11 M &n I e y s
>et. O f f r e t z
_~tt Manley;
) e t * 0 f f• r • ;•? t s
5 c c 1; I M a n 1 e v t

know?

11 w a *s a n t h o p a y p h o n e*
Tell me, okay the phone ^ings, how did you know you had a
te 3 ep hone c aI1?
One of the z>t3.'$r member told me*
C o m e B ntfg o t y ou'?
Come and aot me,

Scott' Manleys

N o they

)et.

Anyway you go t o t h e phone? and then what h a p p e n s * tell m e ?

Offrets

*dn't.

,cott Manleys

Then h e talked, tried t o say a c o u p l e of w o r d s t o m a a n d ah
ha asked m a do I know w h o h e is and I said yeah i t ' s V o n *
And we start talking and he said y o u know I'm on e s c a p e a n d
I>said n o I didn't*

>et. O f f r e t :

So at t h e time y o u ' r e talking to h i m , y o u d i d n ' t k n o w t h a t
h e w a s an e s c a p e e ?

Icott M a n l e y s

No

icott Manleys

And ah we were still tail king and I said w h e r e a r e yoix n o w
^nd h e said h e w a s a t o n e o-f t h o s e c a b i n s with h a n d g u n s and
this and that in t h e r e . Ah h e w a s going to s h o o t s o m e people*

»et. O-f-frets

About what time of d a y , can y o u r e m e m b e r ?
afternoon?

.cott Man 1 ey 5?

A-f ternoon ,

et. O-f-fret:

In t h e a-f t e r n o o n , a n y i d e a what t i m e ?

cott M a n l e y s

I w a s still a s l e e p , I d i d n ' t bother looking at m y c l o c k when
I woke Lip ^ bwcaus®
s h e woke m e u,p<

~*t* O-f-fret *

What time d o you h a v e l u n c h ?

cott Manleys

11.5 3 0

et« O f f r e t :

It w a s quite a bit later than that t h e n ?

cott Manleys

I don't know, yeah I think it w a s .

e t , 0-f frets

"?*©}, i ma s p e c i f i c a l l y what he said if you can r&m?smh&r, a s
c l o s e l y as p o s s i b l e , e x a c t l y what h e told y o u on t h e p h o n e .

cott Manleys

Well I asked him w h a t i s he going to d o , y o u k n o w , h e told
me h e w a s at h i s m o m ' s , away from h i s m o m ' s c a b i n , b u t h e
told me h e went to hi s m o m ' s cabin„

et r Of f r e t s

H e said that h e had b e e n t h e r e , but when h e w a s on t h e p h o n e
to you h e wasn't t h e r e ?

c o 11 M a n I e y::
K) +•

„ Off r e t»

W a s it m o r n i n g ,

E s t i m a t e if y o u c a n ?

I don't know a b o u t t h a t .

R i g h t , h e w as a t an ot h er h ou s e •
0kay

~ott M a n l e y s

And I w a s talking a n d then these t w o came uo« I a s k e d him
about? whet about t h e p e o p l e c o m i n g . W h o cares, they're
wasted. And we heading cut, got to get a car &nti then head
out».

•t„ Offreti

So the p e o p l e that w e ' r e talking about that g o t k i l l e d
there yet?

" c1.1 Ma n 1. e y *
i>t. 0f *f r et ?

I t h i r. k t h s v we^e*
W h y d o you th.i nl-" t h ~>t ?

weren't

»t.' CJffretn

You could hear gun shots being -fired?

*t„ Offret:

Could you hear voices behind his?

:ott Man]ey:

I heard somebody talking.

at. Offrets

Did it sound like a man or woman?

:ott Manleys

I ain't so sure, could have been a man-

»t. Offret:

Did he say anything about being with a friend?

rott Manley:

Yeah he told me all about him*

et. Offret:

Tell me what he told you.

cott Manley:

He told me ha got a friend here that escaped from Orange
Street with him and they were just out, going to have some
fun, go back ta New York

et. Offret;

Said they were going to go back to New York. But he said
he killed these people, or did he say he was going to?

cott Manley?

He was going to.

et. Offreti

What about having somebody hostage?
somebody held hostage?

cott Manleys

Well he was saying something about that too.

st. Offrets

Remember it as closely as you can, it's really important

What about having

that you remember that as closely as you can, what he said?
Jcott Manley:

He just said he was going to head out to New York.

>et« Offret?

Did

:

;cott Manley:
>et* Offretr

He told me he was going to wast© them ail,
He said he was going to waste them &3 I * Did he say how many
he held wasted?

Scott Man leys

Four, he said he had four people,,

)et. Of frets

He had four people, and he -said he was goino bo waste them

he say he was going to take anybody with him?

all?
S c o t t Manley*
!>et * Of f r e t ;

Yeah
Did h e s a y h e had k i l l e d

four

p e o p l e o r h e had ic-Lir

oeople

hostage?

Scott
"it,

Man l e y :
Of^rets

He didn't
oeon1e«

say n o t h i n g ,

l i k e you know

four

Tell m e what else h e told you about t h e guy he w a s w i t h ?
A n a. m e 7 a n )' t h i n q 1 i k e t h a t ?

"•Scott H a n l e y i

No, h e d i d s a y h i s n a m e , b u t

~* e t ,

0) =; a y

O f f r f? z :•

h e 9>aid h e had

X can't,

I ' m bad a t

nam^s,

")e»t« dffret:

What the quys name sounds ]3^e°

Jcott Manleys

Yeah, No I mean I I now what the dude sound like that was
t a]h ng besides Von.

,et.

What d i d h e s o u n d

Of-fret:

liiel~

S c o t t Man "leys

Somebody t h a t was h a v i n g a good t i m e , shoot-3 ng up the? h o u s e
and s t u f f .

>et.

Dad t h e y t a l l -

Of f r e t :

about d r i n k i n g

j c o t t M*nle»y:

No,

>e>t * ( I f f r e t *

He? d o e s some d r a n l . j n g t ! t o u g h "

k r o t t Man1c?ys

Yeah

>et • O f f r r a t s

And you h e a r d s h o t s b e i n g

I c a t t Man1c*ys

Yf*ah

tet-

Bid

Off r e t :

the?y d i d n ' t

«ay n o t h i n g a b o u t t h a t *

»• t ,

Wh?t would you <say h e was s h o o t i n g ,

Manley?

d u d e wa«* s h o o t m g

Exactlv, right
a t a ! ] **'

c o t t Manl*»v"

Von s a i d t i e - v nad one*.

el.

Von c a i d

cott

Man l e v :

et*

c

Man 1cvs
^irM:

on th<3 n o s e ,

jn

the

house.

a , 2 2 , or a

44

B

magnum 0

Did Von s-ay a n y t h i n g c»hout

that

t h e y hau 3 w h a t ?

A , ^ 4 magnum and a b u n c h of

*?t, H f f r r- +• *
cott

drugs,

I would s a y a , 4 4 magnum*

•*t • r f f r e t s

O-ffj'etr

do

what0

Von s a y t h a t h e had b e e n s h o o t i n g or

No : t was t h e e t h e r

cott

Von d o n ' t

firedrt

>cott l l a n l ^ y r
nffr-nts

that0

or d r u g s o r a n y t h i n g 111 e

ether

pistols

i *»t e \ <r ~

Rifle:
Pad ~io t a l 1

r o L t *vL";m j<^y*

- b o u t <* , ^ 9 ~

fo Nh

e»L. Q f f ' ^ t :

What I'd h s r a v ^ h r n t ) i ~* Was i t t h e gun that- you <*n<.i him
Mnc ^ i r p t i m e jind h a went b«3d and gut'"

cot 4 "

r

M

"»nley

H« OfFrt*ti
"„o^ i

VJ

-*n! My:

_t4 C'rr rt:

a on ' l I r ow •»

feu1 d

N

~ou l d ^ r ^ ^ f ^ i t

I shnwod t h a t gun bo yn *'

Yna^
Tell no .^{ro t ^'«ah how would he have come by yo3-»; oa:l
1" C l 1 1 ^ C t h 1 «

~ij* +• ^ » r U C V !

if

AJOll

-r>n

nj *

h<2 t o

1

and

rt

fj f^O f ' V H

OE

"tJLV^rj

UJ ( h

J

f*"lLnd

Ur)

t^c""**,

:otb Manley:

Out in \..^^^r\m
scary side*

=?t. Offret:

Okay, why?

•ott Manley:

Well there was a gun sitting there and he knew where it was
and X knew right when he told me that he wanted to kill some
people, you know it just tripped my mind, God I left a gun
right in front of his nose. And he know's right where it
is at.

He ran to Ogden and . .at's what had me on the

et. Offrets

Where was it?

cott Manley?

It's out in a water thing,

@t. Offret:

Where is this thing at?

cott Manley:

Out there in town there, it's over by the cemetary, hut

et> Offrets

In Ogden?

Icott Manley:

Yeah

>et. Qffrets

Tell me, like did you throw it in a river.

>c:ott Manley?

Something like* I don't know, I call it a little ditch-

>et« Offret:

An irrigation ditch or something like that?

Scott Manleyt.

Yeah but it had

water in it. fishes* and stuff,

)tm Offrets

And you can't tell us more clossaly where it was, how da you
get there?

Scott Man leys

All I know is from on© side of town it goes all the way up
straight through. Sot a bridge where you cross, used to be
working on the road, bridge goos right across. You just
drive right down that road, that follows it ^r\<l just run
riqht
up t hrough *

M r

How come you threw it in

Of fret.-

•Scott Man ley?

I got pan i cing„

Det» Offrett

You got scared?

8 c o 11 M a n 1 a y .1

there?

Ya ah

Det» O^fr^tt

When w e r e y o u up in Ogden with

S c o t t Manley?

A *nonth #nd t h r e e d a y s a g o .

D e t * Of •rets

Quite a while ago then?

him?

H o w did y o u c o m e by foxing in

p o s s e s s i o n of t h i s g u n ?
'S c o 11 M ar: 1 e y y
it»

Hffret:

S c o t t Man'.! ey r
D f» t. , Q f f r ••* t s

B o ugh t i t f r o m a -f r i e n d o f h i % »
And w h a t is h i s -Friends n a m e 0
I coul dn ' t ? I di 6n ' t bother to
D1 d v o u b u y it?

let, Off rets

And ho

>cott Man ley J

He was with me.

,«t, Of Frets

When did he escape, do you know?

»cott Manley5

What from the Half Way House?

tet. Of f r et.•cott
>et«

Mao]eys
Dffrets

icatt
let.

Man l e y s
Offret:

>cotl

let*

Man!eys

Qf-frets

)cotl>vt*

Man 3 eys
Of • f r e t :

rcoit
>t.

Man l e y :
Offret;

>cott
>et«

^i.nleys
Offbeat:

zofct
•et,

coii•t.

coil

et.
cot t

Mv*n 1 ey s
n

you throw it a w a y

Yeah
Ha b o l d
That's

me a week
prior

to

ago.

the

call

you got'""*

Ra g h t
And you g o t

the

call

He s a i d
him and

he wa& gone* f o r
this
other loci.

Did

know t h e

you

afternoon0

Saturday

other

a week

out

of

the

Half

Way House

kid°

No
You d i d n ' t

[now h i s

name was Ed^zvd

De3i,~*

No
Never

heard

of

H a t e ht«> b u t t

him or
if

I f you were up i n
h^ven

i

mot

hum 0

did,
Qqdon wa t h

Von,

what

kind

of

car

Yeeh d i d yon have a Cc^ *'
D i d Von fc©3 )• t o you ^ ! u:ui*
r
o ca
wh^n he t ^ H e d * o you on t n e rh^n<? A

Hfjnlev:

No t h a t

h-*n3ev-

Df f - e t >
^.n^r/n

t3** « O f r r » t «

» what

th^v

were w a i t i n g

A car*-*
Wh-at dad t h e y «3*y a b o u t
g o i n g t o b r i n g one up'"

'ioMnys

hA k n r g

-or.
thai- - W>at

T h i o x'» how he wns cay 3 r g j i%
he* s a i d
i r r t*hjs, car t o come an t o r>m F?„

rsomeoody

ihac

J

h"y

w«.+ s

wrr e

wcit.nq

*>ay
T n= I *>d hsm w r a t ar*» v c u got'-.g t o do wif-h t h e noop] o'~'
YDvi ^ - U ^ S»I-•*-*> t h e c a r « u n ' t t ^ e r * * . whet a r e vou g o i n g t o do
WNMI t h e car come 11 , p e o p l e g o i n g L/j be j n i t ">nd hr* ro-ud
wc-2 1 ^ T J V ' r ^ »;ov*'C: c ^ n^we ir.» t h o v ' r ^ g o i n g
c he --t-'Ot.
Thai-''.- ^ h ^ h? v«r>j » jhou/..
wi i h a c&r rt

• 1-,

C-n n^

» n^ir.

rrcsv

t n^^

- : vjlr^v

UP

00M;

you

Car ?

f ?**»(::

Cn-rrplz

d.id

Y^«*

oh

,oa u j

i

*h*% 1 rvw

wore

wutinq.

Y<?"~ r o r r r n

-ott Manleys

Well no their were presents laying all around, all around the
house. And they -found $300.00 dollars in money from the
presents, I h&ard a hunch of shit, that's all it was. And
I didn't believe it* I didn't ran right off to the guards
and the guards this and that. I waited until this one
guard, because they all, all those guards ar& silly*
There
only one or two that you can talk to and get something got
straightI waited until this dude come in and I asked had
the two people esc$,p®c\ and he said yes. And ah > I said one
names Von to keep him

et. Offret?

Interested?

icott Nan ley jj

Ho not keep him interested, but I wanted to know was it
Von Taylor. He said Von Taylor was gone. And I just
spilled my guts. I said hey man, I'm going to -feel like
shit if I just don't say that i-f they come, in the Half
Way House too. Just I don't know. The next, day they're
going to come in the Half Way House«

>et. Qf^ret:

They were going to come in the Half Way House after they
le-ft these cabins and stuff?

Scott Manley?

Set me out.

)et, Of f ret n

Is that wh y he called you?

•v-ott Manleys

Yeah

3et« Of fret 5

Did he want you to walk away and help him out or what?
Did he ask you to do that?

S c o t t Manleys

He d i d n ' t ask me t o k i l l nobody, c a u s e I w o u l d n ' t .

Det, D f f r e t s

Well he d i d n ' t ask you t o k i l l anybody, what did he? want you
t o c?o?

Scott Manleys

See he needs somebody, do you know what I'm trying to saywants power.

Detn

So he's got to have a group of people to lead, he's got to
b e t h © 1 & ad ©r , i s t h at i t ?

Off ret;

Scott Man I ay 3

No he got to b e a follower,
Vc?n, he
it' s hard for me to e u p 3 a i n i t.

Det, Offret5

So when he called and said thi$ on the pnone about
t hese peop I e ,, you

will

shoot

He

somebody

killing

be 1 i eved h i m.

Scott: ^anley?

Yeah because

Ijet u Of^r-ets

havB

"•'cott ^ an ley:

Well n o , but I knew hi^> disl i'<&&and hsj said the next time
that I ever* they're n s ^ r ' going to take me back* to prison.
They a i n '' t t a k i n g h i m , wo 11 t h <* y ' v & t a k «*r^ h i m b ac k , b u t they
ain't nev»r going to let him ce>„
Mow if I showed you the gun, describe the gun that ho might
h& V'P nenI? hack and ;vi c:'•*od up ,

Det«

O-ffr^ts

I know Von*

I've been around Von*

you been around him when he shot anybody ei se'"--'

Scott Manley:

It was a ,357, I know that -for a -fact.
in three* places. I tore apart the,

•et. Df-fret:

Okay

*ott Manley:

I tore it apart

I took that o-f-f and tossed it in the river, I'd take o-f-f the
barrel and chuck that and then I tossed the rest o-f it.

et- O-f-f ret *

How long was the barrel, how many inches?

cott Manley?

It was a stub nose,

et* O-f-f ret?

Two inches, "four inches?

cdtt Manleys

Four inches

at* O-f-f rets

What kind o-f grips?

st. Of-fretr

Wood?

cott Manleyz

Just plain old cheap old*

»t» O-f-f ret?

I'm going to get a gun and I want you to look at it and
tell me whether or not you have seen it before, okay?

rott Manley;

You ouys don't got Van up here do you?

31 .i 0-f -f *s e t z

H e ' ^ u o s t a i r s in t h e j a i 1»

r o t t Manley?

I -feel s o r r y -for you guys-

: t . O-f-f r e t ;

Did you have b u l l e t s -for t h e gun?

; o 1.1 *vJ. a n 1 e y 5

?t, G-ffre+'i
: o 1 1 M a n 1 f? y s
?t. O-f-f^et:
o11 l^; an 1 B y r.

He w o n ' t he t h e r e very loncu

Mo

You didn't have any at all huh?
No
Does that look like the one? That's not: the one?
That •' s a . 33«

»t. O-f-f r e t s

T h a t ' s r-ight, it is a . 3 3 , n o t a . 3 5 7 . J u s t a long s h o t .
Y o u r g u n is p r o b a b l y still in t h e w a t e r .

a 11

I ' T, h oo i n g.

M ap lev:

W h v did

y o u d e c i d e t o tell yc{,ir

tu O-f-f r e t 5

I'm h o p i n g it i s t o o .
a b o u t this;?

•vtt Manlevs

Becauso; I ^as ^':arodn
I didn't > I don't want to go to Court.
Ok ay he c\-\n get ahold oi my people and I'm going to be out
on

t „ G-f-frets

t b e* % t r e ^ t & w i p e d o u t«

Wall

T wr<nt y o u t o t e s t i T y a g a i n s t h i m -

that you do testify against him.

It's important

You have evidence and

PO's
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February 28, 1991

Judge Frank G. Noel
Third District Court
240 Bast 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Von Taylor

Dear Judge ISoel:
Pursuant to court order I have examined defendant Von Taylor in the Summit
Gounty Jail on February 11, 1991, for the purpose of determining his state of
mind at the time of the alleged commission of crines with which he is charged
as it relates to a defense of insanity. This evaluation is based on a three
hour interview with Mr. Taylor out of the presence of jail staff.
I have also seen the following documents;
1. Summit County Sheriffs Office narrative reports by these officers:
A- Deputy Brad Wilde on December 22, 1990, with supplemental reports on
December 23, and December 24.
B. Deputy Carey Yates, presumably December 22, 1990, with supplemental
report on December 23*
C« Deputy Steve Stokes on December 22, 1990.
D« Deputy Alan Siddoway on December 22, 1990, including a time loss of
evidence collection.
E. Officer Jay L. Of fret on December 22, 1990, with supplemental reports
on December 23 (three reports), December 24, December 26, December 27
(two), December 31 (two) and January 2, 1991.
2. A case report by investigator Jim Bell, undated, describing activities of
December 22, and December 23, 1990,
3. Utah State Fire Marshall's investigative report by Marc G. {last narce
illegible) dated January 3, 1991.
4. Transcripts of interviews with victims.
A. Detective sergeant Robert L. Berry interviewing LaNae Michelle Tiede
on Decmaber 22, 1990.
B. Deputy Alan Siddoway interviewing Rolf Tiede on December 22, 1990.
5. ,!Rap sheet'1 on defendant Taylor dated December 22, 1990.
6. Washington County Sheriffs Office report by Deputy Eugene Roberts on
April 30, 1989, including a photcopied handwritten confession by
Mr. Taylor, and supplemental report by Deputy Jim Webb on April 31, 1989.
7. Medical examiner's reports of autopsy. Autopsy reports by Sharon I.
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Schnittker,M.D., Assistant Medical Examiner, dated December 23, 1990, on
these victims.
A. Kay Tidwell Tiede.
B. Beth Harmon Tidwell Potts.
8. The Pre-sentence Investigation Report by David G. Christensen,
Investigator, Adult Probation and Parole, dated June 9, 1989, including a
letter to Corrections by the defendant's sister, Kaye Auble, dated May 29,
1989, and by his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Thomas J. Taylor, dated May 25,
1989.
9, A 90 Day Diagnostic Report by Robyn Williams, Diagnostic Investigator,
dated August 31, 1989, including a psychological evaluation by L. Donald
Long, Ph.D. psychologist, dated August 11, 1989.
Mr, Taylor is advised of the above-stated purpose of this interview and of its
nonconfidentiality. He is told that information gained in the interview will
be included in a report to the court to which both prosecuting and defense
attorneys will have access. He is further told that this information may be
used for him or against him in court, and that he is therefore not obligated
to answer any question he chooses not to. He willingly answers all questions,
except as noted below.
IDENTIFYING INRDRMATTON: Von Lester Taylor is a 25-year-old unmarried
Caucasian male from Ogden, Utah, who says he has no occupation but has worked
in security and in construction. He is now incarcerated in the Surmdt County
Jail.
UNDERSTANDING OF CHARGES: The defendant lists the following charges against
him: "Capital homicide, kidnapping, arson, evading an officer, attested
homicide and aggravated robbery."
HISTORY SUPPORTING CHARGES: Mr. Taylor has had charges filed against him as a
result of an episode briefly ''summarized as follows: He and co-defendant
Edward Deli walked away from the Orange Street halfway house in Salt Lake
City, where they had been serving sentences. They hitchhiked to Oakley, where
TaylorTs family had a cabin, with intent to proceed on soon to New York to
find work in Deli's home state. They broke into his parents1 cabin, then a
dozen others for supplies, doing extensive dairage. Finally, they broke into
the cabin of the victims, who had a car which Taylor and Deli intended to
steal for the trip to New York. Mr. Taylor and Mr. Delx are accused of
murdering two people, a middle-aged woman and her elderly nother, sparing a
young adult daughter. When the younger victim's husband and teenage daughter
arrived, the man was also shot with fatal intent but not fatal results. The
girls were kidnapped, and the defendants and their hostages became involved in
a high speed chase with tte local police. The defendants were eventually
apprehended when the chase ended in an auto accident. The cabin where the
crirnes took place they had set on fire.
Defendant Taylor gives the following long history of events prior to his
arrest. On April 30, 1989 while intoxicated, Mr. Taylor burglarized the house
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of a neighbor to his parents, armed with a firearm. He was caught by the
owner of the home and jailed in the Washington County Jail upon pleading
guilty. After a 90 day pre-sentencing evaluation, during which psychotherapy
was recommended, he was sent to the Utah State Prison for over a year. He
believes he should have been given a year in jail instead of prison, as this
was his first major offense* Disgruntled, he says the only reason for his
imprisonment was the judge1 s friendship with the man whose home he
burglarized, (Actually, a year in prison had been recaimended by the
pre-sentence investigator despite first offense, because a first degree felony
with a gun and knife was involved.) He was paroled on October 23, 1990,
In the Iron County unit of the Utah State Prison, he had several "write-ups,"
including his being kicked out of school for derogatory language toward a
teacher he says he had proved wrong. He observes cynically, "They offer
rehabilitation but don't let you do it," He had been in the prison's school
program learning computers, math, English and German. He was kicked out of
that program three days before his parole hearing, Ihera were none of the
adverse consequences he had feared, as he was given a 90 day parole date
anyway. He was returned to his home town and the Ninth Street halfway house
in Ogden. After several weeks there he was seen by a parole officer in a
variety department store in the sporting goods section. The officer who saw
him reported that he had been near the gun display counter, a violation of
parole, although he denies having any intent other than to look at sporting
goods. He was transferred to the Orange Street halfway house in Salt Lake.
The defendant describes the Orange Street experience as one where "they are
playing a lot of games and (making) rules," Vttiile there he found a job
grinding slag from steel girders, but was unsatisfied with the pay for the
intensity of labor involved and quit after two days. This and other behavior
lead to five "write-ups" which meant extra duty, marks on his record, and
possibly an extension of his sentence. He had thought for several days about
running from the half-way house, but was hesitant because of his expectation
of more time in prison if caught.
One day, while job searching with an inmate acquaintance, Edward Deli, they
discussed and decided against returning. Having become fugatives, they rode a
bus to Ogden where they stayed with Taylor!s brother for a night, then in a
motel for a night. Deciding to hitchhike to New York where Deli grew up and
where they hoped to get jobs, they found rides as far as Morgan, Because of
the extreme cold, Taylor offered his parent1 s cabin in the Smith-Morehouse
area near Oakley. Hitchhiking further to Beaver Springs, they stole three
wheelers from a cabin, rode to his parent's cabin and broke in. He concedes
they went to other cabins, broke windows and obtained food, liquor, and
clothing. They felt safe frcsn the lawf the area being deserted except for one
cabin with visitors. They arrived on Tuesday and stayed until the crime on
Saturday took place. Bhey chose the Tiede cabin to burglarize, hoping to
steal the occupants1 car for their trip to New York. Taylor had had a
previous brief encounter with the middle-aged woman occupant who passed him on
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the road and asked if he didn't have a snowmobile. His response was
sarcastic.
Seeing the burglar- alarm was not on, they broke into the Tiede cabin one night
and waited until the next dayr expecting the visitors to return because of
unopened presents under the Christmas tree. Some of the cabin occupants
returned around mid-day. As the owner's 20-year-old daughter caite upstairs,
he confronted her with a gun. Her mother and handicapped grandmother
followed. From across the roan Taylor pointed a stolen pistol at them, and
Deli a stolen rifle. He claims he didn't mean to shoot them and doesn't
remember squeezing the trigger, but nevertheless did. The mother of the
family was hit first and exclaimed "I've been shoti", Taylor then emptied his
gun, a 38 pistol, at the victims, grabbed Deli's 44 pistol, and emptied it at
them. He reloaded both guns and counted nine spent cartridges.
He claims not to know why he shot them, cannot say why he didn't shoot their
screaming daughter, and says he was not feeling anything. He didn't even feel
like he had shot them. He adds that he doesn't know why he didn't shoot
himself. Deli looked at him as if to say "what in hell are you doing?" Deli
took the hysterically screaming girl to a back rocm rattier than accede to her
request to call an ambulance. They surveyed the results of the shooting. One
victim was shot through the head and Taylor observed bone fragments, brain
matter and blood on the floor. They dragged the bodies of the two women out
on the deck, and Taylor threw snow over the bodies and the remains on the
floor. He was nauseated by the sight and went to the bathroom to throw up.
They wanted to leave, but didn't knew what to do with the house or how to
handle the other family members who the girl said were due soon. Concerned
about fingerprints or other evidence, the defendant decided to "torch" the
house, which he considered easier than wiping it down. He retrieved gasoline
frari the garage, poured it around the upstairs and lit a natch.
As they were getting ready to leave, the girl's father and sister arrived on
snowmobiles, Taylor pulled the older girl inside and held a gun to her head,
then called to her father to come in under threat that lie would kill the girl.
He asked the man for money and when a billfold was produced, had him throw it
on the ground. He cocked the gun, and there was brief discussion between Deli
and himself over who would shoot the father. Taylor pointed the gun and shot
him. The father fell. After taking the girls, who had witnessed the
shooting, to the snowmobiles, he went back and shot the man one more "dme "to
make sure", He then poured gasoline on the victim and assurtad he would be
consumed in the house fire.
By then he acknowledged feeling "pretty scared" with three dead people, smoke
coning from the burning cabin, and "some guy (who) rode by on a snowmobile."
He still hadn't really thought about what he had done, he says. The girls
looked at him with an expression of fright and hate, wondering if they would
be killed too. His colleague never questioned why he killed them. The
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question of raping the girls didn't cross his mind, "I'm not into that," he
says.
The two men each got on a snowirobile with the girls driving. They reached the
parking area where the older girl unlocked her father's Lincoln town car and
gave Taylor the keys. Deli put two rifles, a pistol and two suitcases in the
trunk. Then with Taylor driving, Deli in the back, and one girl in front and
one in back, they drove away.
At the gate they encountered a man who came toward them who the girls claimed
not to know, but who in reality was their uncle. He drove toward Oakley and
then toward Karoas. A police officer driving the opposite direction caught
their attention. The officer turned to follow them, and they encountered a
police pick-up truck blocking the road ahead. Taylor "punched it" and drove
around the truck. They went through Kamas well over the upper limit
registered by the speedometer, 100 miles per hour he estiinates, with the
police officers in pursuit. Sliding through an intersection, they caire to a
stop and were approached by the officers. Deli forced than back with a pistol
pointed out the window. They sped down a Dugway road toward Park City and
Heber City. As the road curved, he braked, hit a cement barrier, and lost
control. The car coasted backward down an embankment and came to rest.
Police officers were on the scene immediately. Taylor took Deli's gun, said
it was time to die, and put the gun to his head. Deli grabbed the gun, got
out of the car, and aiired it at the police. An officer fired and shattered a
rear window. Taylor says he grabbed the gun from Deli again and threw it out
the window. He could have shot the girls or himself, but says he "didn't want
to shoot anyone anymore." They were arrested and jailed.
He says he was treated as well by the police as anyone charged with murder
could be. Asked hew he now feels about the crime, he says he is sorry he did
it, but could not bring himself to ask forgiveness. He says he has.always
been cold at funerals, assuming that "everyone will die sooner or later" and
live on in the same place in an afterlife.
Asked about his feelings over killing someone, he concedes he has killed
soneone before, srabbing a person through the heart. He declines to talk
further about the incident and was never charged.
PAST CRIMINAL RECOBD; Mr. Taylor concedes having caused "a whole string of
childhood mischief." In early to mid-teens he began using marijuana and
cocaine. He sluffed school and participated in stealing cars for joy-riding
and four-wheeling. Though almost caught several tines, he never was
apprehended for this. He says he did it to go along with friends "if you can
call them that," and participated "for scmsthing to do," His only prior
criminal charge was for aggravated burglary. This resulted from an incident
in St. George while he was staying alone in his parentTs heme. Under
influence of marijuana and alcohol and looking for money, he burglarized the
house of a neighbor he did not like because the neighbor, like his parents,
was actively IDS* He needed money to pay off a loan for car repairs to the
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credit union. Despite holding a gun on his neighbor, the neighbor lunged at
him, subdued him, and summoned the police. He admitted burglarizing another
neighbor's camper-trailer the previous night.

PAST PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY; His written confession to the St, George burglary
indicates msntal distress before the crime and after, eg, "totally going
fucking crazy, I want to kill iryself to put this out of my life," "icy mind, it
tells ms to die, die, die i 11???M "Man and dad don't know that I am going
insane. . •" He was having serious mood swings and once tried to kill himself
according to a brother, who wasn't sure if the attempt was genuine or a
gesture for attention. Counseling was recommended by a psychologist who
evaluated him in the Iron County Jail, (I have not seen the report of
Dr. Kliarsky of Southwest Mental Health), He was placed in a holding cell
briefly as a suicide risk. He did not participate in counseling, however. He
has had psychological testing in confinement which, he says, revealed him to
be extremely paranoid and borderline schizophrenic or depressed and suicidal.
He is skeptical of the interpretation.
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING: Dr. Long's evaluation, a part of the 90 day diagnostic
report, showed his intellectual functioning was average with a full scale I.Q.
of 110, in the average range, and Wide Range Achievement Tests in reading,
spelling, and arithmetic, consistent with his I.Q. His MMPI test shewed him
to be irritable, depressed, and shy. Pessimistic and dissatisfied, he was
found to have strong dependency needs, a marked lack of social skills, and a
feeling of inadequacy in social situations including those with the opposite
sex. The test reflected inability to delay gratification or control impulses.
His pattern was one of acting out/ then-avoiding responsibility, but afterward
feeling guilty and anxious over his antisocial behavior, A propensity toward
addiction was also found. Diagnosis was "Adjustment Disorder with Mixed
Emotional Features and elements of Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder."
There is no mention of paranoia or borderline schizophrenia in contrast to the
defendant's belief,
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: A prominent scar on the cheek was incurred at age
twelve on his father's farm in Idaho when an aerosol can exploded in a fire,
the contents burning his face. Plastic surgery reduced, the extent of the
scar, but a skin graft was recarnvanded and never done. He was bothered by the
scar through most of his later childhood, and was sometimes ridiculed by peers
who called him "snake face," among other names, referring to the tortuous
shape of the scar. He was also self conscious over his very slender body
habitus and inability to gain weight. At fourteen he fell out of a truck in
which he was joy-riding, with his brother driving. The truck rolled several
times, but his only injury was a nroad b u m around the wrist,11 He was not
scolded for this incident by his father until several years later.
He was on no medications at the time of the present crimes and was using no
drugs. He does smoke one pack of cigarettes per day and drinks alcohol only
occasionally. He has drunk a lot at one time in the past, but says he has
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never been drunk. (This contradicts his written confession to the St. George
burglary in which he says he was depressed and drunk,) It was the social
thing to do at parties he attended and brought acceptance by his peers. He
claimed that when he drank he became crazy. He smoked marijuana regularly but
not daily, sometimes alone, sometimes with others. This habit began at age
thirteen or fourteen. It made him lightheaded and fearful at times, but he
never hallucinated. He has occasionally felt bewildered at what someone was
trying to talk over with him, but he insists that despite regular marijuana
use, he still could still function well. He tried snorting and smoking
cocaine a few years ago but didn't like it,
FAMILY HISTORY: One brother has been in a treatment program for alcohol and
drug abuse, No other psychiatric conditions are known to him.
PAST PERSONAL HISTORY: Mr, Taylor was born in Murray, the eighth of eight
children. His father, a-civilian aircraft maintenance worker in a classified '
job, traveled all over the world for the Air Force and made a "pretty good"
living. He was stern in insisting his diildren work by mid-teens and bought a
farm in Idaho for them to gain work experience and earn wages. If angry, he
raised his voice and, rarely, spanked the defendant with a wooden spoon. He
once threw him in a closet for sluffing school. He guesses he liked his
father but was not close to him. His mother was a homemaker until his eighth
year. She was M a nag" about everything, and he was not close to her. Yet he
is quoted in the St. George pre-sentence investigation report as saying they
are "the best parents anybody could have or want." As the youngest child, he
fought a lot with his older siblings, especially a brother two years older and
a sister three years older.
His brother eight years older had the most influence on him and he began
smoking, drinking alcohol, and, using drugs in his teens partly in .admiration
of his brother who was doing the same thing.
In third grade he once became upset and "tore the class apart." Psychological
help was reccsmended, a fact he did not know for many years. His parents
asked for a class change instead of arranging treatment. His sister
considered him a loner who was quiet, nonconforming, and a misfit since
elementary school days, and in need of counseling for his defensive, negative
outlook as a teen and young adult. His parents also found him avoidant and
non-conforming, both within and outside his family though they considered him
respectful, laving, and kind. Socially he had some friends in eleirentary
school, but tended to keep to himself. The only close friends he remembers
moved away. In junior high he became friendly with a few people, and by age
16 had a lot of acquaintances, but not real friends. His neighborhood and IDS
ward were upper middle class with "snobbish kids and parents who didn't work,
for their money." He was alienated by their behavior, not so much by their
beliefs. A turning point, he says, was the scarring of his face. He felt
rejected and ridiculed by name-calling peers and still feels hate toward them.
He went through his senior year of high school but didn't graduate because of
failure to "apply myself/11 and problems doing math and English. He was in
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special education classes in those two subjects. He received D- grades on
average, except for special ed classes where he received C's or B's, The
teachers were surprised if he came to class, he says.
Though his other siblings are mostly religiously commit ted people, he gave up
church attendance at sixteen. His parents believe he was driven away by a
well-meaning but rigid leader who wouldn't tolerate his non-conforming dress.
At that time, he discloses, he became interested in "black magic, satanism, or
witchcraft" with friends. He attended black masses where small animals were
sacrificed under the direction of an acquaintance who had been born into
satanic religion, he says. He reports reading the satanic bible a few times
and though not really believing what it said, found it more interesting than
his parents Mormon religion. Though not serious about it, he did attend
satanic rituals regularly on Saturdays for five years. He never conducted the
service or performed the animal sacrifice, but did drink the animals1 blood.
He says he was once invited to a service where a human was to be sacrificed, a
three year old girl. He turned down the invitation, but says it did take
place and he knows where it was done. His participation in satanic worship
ended when the leader joined another coven.
His understanding of satanic principles is that "they do all that Christians
don't want you to do," e.g. blaspheming Christian "sacrament" through animal
sacrifice, etc. He acknowledges feeling sorry for the animals the first few
times but then getting used to it. His own belief is in neither Satan nor
God, he says, explaining that "all worship is the same thing." He does
believe in a spirit afterlife, and that everyone goes to the same place after
death. He uses this idea to minimize the impact of his killings. Asked what
should be done with someone who sacrifices a three-year-old child, he
rationalized that "religions did it for thousands of years." Asked if someone
sacrificed his own three-year-old girl, he replies "I would shoot the son-of a
bitchi" His parents did not know of his satanic worship.
He has held various jobs, but none for long. He had a 30b briefly in a
variety store, worked construction for a time and was a security officer at
the Freeport Center for a year. He felt unfairly fired fran that job when
made to share blame for his co-worker's breaking a time clock. He
acknowledges that, though his parents tried to instill a work ethic in him, he
never liked working. He buirened a lot, lived with other people and sold drugs
for a while. His parents supported him materially with roam and board through
much of his adult life.
He never had a serious girlfriend, saying he was never in a financial position
to do so, but has been sexually active since age 16. He has never really
desired a relationship with a girl other than personalities on T.V,, and
doesn't know if he would want to be married. There has been no homosexual
experience, though he "threatened to kill a guy" who approached him in prison.
He expresses remorse for his crime and expects he will be sentenced to life in
prison. Rather than spend his life in that way, he says, he will ask for the
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death sentence and if given it, won't let his attorney appeal it. He won't
sit on death row for years, he says. However, he is asking for a change of
venue. It was his and his attorneyrs idea to plead insanity* Asked if he
believes he is insane, he replies "No, but how can you determine? I shot two
people with no motive, out of cold blood, with my gun, then Ed's/1 He has
never been on trial before, having plea-bargained to a previous charge and
received a one-to-fifteen year sentence of which he was to serve eighteen
months.
MENTAL STATOS: The defendant is a young adult Caucasian male of asthenic
habitus with medium long, "frizzy" hair. He is wearing an orange jail-issued
jumpsuit. Eye contact is fair, and speech flow and psychomotor behavior are
normal. He is correctly oriented to time, person, place, and situation.
Immediate recall is excellent, e.g. three of three words after five minutes.
Recent memory is good, e.g., he can give the menu of last night's supper and
joke about it. He can give sane detail about the most prominent of recent
news events, the Persian Gulf war* Bemote memory is not as good, e.g. he can
name none of his first six school teachers, though this may reflect his
attitude towards school as much as rosmory* Fund of information is good, e.g.
he can name the last five presidents in order without difficulty, and equally
well, five cities of more than a million in population. Cognition is intact,
e.g. he can spell "world11 backwards with no difficulty, and can correctly
subtract 7fs serially from 100. He does this slowly, counting down in his
head rather than mentally subtracting, and acts somewhat embarrassed about the
process. He is able to do the mathematics of a simple story problem without
difficulty. Responses to judgment questions are good, and to insight
questions fair, e.g. we need senators and congressmen to "keep the U.S.
running." He has no idea why newspapers can be sold for less than 1£ie cost of
printing them. Affect is appropriate to thoughts, and mood he describes as
"average, considering." He acknowledges depressed states when thinking about
his crimes or dreaming about them, so that he tries to avoid such thoughts and
to stay awake to avoid dreaming. He has flashbacks when awake once* in a
while. He rates his mood as "half way" on a 1 to 10 scale, and he appears
mildly depressed. Ho suicidal ideation is admitted. There are no delusions,
hallucinations, disorder of thought form or thought content, ideas of
reference or influence, thought insertion, thought control, blocking,
perservation or other psychotic processes. Abstractive ability is fair, e.g.
he can correctly give the meaning of a simple proverb, but has not heard of
three mildly more complex ones, and can't abstract them. He is able to
abstract the common elements of word pairs. Intelligence is estimated at
average or perhaps mildly below.
DATA FROM EECOEDS: Interviews with victims Bolf and LaNae Tiede generally
corroborate the description of the crime the defendant has presented.
Officers investigative reports also coincide with the information he gives.
However, they describe destructive vandalism of other cabins rather than just
breaking in to steal supplies. Most significantly, a statement by Taylor's
acquaintance at a halfway house, Scott Manley, says Taylor told him of plans
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not to just take the cabin occupants car but to kill them two hours before the
shooting took place.
DIAGNOSTIC IMPRESSION:
Axis I:
No mental illness (DMS-III RV71.09).
History of Adjustment
Disorder with Depressed Mood (309*00) • Mildly depressed mood now.
Axis II: Antisocial Personality Disorder (301.70) with Schizoid Personality
features (301.20).
Axis III: No medical illness,
OPINION: The examinee was able to intend the criminal acts with which he is
charged and was not insane at the time of their coitttdssionf nor does he show
signs of serious mental illness now,
DISCUSSION: The examinee shows characteristic features of antisocial
personality disorder* He has been unable to sustain consistent work behavior
and has abandoned or been released fraei several jobs without realistic plans
for others* He has failed to conform to social norms of lawful behavior by
drug dealingr previous criminal acts and participation in satanic rituals
including passive observation of cruelty to animals. He has behaved in
reckless disregard of his own or others1 safety. He has often acted
impulsively without forethought for consequences. He has shewn conduct
disorder as a teenager, though most of it beginning at age 16, e.g. truancy,
car theft for joy riding, early sexual activity/ drug abuse and satanic
worship. His level of remorse for having killed and otherwise hurt others is
shallow and superficial.
Features of schizoid personality in the examinee's history include lack of
close relationships within or outside his family, lack of dating experience,
few sexual relationships and no marriage, choice of solitary activities, and
constricted erotions.
Mr. Taylor appears to have been a misfit in the family in which he was brought
up. A learning disorder despite normal intelligence is the probable
explanation for his poor school performance and need for special education
classes. Already self-conscious regarding his social acceptance as axi early
adolescent, he evidently lost his confidence further when burdened with a
facial scar. Not comfortable in the social mainstream, it appears that he was
better accepted by others outside the mainstream and took on their behavioral
patterns, e.g. drug and alcohol use, smoking, sexual activity, all in defiance
of his family's value system, and truancy from school, stealing cars, using
them in dangerous ways for joy-riding and four-wheeling. He was apparently
never the leader in such activitiesf but went along with friends "if you can
call them that11 for something to do.
Proneness to sensation seeking was also evident in his interest in satanic
cult activities. He was apparently there more as an observer than a devoted
participant. His history is not one of violent or physically injurious
behavior until recent adult years, the animal sacrifice eliciting only his
passive involvement.
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As an adult he did not seem to make any satisfactory adjustment in a mature
lifestyle, e.g. erratic and independable job history, dependence on parents
well into adulthood, no stable relationship with a female or thought of
marriage or family, no lasting friendships, and failure to complete any career
preparation. Rather than see himself as responsible for this, he demonstrates
a pattern of blaming others and regarding himself as the unfortunate victim of
unfair treatment.
Anger was apparently harbored and magnified* This, coupled with numbness to
guilt and inability to empathize engendered by his teen antisocial and satanic
cult experiences, made his violent behavior perhaps irore understandable•
However, there is nothing here to suggest a seriously deprived childhood,
victimisation by others1 abuse, or inability through nental illness or irental
deficiency to understand the nature and consequences of his criminal behavior.
On the contrary, his criminal acts appear to have been purposeful and at least
well enough thought out to try to avoid the legal consequences. Though he
does admit responsibility for the shooting, he minimizes that responsibility
in the way he describes what took place, e.g. "I didn't msan to shoot them but
I did" and "I don't remember squeezing the trigger but I did." "I don't know
why, I was not feeling anything." Scare display of conscience is evident later
in his grabbing the gun with which his cohort confronted the police and his
not killing the girls because "I didn't want to shoot anyone anymore."
The random property destruction in the cabins around Oakley, and the
destruction of human life itself, is a level of violence sometimes seen with
head injured or otherwise brain damaged people. However, he presents no
history of head injury and no evidence for brain impairment other than sane
degree of learning disability in math and English. Altered consciousness such
as in an epileptic event could be considered in his saying he did not remember
pulling the trigger* Hcwever, he remembers sufficient detail imnediately
before and after the event to discount this possibility, and he gives no
history of prior events suggestive of altered consciousness leading to violent
behavior. Though he claims alcohol makes him go crazy, he denies being under
the influence of drugs or alcohol when the killings took place. He may have
had clinical depression at the tiire of his aggravated burglary charge in
January 1990, as is suggested in his written confession, but nothing suggests
other major mental illness despite his questioning his sanity then. In sum,
his behavior is reflective of a personality disorder, but not of a n^ntal
illness, and his state of mind was not so affected as no meet the requirements
of the insanity test of the Utah Code.
Sincerely,

Louis A. Mcench, M.D.
LAM/bn/jh
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Thomas Brunker, #4804
Erin Riley, #8375
Assistant Attorneys General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, #4666
Utah Attomey General
Heber Wells Bldg.
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801)366-0180
Attorneys for State of Utah

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VON LESTER TAYLOR,
:

ROBINA GILLESPIE LEVINE
AFFIDAVIT

Petitioner,
v.

Judge Bruce Lubeck

STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. 070500645

Respondent.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss.
)

I, Robina Gillespie Levine, being first duly sworn testify as follows:
1. I am presently employed in the Utah Attorney General's Office as a paralegal
in the Criminal Justice Division.

2, At the time that the State prosecuted Mr. Von Lester Taylor for capital murder,
I worked on the defense team. I worked with Mr. Elliot Levine, Mr. Taylor's attorney, as
a paralegal on the case. Summit County compensated me separately for my services on
the case.
3, Mr. Taylor's co-defendant, Stephen Deli, was tried before Mr. Taylor.
4, As part of my duties on Mr. Taylor's defense team, I sat through the Deli trial,
and, among other things, heard Mr. Deli testify.
5, In his testimony, Mr, Deli admitted that he left the half-way house with Mr.
Taylor and was involved in burglarizing the Tiede cabin with Mr, Taylor.
6, However, Mr. Deli testified that Mr. Taylor did all of the shooting and that he
(Deli) shot no one, Mr, Deli testified that Mr. Taylor began shooting out of the blue, and
that Mr. Deli was surprised when Mr. Taylor began shooting. Mr, Deli testified that no
argument, confrontation, or threats that preceded the shootings.
DATED (</J?J(}<2JQl,
Robina Gillespie Levine
Subscribed and sworn before me K t \ n V\ ftryrfl
TTotary Public

My Commission Expires:
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United States Code Annotated Currentness
Constitution of the United States
••••

i

i\r=
Annotated

Amendment VI. Jury Trial for Crimes, and Procedural Rights (Refs & Annos)

Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
Current through PL 111-237 (excluding P.L. 111-203, 111-211, and 111-226) approved 8-16-10
Westlaw. (C) 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
END OF DOCUMENT
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C

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Constitution of Utah

I^E
Article I. Declaration of Rights

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6, § 1, adopted at election Nov. 8, 1994, eff. Jan. 1, 1995.
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 12, UT CONST Art. 1, § 12
Current with amendments included in the Utah State Bulletin, Number
2010-13, dated July 1, 2010.
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United States Code Annotated Currentness
Title 28. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure (Refs & Annos)

K B ! p ar t vi. Particular Proceedings

mSBBm Chapter 154. Special Habeas Corpus Procedures in Capital Cases

-+

§ 2265. Certification and judicial review

(a) Certification.—
(1) In general.-If requested by an appropriate State official, the Attorney General of the United States shall determine(A) whether the State has established a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in State postconviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners
who have been sentenced to death;
(B) the date on which the mechanism described in subparagraph (A) was established; and
(C) whether the State provides standards of competency for the appointment of counsel in proceedings described m subparagraph (A).
(2) Effective date.--The date the mechanism described in paragraph (1)(A) was established shall be the effective
date of the certification under this subsection.
(3) Only express requirements.-There are no requirements for certification or for application of this chapter
other than those expressly stated in this chapter.
(b) Regulations.-The Attorney General shall promulgate regulations to implement the certification procedure under
subsection (a).

©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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(c) Review of certification.-(1) In general.-The determination by the Attorney General regarding whether to certify a State under this section
is subject to review exclusively as provided under chapter 158 of this title.
(2) Venue.~The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction over matters under paragraph (1), subject to review by the Supreme Court under section 2350 of this title.
(3) Standard of review.-The determination by the Attorney General regarding whether to certify a State under
this section shall be subject to de novo review.
CREDIT(S)
(Added Pub.L. 109-177, Title V g 507(c)m. Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 250.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
2006 Acts. House Conference Report No. 109-333, see 2006 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 184.
Statement by President, see 2006 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. S7.
References in Text
Chapter 158 of this title, referred to in subsec. (c)(1), is Orders of Federal Agencies; Review, 28 U S.C.A. § 2341 et
seq.
Prior Provisions
A prior section 2265, added Pub.L. 104-132, Title I, § 107(a), Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1223, relating to application
to State unitary review procedure, was repealed by Pub.L. 109-177, Title V, § 507(c)(1), Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat.
250.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
American Digest System

Criminal Law > - " —

1600>

Habeas Corpus ^-^
690.
Key Number System Topic Nos. U_0, 197.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-102

c

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code

™ — Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)

§

Part 1. General Provisions

§ 78B-9-102. Replacement of prior remedies
(1) This chapter establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal
offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as provided in Subsection
(2). This chapter replaces all prior remedies for review, including extraordinary or common law writs. Proceedings
under this chapter are civil and are governed by the rules of civil procedure. Procedural provisions for filing and
commencement of a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) This chapter does not apply to:
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense;
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; or
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1166, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 2, eff. May 5. 2008.
Current through 2010 General Session
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
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Kra
Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)

Part 1. General Provisions

§ 78B-9-104. Grounds for relief-Retroactivity of rule
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78B-9-106 or 78B-9-107, a person who has been convicted and sentenced for a
criminal offense may file an action in the district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah
Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed under a statute that is in violation of the United
States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally
protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked in violation of the controlling statutory provisions;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel m violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the conviction or sentence, because:
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time
to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence
could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence;
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(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable
trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received; or
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the United States Supreme Court, the
Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals after conviction and sentence became final on direct appeal,
and that:
(i) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's conviction or sentence became final; or
(ii) the rule decriminalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the crime for which the petitioner was
convicted.
(2) The court may not grant relief from a conviction or sentence unless the petitioner establishes that there would be
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding,
viewed with the evidence and facts introduced at trial or during sentencing.
(3) The court may not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner is innocent of the crime for
which convicted except as provided in Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence. Claims under Part 3 or Part 4 of this chapter may not be filed as part
of a petition under this part, but shall be filed separately and in conformity with the provisions of Part 3 or Part 4.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1168. eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, g 3. eff May 5, 2008; Laws 2010, c. 153,? l,eff.
March 25, 2010.
Current through 2010 General Session
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code

Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)

Part 1. General Provisions

§ 78B-9-105. Burden of proof
(1) The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to
entitle the petitioner to relief. The court may not grant relief without determining that the petitioner is entitled to
relief under the provisions of this chapter and in light of the entire record, including the record from the criminal
case under review.
(2) The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 78B-9-106, but once a ground
has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008. c. 3, § 1169, eff. Feb. 7. 2008; Laws 2008. c. 288, § 4, eff. May 5. 2008.
Current through 2010 General Session
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code

• " " • Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)

Part 1. General Provisions

§ 78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief-Exception
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not,
raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107,
(2)(a) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, including during the state's appeal from
an order granting post-conviction relief, unless the court determines that the state should have raised the time bar or
procedural bar at an earlier time.
(b) Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, provided that it gives the parties notice
and an opportunity to be heard.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been
but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
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(4) This section authorizes a merits review only to the extent required to address the exception set forth in Subsection (3).
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008. c. 3. S 1170. eff. Feb. 7. 2008: Laws 2008. c. 288. § 5. eff. Mav 5. 2008: Laws 2010. c. 48. S h eff. Mav
11.2010.
Current through 2010 General Session
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Kta
Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)

Part 1. Genera! Provisions

§ 78B-9-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme
Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based; or
(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104(l)(f) is established.
(3) The limitations period is tolled for any period during which the petitioner was prevented from filing a petition
due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity. The petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is entitled to relief under this
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Subsection (3).
(4) The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the outcome of a petition asserting:
(a) exoneration through DNA testing under Section 78B-9-303: or
(b) factual innocence under Section 78B-9-401.
(5) Sections 77-19-8. 78B-2-104, and 78B-2-111 do not extend the limitations period established in this section.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008. c. 3. § 1171. eff. Feb. 7. 2008: Laws 2008. c. 288. g 6. eff. May 5. 2008: Laws 2008. c. 358. g 1. eff.
May 5. 2008.
Current through 2010 General Session
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT

©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works,

•ft

$8

estlav\4
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-109

Page 1

Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-109

C

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code

• • — Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)

Part 1. General Provisions

§ 78B-9-109. Appointment of pro bono counsel
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to represent the petitioner in the post-conviction court or on postconviction appeal. Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not be appointed to
represent the petitioner under this section.
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the following factors:
(a) whether the petition or the appeal contains factual allegations that will require an evidentiary hearing; and
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for proper
adjudication.
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008. c. 3, § 1173, eff Feb 7, 2008: Laws 2008, c. 288, § 8. eff. May 5, 2008.
Current through 2010 General Session
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-102
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. Particular Proceedings
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Copyright (c) 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved.
78-35a-102 Replacement of prior remedies.
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a
criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as provided in
Subsection (2). Procedural provisions for filing and commencement of a petition are found in Rule 65C. Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(2) This chapter does not apply to:
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense;
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; or
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-102, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 235, § 2.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Effective Dates. —Laws 1996, ch. 235 became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec.
25.
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-102
UT ST §78-35a-102
END OF DOCUMENT
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-104
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. Particular Proceedings
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Copyright (c) 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved.
78-35a-104 Grounds for relief—Retroactivity of rule.
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has been convicted and sentenced for a
criminal offense may file an action in the district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah
Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was revoked in an unlawful manner;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the conviction or sentence, because:
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time
to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence
could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable
trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received.
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule announced by the United States Supreme
Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity.
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U.C.A. 1953§78-35a-105
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. Particular Proceedings
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Copyright (c) 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved.
78-35a-105 Burden of proof.
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to
entitle the petitioner to relief. The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 783 5a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to disprove its existence by a preponderance
of the evidence.
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-105, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 235, § 5.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Effective Dates. —Laws 1996, ch. 235 became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec.
25.
U.C.A. 1953§78-35a-105
UTST§78-35a-105
END OF DOCUMENT
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-106
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. Particular Proceedings
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Copyright (c) 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved.
78-35a-106 Preclusion of relief—Exception.
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not,
raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been
but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-106, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 235, § 6.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Effective Dates. —Laws 1996, ch. 235 became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to Utah Const, Art VI, Sec.
25.
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-106
UTST§78-35a-106
END OF DOCUMENT
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-107
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. Particular Proceedings
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Copyright (c) 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved.
78-35a-107 Statute of limitations for post-conviction relief.
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme
Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed; or
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based.
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the
time limitations.
(4) Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period established in this section.
History: C. 1953, 78-12-31.1, enacted by L. 1995, ch. 82, § 1; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 235, § 7.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Repeals and Reenactments. —Laws 1995, ch. 82, § 1 repeals former § 78-12-31.1, as enacted by Laws 1979, ch.
133, § 1, setting a three-month time limit on the right to petition for a habeas corpus writ, and enacts the present
section, effective May 1, 1995.
Amendment Notes. —The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, renumbered this section, which formerly
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-109
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. Particular Proceedings
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Copyright (c) 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a division ofReed Elsevier Inc. and Reed
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved.
78-35a-109 Appointment of counsel.
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis. Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal
may not be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section.
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the following factors:
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations that will require an evidentiary hearing; and
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for proper
adjudication.
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition.
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-109, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 235, § 9.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Effective Dates. —Laws 1996, ch. 235 became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec.
25.
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-109
UT ST §78-35a-109
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code

Rrs
Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)

f\ia
Part 2. Capital Sentence Cases

§ 78B-9-202. Appointment and payment of counsel in death penalty cases
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and sentence has been affirmed on appeal shall
be advised in open court, on the record, in a hearing scheduled no less than 30 days prior to the signing of the death
warrant, of the provisions of this chapter allowing challenges to the conviction and death sentence and the appointment of counsel for indigent petitioners.
(2)(a) If a petitioner requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall determine whether the petitioner is indigent
and make findings on the record regarding the petitioner's indigency. If the court finds that the petitioner is indigent,
it shall, subject to the provisions of Subsection (5), promptly appoint counsel who is qualified to represent petitioners in post-conviction death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Counsel
who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not be appointed to represent the petitioner under
this section.
(b) A petitioner who wishes to reject the offer of counsel shall be advised on the record by the court of the consequences of the rejection before the court may accept the rejection.
(3) Attorney fees and litigation expenses incurred in providing the representation provided for in this section and
that the court has determined are reasonable shall be paid from state funds by the Division of Finance according to
rules established pursuant to Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(a) In determining whether the requested funds are reasonable, the court should consider:
(i) the extent to which the petitioner requests funds to investigate and develop evidence and legal arguments that
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duplicate the evidence presented and arguments raised in the criminal proceeding; and
(ii) whether the petitioner has established that the requested funds are necessary to develop evidence and legal
arguments that are reasonably likely to support post-conviction relief.
(b) The court may authorize payment of attorney fees at a rate of $125 per hour up to a maximum of $60,000. The
court may exceed the maximum only upon a showing of good cause as established in Subsections (3)(e) and (f).
(c) The court may authorize litigation expenses up to a maximum of $20,000. The court may exceed the maximum
only upon a showing of good cause as established in Subsections (3)(e) and (f).
(d) The court may authorize the petitioner to apply ex parte for the funds permitted in Subsections (3)(b) and (c)
upon a motion to proceed ex parte and if the petitioner establishes the need for confidentiality. The motion to proceed ex parte must be served on counsel representing the state, and the court may not grant the motion without
giving the state an opportunity to respond.
(e) In determining whether good cause exists to exceed the maximum sums established in Subsections (3)(b) and
(c), the court shall consider:
(i) the extent to which the work done to date and the further work identified by the petitioner duplicates work
and investigation performed during the criminal case under review; and
(ii) whether the petitioner has established that the work done to date and the further work identified is reasonably likely to develop evidence or legal arguments that will support post-conviction relief.
(f) The court may permit payment in excess of the maximum amounts established in Subsections (3)(b) and (c)
only on the petitioner's motion, provided that:
(i) if the court has granted a motion to file ex parte applications under Subsection (3)(d), the petitioner shall
serve the motion to exceed the maximum amounts on an assistant attorney general employed in a division other
than the one in which the attorney is employed who represents the state in the post-conviction case; if the court
has not granted a motion to file ex parte applications, then the petitioner must serve the attorney representing
the state in the post-conviction matter with the motion to exceed the maximum funds;
(ii) if the motion proceeds under Subsection (3)(f)(i), the designated assistant attorney general may not disclose
to the attorney representing the state in the post-conviction matter any material the petitioner provides in support of the motion except upon a determination by the court that the material is not protected by or that the petitioner has waived the attorney client privilege or work product doctrine; and
(iii) the court gives the state an opportunity to respond to the request for funds in excess of the maximum
amounts provided in Subsections (3)(b) and (c).
(4) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as creating the right to the effective assistance of post-conviction
counsel, and relief may not be granted on any claim that post-conviction counsel was ineffective.
(5) If within 60 days of the request for counsel the court cannot find counsel willing to accept the appointment, the
court shall notify the petitioner and the state's counsel in writing. In that event, the petitioner may elect to proceed
pro se by serving written notice of that election on the court and state's counsel within 30 days of the court's notice
that no counsel could be found. If within 30 days of its notice to the petitioner the court receives no notice that the
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petitioner elects to proceed pro se, the court shall dismiss any pending post-conviction actions and vacate any execution stays, and the state may initiate proceedings under Section 77-19-9 to issue an execution warrant.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008. c. 3. § 1176. eff. Feb. 7, 2008: Laws 2008, c. 288. § 9. eff. May 5, 2008: Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2240, eff.
May 5. 2008.
Current through 2010 General Session
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-202
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. Particular Proceedings
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES
Copyright (c) 1953-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights
reserved.
78-35a-202 Appointment and payment of counsel in death penalty cases.
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and sentence has been affirmed on appeal
shall be advised in open court, on the record, in a hearing scheduled no less than 30 days prior to the signing of the
death warrant, of the provisions of this chapter allowing challenges to the conviction and death sentence and the
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants.
(2) (a) If a defendant requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall determine whether the defendant is indigent
and make findings on the record regarding the defendant's indigency. If the court finds that the defendant is indigent, it shall promptly appoint counsel who is qualified to represent defendants in death penalty cases as required
by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(b) A defendant who wishes to reject the offer of counsel shall be advised on the record by the court of the consequences of the rejection before the court may accept the rejection.
(c) Costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation expenses incurred in providing the representation provided for in
this section shall be paid from state funds by the Division of Finance according to rules established pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-202, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 76, § 2.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 76 became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec.
25.
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-202
UT ST § 78-35a-202
END OF DOCUMENT
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Part 4. Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence

§ 78B-9-402. Petition for determination of factual innocence—Sufficient allegationsNotification of victim
(1) A person who has been convicted of a felony offense may petition the district court in the county in which the
person was convicted for a hearing to establish that the person is factually innocent of the crime or crimes of which
the person was convicted .
(2)(a) The petition shall contain an assertion of factual innocence under oath by the petitioner, and shall aver, with
supporting affidavits or other credible documents, that:
(i) newly discovered material evidence exists that, if credible, establishes that the petitioner is factually innocent;
(ii) the specific evidence identified by the petitioner in the petition establishes innocence;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known;
(iv) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence;and
(v) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered evidence demonstrates that the petitioner is factually innocent.
(b) The court shall review the petition in accordance with the procedures in Subsection (9)(b), and make a finding
that the petition has satisfied the requirements of Subsection (2)(a). If the court finds the petition does not meet all
the requirements of Subsection (2)(a), it shall dismiss the petition without prejudice and send notice of the dismissal to the petitioner and the attorney general.
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(3)(a) The petition shall also contain an averment that*
(1) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or m time
to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or postconviction motion, and the evidence
could not have been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, or
(n) a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to exercise reasonable diligence m uncovering
the evidence
(b) Upon entry of a finding that the petition is sufficient under Subsection (2)(a\ the court shall then review the
petition to determine if Subsection (3)(a) has been satisfied If the court finds that the requirements of Subsection
(3)(a) have not been satisfied, it may dismiss the petition without prejudice and give notice to the petitioner and
the attorney general of the dismissal, or the court may enter a finding that based upon the strength of the petition,
the requirements of Subsection (3)(a) are waived in the interest of justice.
(4) If the conviction for which the petitioner asserts factual innocence was based upon a plea of guilty, the petition
shall contain the specific nature and content of the evidence that establishes factual innocence The court shall review the evidence and may dismiss the petition at any time in the course of the proceedings, if the court finds that
the evidence of factual innocence relies sole!) upon the recantation of testimony or prior statements made b> a witness against the petitioner, and the recantation appears to the court to be equivocal or self-serving
(5) A person who has already obtained postconviction relief that vacated or reversed the person's conviction or sentence may also file a petition under this part in the same manner and form as described above, if no retrial or appeal
regarding this offense is pending
(6) If some or all of the evidence alleged to be exonerating is biological evidence subject to DNA testing, the petitioner shall seek DNA testing pursuant to Section 78B-9-301
(7) Except as provided in Subsection (9), the petition shall be in compliance with and governed by Rule 65C, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall include the underlying criminal case number
(8) After a petition is filed under this section, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and crime laboratory personnel
shall cooperate m preserving evidence and m determining the sufficiency of the chain of custody of the evidence
which is the subject of the petition
(9)(a) A person who files a petition under this section shall serve notice of the petition and a copy of the petition
upon the office of the prosecutor who obtained the conviction and upon the Utah attorney general
(b) The assigned judge shall conduct an initial review of the petition If it is apparent to the court that the petitioner is either merely rehtigating facts, issues, or evidence presented in previous proceedings or presenting issues
that appear frivolous or speculative on their face, the court shall dismiss the petition, state the basis for the dismissal, and serve notice of dismissal upon the petitioner and the attorney general If, upon completion of the initial
review the court does not dismiss the petition, it shall order the attorney geneial to file a response to the petition
The attorney general shall, withm 30 days after receipt of the court's order, or within any additional period of time
the court allows, answer or otherwise respond to all proceedings initiated under this part
(c) After the time for response by the attorney general under Subsection (9)(b ( has passed, the court shall order a
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hearing if it finds the petition meets the requirements of Subsections (2) and (3) and finds there is a bona fide and
compelling issue of factual innocence regarding the charges of which the petitioner was convicted.No bona fide
and compelling issue of factual innocence exists if the petitioner is merely relitigating facts, issues, or evidence
presented in a previous proceeding or if the petitioner is unable to identify with sufficient specificity the nature
and reliability of the newly discovered evidence that establishes the petitioner's factual innocence.
(d) If the parties stipulate that the evidence establishes that the petitioner is factually innocent, the court may find
the petitioner is factually innocent without holding a hearing.
(10) The court may not grant a petition for a hearing under this part during the period in which criminal proceedings
in the matter are pending before any trial or appellate court, unless stipulated to by the parties.
(11) Any victim of a crime that is the subject of a petition under this part, and who has elected to receive notice under Section 77-38-3, shall be notified by the state's attorney of any hearing regarding the petition.
(12) A petition to determine factual innocence under this part, or Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, shall be
filed separately from any petition for postconviction relief under Part 1, General Provisions. Separate petitions may
be filed simultaneously in the same court.
(13) The procedures governing the filing and adjudication of a petition to determine factual innocence apply to all
petitions currently filed or pending and any new petitions filed on or after the effective date of this amendment.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008, c. 358. § 6, eff. May 5. 2008; Laws 2009, c. 301, g L eff. May 12. 2009; Laws 2010, c. 153. § 3. eff.
March 25.2010.
Current through 2010 General Session
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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mimm Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
wmmm

S

Part 4. Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence

§ 78B-9-403. Requests for appointment of counsel—Appeals—Postconviction petitions
(1) Subsections 78B-9-109(1) and (2), regarding the appointment of pro bono counsel, apply to any request for the
appointment of counsel under this part.
(2) Subsection 78B-9-109(3), regarding effectiveness of counsel, applies to subsequent postconviction petitions and
to appeals under this part.
CREDIT(S)
Current through 2010 General Session
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Title 78B. Judicial Code

Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)

Kra
Part 4. Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence

§ 78B-9-404. Hearing upon petition—Procedures—Court determination of factual innocence
(l)(a) In any hearing conducted under this part, the Utah attorney general shall represent the state.
(b) The burden is upon the petitioner to establish the petitioner's factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.
(2) The court may consider:
(a) evidence that was suppressed or would be suppressed at a criminal trial; and
(b) hearsay evidence, and may consider that the evidence is hearsay m evaluating its weight and credibility.
(3) In making its determination the court shall consider, in addition to the evidence presented at the hearing under
this part, the record of the original criminal case and at any postconviction proceedings in the case.
(4) If the court, after considering all the evidence, determines by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner:
(a) is factually innocent of one or more offenses of which the petitioner was convicted, the court shall order that
those convictions:
(i) be vacated with prejudice; and
(ii) be expunged from the petitioner's record; or
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(b) did not commit one or more offenses of which the petitioner was convicted, but the court does not find by
clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner did not commit any lesser included offenses relating to those offenses, the court shall modify the original conviction and sentence of the petitioner as appropriate for the lesser
included offense, whether or not the lesser included offense was originally submitted to the trier of fact.
(5)(a) If the court, after considering all the evidence, does not determine by clear and convincing evidence that the
petitioner is factually innocent of the offense or offenses the petitioner is challenging and does not find that Subsection (4)(b) applies, the court shall deny the petition regarding the offense or offenses.
(b) If the court finds that the petition was brought in bad faith, it shall enter the finding on the record, and the petitioner may not file a second or successive petition under this section without first applying to and obtaining permission from the court which denied the prior petition.
(6) At least 30 days prior to a hearing on a petition to determine factual innocence, the petitioner and the respondent
shall exchange information regarding the e\idence each intends to present at the hearing. This information shall include:
(a) a list of witnesses to be called at the hearing; and
(b) a summary of the testimony or other evidence to be introduced through each witness, including any expert
witnesses.
(7) Each party is entitled to a copy of any expert report to be introduced or relied upon by that expert or another expert at least 30 days prior to hearing.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008, c. 358. § 8. eff. May 5. 2008; Laws 2010. c. 153, ? 4, eff March 25, 2010.
Current through 2010 General Session
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Chapter 3. Punishments (Refs & Annos)

Part 2. Sentencing

§ 76-3-207. Capital felony—Sentencing proceeding
(l)(a) When a defendant has pled guilty to or been found guilty of a capital felony, there shall be further proceedings
before the court or jury on the issue of sentence.
(b) In the case of a plea of guilty to a capital felony, the sentencing proceedings shall be conducted before a jury
or, upon request of the defendant and with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, by the
court which accepted the plea.
(c)(i) When a defendant has been found guilty of a capital felony, the proceedings shall be conducted before the
court or jury which found the defendant guilty, provided the defendant may waive hearing before the jury with the
approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, in which event the hearing shall be before the court.
(ji) If circumstances make it impossible or impractical to reconvene the same jury for the sentencing proceedings, the court may dismiss that jury and convene a new jury for the proceedings.
(d) If a retrial of the sentencing proceedings is necessary as a consequence of a remand from an appellate court,
the sentencing authority shall be determined as provided in Subsection (6).
(2)(a) In capital sentencing proceedings, evidence may be presented on:
(i) the nature and circumstances of the crime;
(ii) the defendant's character, background, history, and mental and physical condition;
(iii) the victim and the impact of the crime on the victim's family and community without comparison to other
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persons or victims; and
(iv) any other facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty that the court considers relevant to the sentence.
(b) Any evidence the court considers to have probative force may be received regardless of its admissibility under
the exclusionary rules of evidence. The state's attorney and the defendant shall be permitted to present argument
for or against the sentence of death.
(3) Aggravating circumstances include those outlined in Section 76-5-202.
(4) Mitigating circumstances include:
(a) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(b) the homicide was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance;
(c) the defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person;
(d) at the time of the homicide, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirement of law was impaired as a result of a mental condition, intoxication, or influence of drugs, except that "mental condition" under this Subsection (4)(d) does not mean an abnormality manifested primarily by repeated criminal conduct;
(e) the youth of the defendant at the time of the crime;
(f) the defendant was an accomplice in the homicide committed by another person and the defendant's participation was relatively minor; and
(g) any other fact in mitigation of the penalty.
(5)(a) The court or jury, as the case may be, shall retire to consider the penalty. Except as provided in Subsection 763-207.5(2), in all proceedings before a jury, under this section, it shall be instructed as to the punishment to be imposed upon a unanimous decision for death and that the penalty of either an indeterminate prison term of not less
than 25 years and which may be for life or life in prison without parole, shall be imposed if a unanimous decision for
death is not found.
(b) The death penalty shall only be imposed if, after considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the jury is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total mitigation, and
is further persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate in the circumstances. If the jury reports unanimous agreement to impose the sentence of death, the court shall
discharge the jury and shall impose the sentence of death.
(c) If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous decision imposing the sentence of death, the jury shall then determine whether the penalty of life in prison without parole shall be imposed, except as provided in Subsection 76-3207.5(2). The penalty of life in prison without parole shall only be imposed if the jury determines that the sentence of life in prison without parole is appropriate. If the jury reports agreement by 10 jurors or more to impose
the sentence of life in prison without parole, the court shall discharge the jury and shall impose the sentence of life
in prison without parole. If 10 jurors or more do not agree upon a sentence of life in prison without parole, the
court shall discharge the jury and impose an indeterminate prison term of not less than 25 years and which may be
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for life.
(d) If the defendant waives hearing before the jury as to sentencing, with the approval of the court and the consent
of the prosecution, the court shall determine the appropriate penalty according to the standards of Subsections
(5)(b)and(c).
(e) If the defendant is sentenced to more than one term of life in prison with or without the possibility of parole, or
in addition to a sentence of life in prison with or without the possibility of parole the defendant is sentenced for
other offenses which result in terms of imprisonment, the judge shall determine whether the terms of imprisonment shall be imposed as concurrent or consecutive sentences in accordance with Section 76-3-401.
(6) Upon any appeal by the defendant where the sentence is of death, the appellate court, if it finds prejudicial error
in the sentencing proceeding only, may set aside the sentence of death and remand the case to the trial court for new
sentencing proceedings to the extent necessary to correct the error or errors. An error in the sentencing proceedings
may not result in the reversal of the conviction of a capital felony. In cases of remand for new sentencing proceedings, all exhibits and a transcript of all testimony and other evidence properly admitted in the prior trial and sentencing proceedings are admissible in the new sentencing proceedings, and if the sentencing proceeding was before a:
(a) jury, a new jury shall be impaneled for the new sentencing proceeding unless the defendant waives the hearing
before the jury with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, in which case the proceeding
shall be held according to Subsection (6)(b) or (c), as applicable;
(b) judge, the original trial judge shall conduct the new sentencing proceeding; or
(c) judge, and the original trial judge is unable or unavailable to conduct a new sentencing proceeding, then another judge shall be designated to conduct the new sentencing proceeding, and the new proceeding will be before
a jury unless the defendant waives the hearing before the jury with the approval of the court and the consent of the
prosecution.
(7) If the penalty of death is held to be unconstitutional by the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme
Court, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death for a capital felony shall cause the
person to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence the person to life in prison without parole.
(8)(a) If the appellate court's final decision regarding any appeal of a sentence of death precludes the imposition of
the death penalty due to mental retardation or subaverage general intellectual functioning under Section 77-15a-101,
the court having jurisdiction over a defendant previously sentenced to death for a capital felony shall cause the defendant to be brought before the sentencing court, and the court shall sentence the defendant to life in prison without
parole.
(b) If the appellate court precludes the imposition of the death penalty under Subsection (8)(a), but the appellate
court finds that sentencing the defendant to life in prison without parole is likely to result in a manifest injustice, it
may remand the case to the sentencing court for further sentencing proceedings to determine if the defendant
should serve a sentence of life in prison without parole or an indeterminate prison term of not less than 25 years
and which may be for life.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-207; Laws 1982, c. 19, § 1; Laws 1991. c. 10. g 6: Laws 1992. c. 142. g 3: Laws 1995. c.
352. $ 5. eff. May 1. 1995: Laws 1997. c. 286. § 1. eff May 5. 1997: Laws 1998. c. 137. § 1. eff. May 4. 1998: Laws
2001. c. 209. § 5. eff. April 30. 2001: Laws 2002. c. 24. § 1. eff. May 6. 2002: Laws 2002. c. 26. g 1. eff. May 6.
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code

! • • • Chapter 1. Juries and Witnesses

Part 1. Jury and Witness Act

§ 78B-1-103. Jurors selected from random cross section -Opportunity and obligation to
serve
(1) It is the policy of this state that:
(a) persons selected for jury service be selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of the
county:
(b) all qualified citizens have the opportunity in accordance with this chapter to be considered for service; and
(c) all qualified citizens are obligated to serve when summoned, unless excused.
(2) A qualified citizen may not be excluded from jury service on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
age, occupation, disability, or economic status.
CREDIT(S)
Current through 2010 General Session
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Chapter 38. Rights of Crime Victims Act

§ 77-38-9. Representative of victim—Court designation-Representation in cases involving
minors—Photographs in homicide cases
(l)(a) A victim of a crime may designate, with the approval of the court, a representative who may exercise the same
rights that the victim is entitled to exercise under this chapter.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the victim may revoke the designation at any time.
(c) In cases where the designation is in question, the court may require that the designation of the representative
be made in writing by the victim.
(2) In cases in which the victim is deceased or incapacitated, upon request from the victim's spouse, parent, child, or
close friend, the court shall designate a representative or representatives of the victim to exercise the rights of a victim under this chapter on behalf of the victim. The responsible prosecuting agency may request a designation to the
court.
(3)(a) If the victim is a minor, the court in its discretion may allow the minor to exercise the rights of a victim under
this chapter or may allow the victim's parent or other immediate family member to act as a representative of the victim.
(b) The court may also, in its discretion, designate a person who is not a member of the immediate family to represent the interests of the minor.
(4) The representative of a victim of a crime shall not be:
(a) the accused or a person who appears to be accountable or otherwise criminally responsible for or criminally
involved in the crime or conduct, a related crime or conduct, or a crime or act arising from the same conduct,
criminal episode, or plan as the crime or conduct is defined under the laws of this state;
(b) a person in the custody of or under detention of federal, state, or local authorities; or
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(c) a person whom the court in its discretion considers to be otherwise inappropriate.
(5) Any notices that are to be provided to a victim pursuant to this chapter shall be sent to the victim or the victim's
lawful representative.
(6) On behalf of the victim, the prosecutor may assert any right to which the victim is entitled under this chapter,
unless the victim requests otherwise or exercises his own rights.
(7) In any homicide prosecution, the prosecution may introduce a photograph of the victim taken before the homicide to establish that the victim was a human being, the identity of the victim, and for other relevant purposes.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1994 c. 198, § 10; Laws 1995. c. 352, § 15. eff. May 1, 1995.
Current through 2010 General Session
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Kta
Part VIII. Provisional and Final Remedies and Special Proceedings

RULE 65C. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
(a) Scope. This rule governs proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act, Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9. The Act sets forth the manner and extent to which a person may
challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and sentence after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in
a direct appeal under Article h Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, or the time to file such an appeal has expired.
(b) Procedural defenses and merits review. Except as provided in paragraph (h), if the court comments on the
merits of a post-conviction claim, it shall first clearly and expressly determine whether that claim is independently
precluded under Section 78B-9-106.
(c) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by the court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong
county. The court may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.
(d) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of
the conviction or sentence. The petition shall state:
(d)(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;
(d)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in
which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
(d)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief;
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(d)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the
results of the appeal;
(d)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other
civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the
results of the prior proceeding; and
(d)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the reasons why the evidence
could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous postconviction petition.
(e) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the petition:
(e)(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations;
(e)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case;
(e)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and
(e)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(f) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in the
petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(g) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the
normal course,
(h) (1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is apparent to the court
that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face,
the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that
the claim is frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner Proceedings on the claim shall
terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(h) (2) A claim is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that:
(h)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(h)(2)(B) the claim has no arguable basis in fact; or
(h)(2)(C) the claim challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the filing of the petition.
(h)(3) If a claim is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to comply with the re-
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quirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days The court
may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown
(h)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death
(i) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition should not be
summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk
to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General In
all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner
(j) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and shall
serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b) Within 30 days (plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the
court
(k) Hearings. After pleadings are closed the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition At the prehearing conference, the court may
(k)(l) consider the formation and simplification of issues,
(k)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents, and
(k)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at the evidentiary hearing
(I) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel The prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video
conferencing The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present m court during the proceeding The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where
the petitioner is confined
(m) Discover); records. Discover) under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed b> the court upon motion of a party
and a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence
that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent
to obtain any relevant transcript or court records
(n) Orders; stay.
(n)(l) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law
and an appropriate order If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5
days Withm the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action Thereafter the stay of the
order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure
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(n)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, the stay shall expire and
the court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner.
(n)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the trial court may enter any
supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be necessary and proper.
(o) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems
appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that
prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Utah Code Title 78 A,
Chapter 2, Part 3 governs the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the amount, if any, to
charge for fees and costs.
(p) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts.
CREDIT(S)
[Adopted effective July I, 1996; amended effective November 1, 2008; January 4, 2010.]
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2010.
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

RULE 29. DISABILITY AND DISQUALIFICATION OF A JUDGE OR CHANGE OF
VENUE
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom a trial has begun is unable to continue
with the trial, any other judge of that court or any judge assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council,
upon certifying that the judge is familiar with the record of the trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified, proceed
with and finish the trial, but if the assigned judge is satisfied that neither he nor another substitute judge can proceed
with the trial, the judge may, in his discretion, grant a new trial.
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom a defendant has been tried is unable to
perform the duties required of the court after a verdict of guilty, any other judge of that court or any judge assigned
by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council may perform those duties.
(c)(1)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to disqualify a judge. The motion shall be
accompanied by a certificate that the motion is filed in good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating facts
sufficient to show bias or prejudice, or conflict of interest.
(c)(1)(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but not later than 20 days after the last of the
following:
(c)(l)(B)(i) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge;
(c)(l)(B)(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or
(c)(l)(B)(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
learned of the grounds upon which the motion is based.
If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a hearing, the motion shall be filed as soon as practicable.
(c)(1)(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a certificate under Rule IK Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
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subjects the party or attorney to the procedures and sanctions of Rule 11. No party may file more than one motion to
disqualify in an action.
(c)(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, without further hearing, enter an order
granting the motion or certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge. The judge shall take no further action in the case until the motion is decided. If the judge grants the motion, the order shall direct the presiding judge
of the court or, if the court has no presiding judge, the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to assign another
judge to the action or hearing. Assignment injustice court cases shall be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-5138. The presiding judge of the court, any judge of the district, any judge of a court of like jurisdiction, or the
presiding officer of the Judicial Council may serve as the reviewing judge.
(c)(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are timely filed, filed in good faith and legally
sufficient, the reviewing judge shall assign another judge to the action or hearing or request the presiding judge or
the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to do so. Assignment injustice court cases shall be in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. S 78-5-138.
(c)(3)(B) In determining issues of fact or of law, the reviewing judge may consider any part of the record of the action and may request of the judge who is the subject of the motion and affidavit an affidavit responsive to questions
posed by the reviewing judge.
(c)(3)(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a timely manner.
(d)(1) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in
the jurisdiction where the action is pending, either may, by motion, supported by an affidavit setting forth facts, ask
to have the trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction.
(d)(2) If the court is satisfied that the representations made in the affidavit are true and justify transfer of the case,
the court shall enter an order for the removal of the case to the court of another jurisdiction free from the objection
and all records pertaining to the case shall be transferred forthwith to the court in the other county. If the court is not
satisfied that the representations so made justify transfer of the case, the court shall either enter an order denying the
transfer or order a formal hearing in court to resolve the matter and receive further evidence with respect to the alleged prejudice.
(e) When a change of judge or place of trial is ordered all documents of record concerning the case shall be transferred without delay to the judge who shall hear the case.
CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective July 22, 1999; November 1, 2002; November 1, 2006.]
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2010.
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
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Article VI. Witnesses

RULE 606. COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before that jury in the trial of the case in which
the juror is sitting. If the juror is called so to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object
out of the presence of the jury.
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a
juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent
from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a
juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from
testifying be received for these purposes.
CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.]
Current with amendments effective April 1,2010.
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
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Article XI. Miscellaneous Rules

RULE 1101. APPLICABILITY OF RULES
(a) Courts and magistrates. These rules apply to all actions and proceedings in the courts of this state except as
otherwise provided in Subdivisions (b) and (c).
(b) Rules inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do not apply in the following situations:
(1) Preliminary questions of fact which are to be determined under Rule 104(a);
(2) Grand jury proceedings;
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings for extradition, sentencing or granting or revocation of probation, issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses and search warrants and proceedings with respect to release on bail or otherwise;
(4) Contempt proceedings in which the court may act summarily.
(c) In a criminal preliminary examination, reliable hearsay shall be admissible as provided under Rule 1102.
CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective January 1, 1995; April 1, 1999.]
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2010.
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